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Abstract of Thesis. 
 
 
This thesis discusses two important anti-socialist organisations which have 
received little attention from historians: the British Empire Union (BEU) and the National 
Citizens’ Union (NCU). It assesses the ideology, activity and impact of these bodies 
between 1917 and 1927. Difficulties arise in this task due to the absence in the archives 
of substantial amounts of manuscript evidence such as minute books and correspondence. 
The history of these organisations has, therefore, been reconstructed primarily from 
contemporary published sources. This material allows us to develop a picture of these 
organisations which reveals a close affinity with mainstream Conservatism both in terms 
of ideology and personnel. This contradicts to an extent the impression given in the 
relatively thin treatment of these organisations in the historiography, which tends to focus 
on their alleged extremism. The thesis shows that the BEU and the NCU embodied 
opinions which encompassed a range of political positions, ranging from support for the 
Liberal-led post-war Coalition as a means of uniting all those ‘Constitutionalist’ forces 
opposed to socialism, to calls for the setting up of an ‘English Fascisti’ to emulate 
Mussolini’s example in Italy and physically destroy the socialist movement in Britain.  
The thesis examines the role of the BEU in combating the alleged menace of 
‘British Bolshevism’. It assesses the importance of the NCU in the events leading to the 
collapse of the Coalition government in October 1922; and its role in strikebreaking. It 
looks at how both organisations had a part in the development of Conservative strategies 
for defeating the electoral challenge of the Labour Party. It assesses the relationship 
between the British anti-socialist right and fascism as it was understood in the 1920s. 
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 The thesis concludes that the two organisations under discussion were relatively 
influential inside the Conservative Party, particularly among backbench MPs and party 
activists; they were important catalysts in the development of anti-socialist alliances in 
municipal elections, which arguably influenced Conservative strategies in parliamentary 
contests; and they were able to divert potentially ‘fascist’ energies and obsessions into the 
respectable, mainstream political discourse of British Conservatism. Ironically the 
Conservative Party's openness to anti-socialism contributed significantly to the 
marginalisation of the BEU and the NCU, as did the weakness of the revolutionary 
socialist threat in Britain, particularly after the failure of the General Strike in May 1926.  
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 5 
Introduction. 
 
 This thesis is concerned with right-wing anti-socialist organisations in Britain 
between 1917 and 1927. It focuses on two important bodies which have received little 
attention from historians: the British Empire Union (BEU) and the National Citizens’ 
Union (NCU). Although both of these organisations claimed to be ‘non-political’ in 
character, they in fact had quite intimate connections in terms of personnel and outlook 
with the Conservative Party. Ironically the Conservative Party's openness to anti-
socialism contributed to the marginalisation of the BEU and NCU, particularly after the 
failure of the General Strike in 1926. Alongside the substantial practical difficulties in 
reconstructing the activities of anti-socialist organisations of the period, this subsequent 
marginalisation has led historians to make a superficial assessment of their impact. This 
has tended to focus on their allegedly extremist and fascist tendencies and to 
underestimate their close affinity with mainstream Conservatism.  
The two organisations with which we are centrally concerned were launched a 
few years apart. Initially, each body had different primary objectives, signified by their 
original titles. The British Empire Union originated as the Anti-German Union (AGU) in 
April 1915. Founded by a Scottish baronet, Sir George Makgill, its declared mission was 
‘to root out the German Canker which has eaten its way deep into our national life’. It 
received support from a number of Conservative peers and MPs, as well as right-wing 
publicists like Leopold Maxse, editor of the National Review.1 A year after its foundation 
the AGU was renamed as the British Empire Union. Makgill pointed out that while the 
organisation’s ‘objects and policy remain[ed] the same’, the new title better-emphasised 
                                                 
1
 The Times, 18 June 1915; 21 February 1916. 
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the ‘constructive side’ of the Union’s work, which was ‘to foster imperial ideals’.2 
Despite this, Germanophobia persisted as the organisation’s dominant theme until 1918. 
Following the Bolshevik Revolution of Autumn 1917, however, the BEU focus shifted to 
the perceived threat posed by socialism and trade union militancy. In the 1920s the BEU 
became the leading anti-communist body on the British right. 
While the BEU’s initial focus was on winning the war and defending the empire, 
the launch of the NCU was predicated primarily on concern over domestic issues. The 
organisation began life as the Middle Classes Union (MCU), founded in March 1919 by a 
number of Conservative MPs and businessmen, including William Kennedy Jones, MP 
for Hornsey, a former editor of the Globe newspaper, and Major John Pretyman 
Newman, MP for Finchley. Its president was Sir George Askwith, former government 
Chief Industrial Commissioner, who became Baron Askwith later that year. The 
organisation was formed to ‘withstand the rapacity of the manual worker and the 
profiteer’; and was committed to the militant defence of middle-class interests.3 A major 
plank of its platform was opposition to working-class unrest and socialism; and it became 
known for recruiting volunteer labour to ‘maintain essential services’ during strikes. In 
January 1922 the organisation was renamed the National Citizens’ Union;4 and a year 
later the defeat of communism was declared to be its primary objective.5 The BEU and 
the NCU were the most prominent of a number of British anti-Bolshevist propaganda 
societies which proliferated in the aftermath of the Great War. Despite their initial 
                                                 
2
 New Age, 4 May 1916, p. 22; Manchester Guardian, 22 March 1916; BEU, ‘Aims and Objects’, typed 
sheet (n.d. [1917]), Cumbria Record Office (Whitehaven), DWM 7/86. 
3
 The Times, 4 March 1919.  
4
 The Times, 19 December 1921. 
5
 The Times, 14 December 1922. 
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specialisms both bodies came to share a commitment to combating socialism by the early 
1920s; a commitment which became their defining credo as the decade progressed.   
In contrast to some smaller or more ephemeral right-wing bodies of the time, like 
the Britons, the National Party, and the various ‘fascist’ sects of the 1920s, very little has 
been written by historians about the BEU and the NCU. The three standard works on the 
British right covering this period contain only fleeting references to them.6 The wartime 
activities of the BEU have been described in more detail by Panikos Panayi.7 Its 
trajectory after 1918, however, has elicited only brief mentions in broader studies, most 
notably those of Robert Benewick, Kenneth Brown, and Stephen White;8 and a short 
research paper by Roy Bean exposing the undercover work of the organisation in the 
North West of England.9 In the case of the NCU even less secondary material exists. 
Benewick and White give the NCU some attention;10 while its forerunner, the MCU, is 
referred to in a number of more general studies of inter-war Britain, though again not in 
any detail.11 Sam Davies’ and Bob Morley’s ongoing collection dealing with county 
                                                 
6
 G. C. Webber, The Ideology of the British Right 1918-1939, Croom Helm, London (1986), pp. 17, 145, 
156-7; B. Farr, The Development and Impact of Right-Wing Politics in Britain, 1903-1932, Garland, New 
York (1987), pp. 59, 63; A. Sykes, The Radical Right in Britain: Social Imperialism to the BNP, Palgrave, 
London (2005), p. 52. 
7
 P. Panayi, ‘The British Empire Union in the First World War’, in T. Kushner and K. Lunn (eds.), The 
Politics of Marginality, Frank Cass, London (1990), pp. 113-128. 
8
 R. Benewick, The Fascist Movement in Britain, Allan Lane, London (1972), pp. 39-40; K. D. Brown, 
‘The Anti-Socialist Union, 1908-49’, in idem. (ed.), Essays in Anti-Labour History, Macmillan, London 
(1974), pp. 255-6; S. White, ‘Ideological Hegemony and Political Control: The Sociology of Anti-
Bolshevism in Britain 1918-20’, Scottish Labour History Society Journal, No. 9 (May 1975), pp. 10-11. 
9
 R. Bean, ‘Liverpool Shipping Employers and the Anti-Bolshevik Activities of J. M. Hughes’, Bulletin of 
the Society for the Study of Labour History, No. 34 (Spring 1977), pp. 22-6. 
10
 Benewick, pp. 40-1; White, pp. 12-14.  
11
 M. Cowling, The Impact of Labour 1920-1924: The Beginning of Modern British Politics, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge (1971), pp. 64-5, 74-5; B. Waites, ‘The Language and Imagery of Class in 
Early Twentieth-Century England’, Literature and History, No. 4 (Autumn 1976), p. 36; idem, A Class 
Society at War: England 1914-18, Berg, Leamington Spa (1987), pp. 26, 53-4; T. Jeffery and K. 
McClelland, ‘A World Fit to Live in: The Daily Mail and the Middle Classes 1918-39’, in J. Curran, A. 
Smith and P. Wingate (eds.), Impacts and Influences: Essays on Media Power in the Twentieth Century, 
Routledge, London (1987), p. 44. 
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borough elections, and Steven Woodbridge’s short article on the NCU in Richmond, are 
the only other modern published sources of note. Both deal with the organisation’s 
significant contribution to municipal politics.12 Finally, both organisations are referred to 
in Mike Hughes’ study of the Economic League and in the work of John Hope, which 
deals with the relationship between anti-socialist organisations and the British secret 
state.13 
The relatively thin treatment of these organisations in some of this secondary 
material has, on occasion, led to a number of basic misunderstandings about their past. 
Some of these are relatively trivial matters, such as the common misnaming of the 
Middle Classes Union as the Middle Class Union. More seriously, the longevity and 
influence of these organisations is often misconstrued. David Baker, for instance, 
describes the BEU and the NCU as ‘short-lived’, when in fact they existed for relatively 
long periods compared to other contemporary right-wing bodies.14 The MCU/NCU began 
life in 1919. It disintegrated during the early stages of World War II, amid allegations of 
pro-Nazism, though it was still referred to in the press as late as August 1942.15 An 
                                                 
12
 S. Davies and B. Morley, County Borough Elections in England and Wales, 1919-1938: A Comparative 
Analysis, 3 Vols., Ashgate, Aldershot (1999; 2000; 2006), passim; S. Woodbridge, ‘The National Citizens’ 
Union in Richmond: A Brief History’, Richmond History, No. 27 (May 2006), pp. 85-7. 
13
 J. Hope, ‘Fascism, the Security Service and the Curious Careers of Maxwell Knight and James McGuirk 
Hughes’, Lobster, No. 22 (November 1991), pp. 1-5; idem, ‘British fascism and the state 1917-1927: a re-
examination of the documentary evidence’, Labour History Review, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Winter 1992); pp. 72-
83; idem, ‘Fascism and the State: The Case of the British Fascists’, Australian Journal of Politics and 
History, Vol. 39, No. 3 (1993), pp. 367-80; idem, ‘Surveillance or Collusion? Maxwell Knight, MI5 and 
the British Fascisti’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 9, No. 4 (October 1994), pp. 651-75; M. 
Hughes, Spies at Work, 1 in 12, Bradford (1995). 
14
 D. Baker, ‘The Extreme Right in the 1920s: Fascism in a Cold Climate, or “Conservatism with Knobs 
on”?’, in M. Cronin (ed.), The Failure of British Fascism: The Far Right and the Fight for Political 
Recognition, Macmillan, London (1996), p. 17.  
15
 R. M .Douglas, Feminist Freikorps: The British Women Police, 1914-1940, Praeger, London (1999), pp. 
126-7; C. Holmes, Anti-Semitism in British Society 1876-1939, Edward Arnold, London (1979), pp. 201-2; 
The Times, 17 August 1942. 
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attempt to revive the organisation under its original title was made after the war;16 and its 
final demise only came in the mid-1950s.17 The BEU existed from 1915 until at least 
1975, initially as the AGU, and after 1960 as the British Commonwealth Union (BCU).18 
This later change of name has sown confusion, due to the existence of an earlier BCU, 
led by Sir Patrick Hannon, which eventually evolved into the Empire Industries 
Association. Webber, for instance, suggests that the earlier BCU and the BEU were the 
same organisation, when in fact they were entirely separate bodies, though with very 
similar ideological underpinnings.19 Such mistakes have been repeated and compounded 
in subsequent studies.20 Obviously, historians researching a particular organisation cannot 
be expected to know the minutiae of every other body existing contemporaneously. 
Similarly, historians writing on general themes might be forgiven for misnaming the 
Middle Classes Union as the Middle Class Union, particularly as the same mistake was 
often made by contemporaries. However, more serious problems may arise when 
analyses take for granted the interpretations of other authors without seeking verification 
from reliable contemporary source materials. 
Unfortunately, in the case of both the BEU and the NCU the amount of such 
reliable material is severely limited, due to the apparent unavailability of items like 
minute books, correspondence and other papers generated by the organisations. This 
presents a major obstacle to anybody wishing to research these bodies in any depth; and 
is a possible reason why no major study has been undertaken on this theme. The present 
                                                 
16
 Manchester Guardian 21 December 1949. 
17
 London Gazette, 24 September 1954, 21 January 1955. 
18
 Panayi, p. 113.  
19
 Webber, p. 145; J. A. Turner, ‘The British Commonwealth Union and the general election of 1918’, 
English Historical Review, Vol. 93, No. 368 (July 1978). 
20
 Baker, p. 18; P. Barberis, J. McHugh, and M. Tyldesley, Encyclopaedia of British and Irish Political 
Organisations: Parties, Groups and Movements of the Twentieth Century, Pinter, London (2003), pp. 242, 
1124.  
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author has made numerous enquiries into the whereabouts of such material. 
Unfortunately, in common with the experience of a number of other historians of British 
anti-socialist organisations, this search has been unsuccessful. As we shall see, however, 
this has not meant that a substantial study cannot be undertaken. 
There is no doubt that in the case of the BEU/BCU an archive was accessible to 
researchers at its London office until the mid-1970s. Chris Cook’s 1975 publication, 
Sources in British Political History 1900-1951, contains a description of its contents. 21 
When Panayi was researching the early history of the BEU in the 1980s, however, his 
requests to view unpublished material were met with obstructionism, suggesting that 
sometime after 1975 the collection was removed from the public domain.22 Current 
databases such as the National Register of Archives and the Database of Archives of 
Non-Governmental Organisations have no information on this material beyond Cook’s 
description. Correspondence with major repositories including the British Library, the 
Bodleian Library, the National Archives, the Modern Records Centre, the Royal 
Commonwealth Society, and various university libraries has neither unearthed this 
material nor shed significant light on its fate.  
In the case of the MCU/NCU the trail is colder still. James Peters and David 
Jarvis were unable to locate archival material relating to this body during their research in 
the 1980s and early 90s.23 John Hope, who has searched exhaustively for the papers of 
both organisations, speculates that the records of the NCU may have been destroyed 
during the 1940s after the organisation was discredited by its association with British pro-
                                                 
21
 C. Cook, Sources in British Political History 1900-1951, Vol. 1: A Guide to the Archives of Selected 
Organisations and Societies, Macmillan, London (1975), p. 25. 
22
 Email correspondence with P. Panayi, 23 May 2006.  
23
 Email correspondence with J. Peters, 5 March 2008; and D. Jarvis, 7-10 March 2008. 
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Nazi elements.24 Another possibility is that this material – and possibly the BEU archive 
too – was taken into the possession of the Economic League (EL). The activities of 
various anti-socialist bodies, including the BEU, the NCU, and the Anti-Socialist and 
Anti-Communist Union (ASU), were co-ordinated in the 1920s and 30s by this 
organisation. Brown states that the ‘financial and literary assets’ of the ASU were lodged 
with the EL after it disbanded in 1949.25 Unfortunately, the archives of the notoriously 
secretive EL have also long been unavailable to researchers. Arthur McIvor was refused 
access when he researched the organisation in the 1980s, amid claims that many of its 
older records had been destroyed during World War II.26 Attempts by other authors, 
including Ewen Green, John Mason, and James Peters to locate ASU material have 
proved similarly fruitless.27 The consensus of opinion among the historians and archivists 
consulted by the present author is that much of the manuscript record of inter-war British 
anti-socialism has been destroyed, misplaced, or deliberately withheld from scrutiny; 
with most suspecting the former. 
The methodology of this research has undoubtedly been affected by this lack of 
unpublished archival material. Of necessity, it has been forced to rely upon the 
publications of the BEU and NCU, and those of their supporters. It has also drawn on the 
publications of their opponents, as well as other relevant contemporary press and 
periodical literature. Fortunately, much of the anti-socialist material consulted – in 
particular the BEU’s Annual Report, and the BEU and NCU periodicals: the British 
Empire Union Monthly Record (subsequently the Empire Record), and the New Voice 
                                                 
24
 Telephone conversation with J. Hope, 10 March 2008. 
25
 Brown, p. 257. 
26
 A. McIvor, ‘“A Crusade for Capitalism”: The Economic League, 1919-39’, Journal of Contemporary 
History, Vol. 23, No. 4 (October 1988), pp. 654-5, n. 59; conversation with A. McIvor, 6 May 2006. 
27
 Email correspondence with J. Peters, 5 March 2008. 
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(subsequently the National Citizen) – provides a fascinating and relatively comprehensive 
description, from their own standpoint, of the trajectory and significance of these 
organisations. These sources have been under-utilised by historians. Arguably, an 
analysis of their content is crucial to understanding British anti-socialism in the 1920s. 
 This thesis understands the forces of the political right at the heart of this study 
primarily as part of an anti-labour movement, which attempted to keep working-class 
aspirations within the constraints of bourgeois political hegemony, based upon capitalist 
economic relations. In Britain class struggles not only conditioned the evolution of the 
modern labour movement, but also coloured the development of those forces opposed to 
labour. As Larry Witherell has pointed out: 
 
the political maturation of the labour movement did not occur in a vacuum. There 
were equally aggressive forces at work as a direct result of that maturation…it 
must be recognised that the right was equally responsible for the development of 
class politics.28 
 
In the context of twentieth-century British history, left-leaning historians 
generally have focused on the Labour Party, the Communist Party and the trade unions. 
Quantitatively, the amount of literature from this perspective dealing with the British 
right is relatively low. What does exist tends to focus on the fascist extreme; and 
occasionally exhibits a tendency towards a conspiratorial explanation of events which can 
be unhelpful. The much larger phenomenon of right-wing anti-socialism has received less 
                                                 
28
 L. L. Witherell, ‘Anti-labourism and the British radical right, 1900-1940’ (book review), Bulletin of the 
Society for the Study of Labour History, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Winter 1988), p. 59. 
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attention. The only major exception is the literature examining the role of business 
associations in ‘moderating’ the aspirations of labour;29 and the historiography of the 
Conservative Party itself, which although traditionally dominated by studies implicitly 
sympathetic to their subject,30 also contains an important body of work which focuses on 
the anti-labour aspect of Conservative politics.31  
Whilst recognising these exceptions, Witherell’s contention that anti-labourism 
has been a neglected theme remains convincing: 
 
Anti-labourism provides a thread of continuity detectable within the evolution of 
the radical right’s ideology and activism and, yet, it begs for cultivation. 
Notwithstanding such an inviting theme, there remains a dearth of scholarship 
upon the link between anti-labourism and the British radical right and their 
influence upon political behaviour…[in]…inter-war Britain.32 
  
What follows is an attempt to contribute to that still-necessary process of cultivation.  
 
                                                 
29
 Brown (ed.), Essays in Anti-Labour History, Macmillan, London (1974); A. McIvor, ‘Political 
Blacklisting and Anti-socialist Activity Between the Wars’, Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour 
History, Vol. 53, No. 1, Spring 1988; idem, ‘“A Crusade for Capitalism”…’. 
30
 Implicit sympathy for the Conservatives does not preclude analysis which focuses on the party’s anti-
labourism, however, as Cowling’s The Impact of Labour clearly shows. 
31
 E. H. H. Green, The Crisis of Conservatism: The Politics, Economics and Ideology of the British 
Conservative Party, 1880-1914, Routledge, London (1995); idem, Ideologies of Conservatism: 
Conservative Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2002); D. Jarvis, 
Stanley Baldwin and the ideology of the Conservative response to socialism, PhD thesis, University of 
Lancaster (1991); idem, ‘British Conservatism and Class Politics in the 1920s’, English Historical Review 
(February 1996); idem, ‘The shaping of Conservative electoral hegemony, 1918-39’, in J. Lawrence and M. 
Taylor (eds.), Party, State and Society: Electoral Behaviour in Britain since 1820, Scolar Press, Aldershot 
(1997); R. McKibbin, ‘Class and Conventional Wisdom: The Conservative Party and the “Public” in Inter-
war Britain’, in R. McKibbin, The Ideologies of Class: Social Relations in Britain 1880-1950, Clarendon, 
Oxford (1990). 
32
 Witherell, p. 56. 
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Chapter 1. 
 The British Empire Union: Bolshevism on the Brain. 
 
In 1917 the words ‘Bolshevist’ and ‘Bolshevism’ were new additions to the 
lexicon of British politics. From early 1918 onwards, however, the notion of Bolshevism 
became ingrained into the psyche of every Briton with a modicum of political awareness. 
In the decade which followed, anti-socialist agitation in Britain ‘reached a zenith of 
activity’, and opposition to ‘British Bolshevism’ became a priority for many right-wing 
organisations.33 Between 1918 and 1920 a remarkable number of anti-Bolshevist 
propaganda societies were active, some evolving from pre-existing patriotic and anti-
socialist organisations, and others created specifically to counter the perceived new 
menace. Many of these bodies were ephemeral, small, and marginal. The British Empire 
Union was larger and more significant and forms the subject of this chapter. By 1921 it 
had eclipsed most of the other anti-Bolshevist societies. The most important exceptions 
were the Middle Classes Union/National Citizens’ Union, which will be dealt with in 
Chapter 2, and the National Propaganda Committee, a secret anti-subversive body, which 
had evolved out of the anti-socialist employers’ organisation, the British Commonwealth 
Union in 1919, and later took on a slightly more public guise as the Economic League 
(EL).34 National Propaganda/EL played an important co-ordinating role on the anti-
socialist right and has rightly received attention from a number of historians. It will, 
therefore, not feature heavily in this discussion. The BEU, the NCU, and other bodies 
                                                 
33
 Farr, The Development and Impact…, p. 33. 
34
 J. Hope, ‘Surveillance or Collusion? Maxwell Knight, MI5 and the British Fascisti’, Intelligence and 
National Security, Vol. 9, No. 4 (October 1994), p. 660; NA CAB 27/84. 
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including the Anti-Socialist Union (ASU), co-operated under its umbrella to some extent, 
though each retained a significant level of autonomy.  
During the period of acute industrial unrest in 1918-20 it appeared to some that 
the nightmare scenario of a British revolution was indeed manifesting itself.35 Webber 
has pointed to the disconcerting manner in which the Bolshevik Revolution gave 
contemporaries ‘a terrifying vision of the fate that could befall the United Kingdom if 
discontented workers at home or rebellious nationalists in the colonies were somehow to 
gain the upper hand’.36 Scholars have tended to downplay the severity and significance of 
this post-war crisis in British history.37 Some have pointed out the weakness of the 
revolutionary challenge in these years, suggesting that the contemporary British Marxist 
left was ‘no more a threat to the established order than were the Jehovah’s Witnesses to 
the established church or the Mormons to the institution of marriage’.38 While such a 
view is understandable, given the relatively minor impact of the far left in Britain 
throughout the twentieth century, it understates the level of concern among contemporary 
anti-socialists, who perceived the threat from the revolutionary left as very real and very 
worrying. The right-wing author and activist, Nesta Webster, for instance, stated that in 
1919 ‘England was faced by as great a danger as in 1914, and a danger of a more 
insidious kind’, for at the very moment of her great victory ‘a wave of revolution broke 
all over England…a new era of strife began; the very air was charged with violence’.39 
That such fears were not confined to the vivid imagination of the ‘grand dame of British 
                                                 
35
 White, ‘Ideological Hegemony and Political Control…’, p. 3; J. St Loe Strachey, ‘The Mechanism of 
Revolution’, Nineteenth Century and After, Vol. 88, No. 524 (October 1920), p. 582. 
36
 Webber, p. 16. 
37
 D. Mitchell, ‘Ghost of a Chance: British Revolutionaries in 1919’, History Today, Vol. 20, No. 11 
(November 1970), pp. 753-761. 
38
 M. Kitchen, Europe Between the Wars: A Political History, Longman, London (1988), p. 187. 
39
 N. H. Webster, The Surrender of an Empire, third edition, Boswell, London (1931), p. 85. 
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conspiracy theory’ is evident in the remarkable number of organisations active between 
1918 and 1921 whose stated objective was to counter the threat from ‘British 
Bolshevism’.  
Some of these bodies predated the Great War, the oldest being the Primrose 
League, which had existed since the 1880s. Throughout its existence it had expressed 
antipathy towards socialism and it was only natural that it would set its face against 
Bolshevism after 1917.40 Other long-established anti-socialist organisations which 
donned the anti-Bolshevist mantle were the British Constitutional Association and the 
Liberty and Property Defence League.41 The most outspoken of these older bodies was 
the Anti-Socialist Union, originally formed in 1908.42 During the later stages of the war 
the ASU remodelled itself as the Reconstruction Society.43 Despite the change of name 
the organisation continued to employ the kind of negative anti-socialist scaremongering 
which Brown describes as the mainstay of its pre-war propaganda.44 A speciality of the 
Reconstruction Society was the promulgation of vicarious and often inaccurate accounts 
of the horrors of life in revolutionary Russia.45 In late 1918, to commemorate the first 
anniversary of the revolution, it reprinted approvingly a Daily Express article which 
described Bolshevism as a ‘ruthless…red war against property and the institutions of the 
State. It is the deliberate attempt to reach the millennium, by way of destruction, rapine, 
                                                 
40
 The Times, 2 February 1920; M. Hendley, ‘Anti-Alienism and the Primrose League: The Externalization 
of the Postwar Crisis in Great Britain 1918-32’, Albion, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Summer 2001), pp.255-7. 
41
 Independent Labour Party (Information Committee), Who Pays for the Attacks on Labour? An exposure 
of the Blackleg Organisations and Propaganda Agencies of Big Capital, London (n. d. [1920]), p. 9; White, 
p. 8 
42
 Brown, pp. 234-61; F. Coetzee, For Party and Country: Nationalism and the Dilemmas of Popular 
Conservatism in Edwardian England, Oxford University Press, Oxford (1990), pp. 155-9. 
43
 Scotsman, 29 April 1918. 
44
 Brown, pp. 247, 252.  
45
 ILP, Who Pays…, p. 4; Brown, pp. 252-3; White, p. 8. 
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and assassination’.46 Another Reconstruction Society leaflet concluded ‘if you want…to 
see the cost of living rise to forty times its pre-war cost, and the shops empty of food, and 
the children crying for bread that you cannot get them…and scores of people murdered 
daily in the streets, then, by all means become a Bolshevik’.47 In 1919 the organisation 
turned its attention to the Bolsheviks’ alleged imposition of ‘Free Love’ on the Russian 
people, declaring that under Bolshevism ‘the position of a woman seems to be little 
different from that occupied by a breeding animal on a stud farm’, while the ‘children 
who are the issue of these unions are to become the property of the State’.48 A later leaflet 
reiterated this, suggesting that the Bolshevik ‘Nationalisation of Girls’ had resulted in 
child abduction, rape, suicide and murder.49 This particular piece of disinformation was 
relatively easily discredited, and much was made of this by the left.50 Even Scotland 
Yard’s uncompromisingly anti-Bolshevist Director of Intelligence, Basil Thomson, was 
forced to admit that ‘some harm’ had been done to the anti-Bolshevist cause by the 
widespread circulation of the statement.51  
In addition to these older bodies a number of important patriotic organisations 
formed during the war became concerned about Bolshevism. These included the National 
Party,52 the British Commonwealth Union (BCU),53 and the ‘patriotic Labour’ 
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organisation, the British Workers’ League (BWL), subsequently the National Democratic 
Party (NDP).54 1919-20 also witnessed the creation of a large number of new, specifically 
anti-Bolshevist, groupings. Such bodies generally had a brief spurt of life in the panicky 
two and a half years or so after the Bolshevik Revolution, before fading into obscurity or 
being absorbed by bigger or more effective organisations like the BEU and National 
Propaganda. White’s brief but invaluable study is the standard work on such bodies,55 
which included, among others, the National Security Union,56 the Liberty League,57 the 
National Unity Movement and the People’s Union for Democracy,58 the Anti-Bolshevik 
League of Great Britain,59 the Christian Counter-Bolshevist Crusade,60 and the Welsh 
Democratic League.61 
The British Empire Union had originated in 1915 (as the Anti-German Union) and 
worked closely with the other bodies formed during the war, attempting to disrupt pacifist 
and socialist meetings, often violently.62 The BEU’s antipathy to socialism grew more 
vociferous in the summer of 1917 when revolutionary events in Russia threatened to 
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remove Britain’s eastern ally from the conflict.63 The Bolshevik Revolution turned that 
threat into reality, prompting the BEU to perceive a German ‘hidden hand’ behind 
Russian events, a direct attempt to undermine the Allied war effort.64 The Bolsheviks 
were seen by their British opponents as either financially motivated German agents, or 
‘honest fanatics’, unwittingly duped by the German High Command.65 Panayi records the 
views of Captain Parsons, a BEU organiser, who, when comparing the anti-war 
Independent Labour Party with the Russian Communists, stated that ‘he believed that the 
Germans controlled both groups’.66 Panayi presents opposition to Bolshevism as only a 
developing theme in BEU propaganda at this time. Overshadowed by its Germanophobia 
and desire for a crushing victory in the war, BEU hostility to socialism only became a 
primary consideration in the 1920s.67  
Anti-socialism had, however, long been intertwined with hostility to Germany in 
the ideology of the BEU.68 This stemmed largely from the fact that the organisation was 
influenced by conspiracy theories linking socialism and pan-Germanism in an anti-
Christian plot for world domination, financed by Jewish capitalists. The Bolshevik 
Revolution was subsequently held up as proof of this theory.69 Following Germany’s 
military defeat BEU propaganda increasingly targeted Bolshevism as the spearhead of 
this alleged world conspiracy. In 1921 a circular letter to prominent supporters of the 
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BEU claimed that the Union had been ‘fighting the spread of Bolshevism in this country 
for the past five years’.70 
On 4 February 1919 the BEU placed an advertisement in the press appealing for 
funds to enable it to extend its campaign against Bolshevism, warning that ‘immediate 
action is vital for the safety of our country’.71 From April 1919 onwards the Monthly 
Record carried regular articles attacking the new regime in Russia under such headings as 
‘The Hell of Bolshevism’, ‘Boches and Bolsheviks’, ‘The Bolshevik Lie’, ‘Russia Under 
the Germans’, ‘The Bloody Hand of Bolshevism’, and ‘The Reign of Terror at Riga’. In 
July the magazine carried a cartoon depicting the Bolshevik ‘Cobra of Confiscation’.72 A 
number of these articles were reproduced as leaflets and pamphlets.73  
The BEU organised numerous meetings in London on the issue of Bolshevism in 
1919. On 18 May Sir Frederick Milner addressed a BEU gathering at the Criterion 
Theatre on the subject of ‘Industrial Strife and Bolshevism’. He described Bolshevism as 
‘the negation of liberty, justice and humanity’. Those who supported it were ‘utterly 
contemptible and utterly unworthy to be citizens of great liberty-loving England’. He 
believed that British socialists were being ‘supplied with large funds to carry on 
Bolshevist propaganda’, and called for a ‘very careful investigation’ into their source. He 
went on to state that ‘If it were true that certain capitalists in this country were supplying 
money the sooner they were hunted out and hounded out the better’, reflecting a 
conspiratorial frame of mind which regarded Jewish capitalists and socialist agitators as 
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two sides of the same coin. At the same meeting Colonel Alan Burgoyne, Unionist MP 
for Kensington North, described Bolshevism as ‘a disease of the mentality’.74 A week 
later, under the chairmanship of Lord Denbigh, a further BEU meeting was held at the 
same venue. It was addressed by Frank Souter, Deputy Chairman of the BEU Board of 
Management, and Clem Edwards, NDP MP for East Ham South, who spoke on 
‘Bolshevism as an international danger’.75 At the end of 1919 a series of BEU lectures on 
‘Revolution or Industrial Peace?’ was held at the Wigmore Hall. These included the 
Fabian socialist and translator of Tolstoy’s works, Aylmer Maude, speaking on 
‘Bolshevism’ on 19 November.76  
As 1919 progressed BEU concerns began to shift to the threat posed by ‘British 
Bolshevism’. Articles in the Monthly Record pointed to linkages between the Bolsheviks, 
Sinn Fein and the Irish Transport and General Workers’ Union; and claimed that 
Bolshevik agitators were stirring up trouble in South Wales and other industrial centres.77 
In order to counter this perceived threat the BEU determined to spread its anti-Bolshevist 
message beyond the capital and launched a series of propaganda campaigns in industrial 
areas, the most successful of which was a three-month caravan tour of Yorkshire.78 
In early 1920 the BEU launched an appeal for £250,000 for its campaign against 
Bolshevism and industrial unrest. It emphasised that it was committed to concentrating its 
propaganda effort among the ‘vast body of British workers [who] are not 
revolutionary’.79 This strategy involved the BEU promotion of ‘patriotic Labour’ figures 
                                                 
74
 Scotsman, 19 May 1919. 
75
 The Times, 15 May 1919. 
76
 Daily Express, 17 November 1919; The Times, 7, 19 November 1919; Monthly Record, December 1919, 
p. 8. 
77
 Monthly Record, June 1919, pp. 88-90; August 1919, p. 112; September 1919, p. 124.  
78
 Monthly Record, September 1919, p. iii (inside back cover), November 1919, p. 155. 
79
 Monthly Record, February 1919, p. 33; The Times, 31 January 1920. 
 22 
like Clem Edwards; and an emphasis on exposing the allegedly revolutionary and 
extremist character of the official Labour leadership in BEU publications.80 Meetings 
were held in industrial areas and in major towns and cities. In January 1920 the 
Edinburgh branch of the BEU launched its own campaign with a meeting entitled 
‘Bolshevism Exposed’. It was chaired by T. B. Morison, the Coalition Liberal MP for 
Inverness and Solicitor-General for Scotland, and was addressed by Edouard Luboff, 
editor of The Russian and a ‘pioneer of…anti-German Bolshevism [sic] in Russia’.81 On 
28 January the branch held a further meeting on the subject of ‘Insidious Bolshevism’ at 
Drumsheugh Hall, during which the branch Organising Secretary, Miss Barbara Wylie, 
stated that Bolshevism was being spread ‘by means of money and false doctrines’ to 
achieve  for Germany ‘that victory which they were not able to obtain by the force of 
arms’.82 
Public meetings and debates in London continued to form an important part of the 
BEU campaign in 1920. Some were addressed by high-ranking Conservative politicians, 
along with aristocratic Russian émigrés and British eyewitnesses of the ‘Bolshevik 
tyranny’. On 30 January the Westminster branch hosted a lecture at the Caxton Hall by 
Reverend R. Courtier-Forster, entitled ‘The Truth About Russia’, at which the former 
British Chaplain at Odessa spent an hour pouring scorn on the ‘monstrous “new 
civilisation” which the Bolsheviks had given to Russia’, and highlighting the ‘many 
instances of Bolshevist atrocities which he had personally seen’. There were numerous 
interventions from members of the audience during the course of the meeting, including 
‘outbursts’ from W. T. Goode, of the Manchester Guardian, and from Colonel C. 
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Malone, the communist-supporting MP for Leyton East, who took offence at comments 
from both the main speaker and the chairman – BEU Secretary, Reginald Wilson – which 
appeared to cast doubt on Malone’s veracity as a witness to events in Russia, whilst 
endorsing fulsomely those of opponents of the regime.83 James Adderley, an audience 
member who also queried the chairman’s apparent bias, later complained at being 
‘howled down…as a lover of murder, free love, and atheism…[and]…set upon by some 
20 ladies in the name of free speech, law, order, and Christianity’.84  
On 20 February the BEU organised a public meeting at the Queen’s Hall at which 
personal reminiscences of life in Bolshevist Russia were related by Lydia Yavorska 
(Princess Bariatinsky), Miss May Healy, Rev. Courtier-Forster, Paul Dukes, John 
Pollock, Aylmer Maude and others. A. W. Gough, Prebendary of St. Paul’s Cathedral, 
opened the meeting, repeating the BEU mantra that while ‘real Labour’ was ‘sound, 
human and sincere’, the ‘voice that claimed to speak for Labour…was a voice that was 
working up a spirit alien to this country. All the cant about nationalisation was intended 
to prepare the way for Bolshevism’. To interruptions from a section of the audience, 
Bariatinsky stated that the Bolshevists ‘were aiming at the destruction of all cultured life’. 
Miss Healy recommended, to loud cheers, that ‘those who had any illusions about the 
state of things in Russia should go out and live there’. A series of lantern slides 
illustrating alleged Bolshevist atrocities was shown by E. Luboff. The divided nature of 
the audience was again indicated when slides depicting Lenin and Trotsky were received 
with a mixture of hisses and applause.85 On 22 March Viscount Curzon, the Foreign 
Secretary, presided at a further BEU meeting in London at which Bariatinsky described 
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Bolshevik commissars as ‘either murderers and thieves…or German agents’. She went on 
to warn the British government not to make peace with a regime which was working in 
the interests of ‘German militarism and German revenge’.86 In April she was a speaker at 
a reception and meeting held at the London residence of Lady St Helier, during the 
course of which Reginald Wilson reassured his upper-class audience that the BEU was 
now ‘out to combat Bolshevism’ and proposed the setting up of ‘colleges for working 
men’ to counter Bolshevist propaganda.87  
During the summer of 1920 the annual meeting of the BEU at the Cannon-Street 
Hotel was addressed by H. V. Keeling, a British journalist and trade unionist, who had 
been imprisoned by the Bolsheviks. He derided the qualified support given to the new 
regime in Russia by a British Labour Delegation, which had visited whilst he was still a 
prisoner, describing the ‘elaborate stage management of the visit’ by the Bolshevik hosts, 
and the entirely misleading impression figures like George Lansbury had imparted to the 
British public.88 In September the City of London branch of the BEU held a meeting at 
Leyton Town Hall, at which the Rev. H. D. Longbottom gave an address on the 
‘Bolshevik Conspiracy’. In November the branch organised a meeting at the Æolian Hall, 
at which Nesta Webster ‘exposed the insincerity of the Revolutionary Movement in a 
masterly analysis of “The History of the World Revolution”’.89  
Throughout 1920 the Monthly Record continued with its themes of the previous 
year: criticism of Bolshevik Russia, alongside attacks on striking workers and their 
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‘Bolshevik’ leaders. One article accused Lansbury of ‘whitewashing Bolshevism’; while 
another applauded Sir Winston Churchill for his attacks on Lenin.90 Others spoke of ‘the 
Horrors of Bolshevik Russia’, ‘The Red Terror of Bolshevism’, and ‘The Red Peril’.91 In 
June 1920 the BEU placed full page advertisements in the press publicising its 
‘Campaign against Bolshevism and Industrial Unrest’. It repeated the appeal for 
£250,000, which, it was pointed out, was urgently needed to fund the campaign; and it 
warned of the dire consequences for the British Empire if such a figure was not 
forthcoming: 
 
At the present time Britain is tired…. The microbe of Bolshevism…has a tired 
victim to attack and has already made dangerous headway…. The heart of Britain 
is sound, yet it may one day cease to beat if this dreadful disease is allowed to 
spread…. Just as a minute microbe can destroy a powerful man, so Bolshevism 
will inevitably destroy the British nation unless the wholesome medicine of truth 
is administered in time and in the right way. 
 
For the BEU the stakes could not be higher. Success for Bolshevism meant irreversible 
collapse for the British Empire:  
 
Destroyed nations can never live again. If once the British Empire were to fall, it 
would fall for ever. Rome, Egypt, Babylon and Persia all were once the governing 
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centres of great empires. Where are they today? Lack of patriotism killed them 
all.92 
 
The BEU pointed out that even if insurrection was a relatively remote possibility in 
Britain, Bolshevism still presented a serious threat: 
 
The danger from this evil is very great and a serious menace to civilisation. Even 
if we do not have a revolution as in Russia, the poisonous doctrines now being 
preached will, unless counteracted, kill all thrift and industry.93 
 
The collapse of official British intervention against the Bolsheviks in the Russian 
Civil War in early 1920 was followed that summer by the Communist Unity Convention 
which founded the Communist Party of Great Britain.94 Amongst pro-interventionist 
forces, animated protests against abandoning Russia to ‘the policy of the anti-Christ’ and 
‘the “bloody baboonery” of Lenin and Trotsky’ subsided to a degree, and concern 
focused on the potential threat of communism within Britain and its empire.95 This 
became a perennial theme of British right-wing politics throughout the inter-war years 
and beyond. The ‘Red menace’ abroad provided an external enemy useful for 
maintaining notions of national solidarity; while fear of domestic communism generated 
mistrust of anything which smacked of radicalism and militancy; and was employed to 
discredit the wider labour movement. By 1921 the BEU’s ‘primary purpose’ was to 
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counter Communist propaganda.96 It became the leading anti-communist organisation in 
Britain by the mid-1920s; eclipsing the Anti-Socialist Union, even after that organisation 
re-invented itself as the Anti-Socialist and Anti-Communist Union in September 1925.97 
One of the BEU’s most prominent campaigns was waged against the dangers 
associated with Communist Sunday Schools (and the similar Proletarian Sunday School 
movement, founded by the Glasgow socialist, Tom Anderson).98 The first mention of the 
Proletarian Schools in the Monthly Record appeared in April 1920; followed by a further 
article on the schools a month later.99 Articles focused on the allegedly seditious and 
blasphemous nature of the teaching in the schools, a theme hammered home to parents 
and the wider public in a number of BEU leaflets from 1921 onwards, most bearing the 
emotive call to ‘Save the Children’.100 On 8 July 1921 the BEU sent a deputation to the 
Bishop of London to discuss the matter; and also sought the support of churchmen from 
other denominations. Throughout the year the Empire Record devoted considerable space 
to attacking the schools.101 In September BEU members heckled Communist speakers 
‘effectively’ over the issue at a meeting in Bermondsey Town Hall, after which a ‘very 
successful’ meeting of women opposed to the schools was held at a local vicarage.102 The 
BEU Grand Council meeting of 24 October made opposition to the ‘atheistic and 
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revolutionary doctrines’ taught in the schools one of the organisation’s official 
policies.103  
A full-length exposé of the schools’ practices and the menace they posed was 
drafted by the BEU Secretary, Reginald Wilson, and published under the title Danger 
Ahead in February 1922.104 It became one of the organisation’s best selling publications, 
going into five editions (19,500 copies) that year alone; a sixth expanded edition in 
January 1924; and a largely rewritten seventh edition in 1925.105 Throughout the 1920s 
the BEU held meetings across the country on the subject, many addressed by the General 
Secretary;106 and the issue was regularly revisited in the pages of the Empire Record.107 
In 1924 the BEU organised a May Day Festival, at the Hyde Park Hotel, ‘in aid of its 
special campaign against…Proletarian schools’. In June 1925 it organised a ball, hosted 
by the Countess of Malmesbury, in support of the same cause.108  
The BEU was closely involved in supporting attempts to pass legislation aimed at 
curtailing the activities of the schools. Sir John Butcher, the long-serving Conservative 
MP for York, and a future President of the BEU, was among a group of right-wing MPs 
and peers who pressed the Home Office to prosecute those involved in teaching and 
disseminating blasphemous and subversive ideas through Sunday schools.109 In February 
1922 Butcher attempted unsuccessfully to introduce a Seditious Teachings Bill to outlaw 
the schools. In response the BEU supported Butcher with a petition campaign, in which it 
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claimed that a staggering 7,012,143 signatures were collected.110 On the basis of this 
groundswell of support, Butcher re-introduced his Bill in March 1923. On this occasion it 
received a second reading and was in the Lords when Parliament was disbanded to 
facilitate the snap general election which subsequently resulted in the first Labour 
government.111 In July 1924 Butcher, by now Lord Danesfort, introduced a similar Bill in 
the upper chamber. He railed against those who suggested that his Bill would only 
advertise communism, regarding this as ‘the excuse of a timid mind in order to justify 
culpable inaction’. Against this ‘policy of the ostrich’ he wished to enact a measure in 
favour of child protection, stating that ‘Surely the State has a…sacred duty to protect the 
souls and minds of children from moral and spiritual ruin.112 With a Labour government 
in office, however, it was shelved. It re-appeared each year subsequently, but even with 
the Conservatives firmly in office after 1924 it received little parliamentary time and 
never made the statute book.113 The real importance of this parliamentary campaign to the 
anti-socialist right was the widespread publicity it afforded its anti-subversive message. 
The BEU stressed that as a result of Butcher’s efforts ‘[p]ublic attention was directed to 
the existence of this evil in an unmistakeable fashion’.114 
  Much was made of the immoral nature of the teaching in the schools. At a 
meeting at Notting Hill in April 1923 Reginald Wilson claimed the schools were 
poisoning children’s minds with ‘absolutely disgusting and filthy ideas’.115 In the Spring 
                                                 
110
 BEU, Annual Report, 1924, pp. 38. 
111
 H. Kean, ‘Teachers and the State 1900-30’, British Journal of Sociology of Education, Vol. 10, No. 2 
(June 1989), p. 153, n. 12. 
112
 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates (House of Lords), Vol. 58, 3 July 1924; Empire Record, August 1924, 
pp. 136-7. 
113
 The Times, 24 November 1925, 12 March 1927, 2 July, 14 October 1927, 13 December 1930. 
114
 BEU, Annual Report (1924), p.11. 
115
 Empire Record, May 1923, p. 84. 
 30 
of 1924 he wrote that the ‘watchword of the movement is Banish Gods from the Skies 
and Capitalists from the Earth’; and claimed to have uncovered evidence that: 
 
free love…is taught in some of the ‘underground’ revolutionary schools…there is 
no doubt at all that in Proletcult, the monthly organ of this movement, articles 
have appeared under the title of ‘Sex Knowledge’ that could not be printed in any 
decent newspaper. Yet this magazine is specifically stated to be ‘for boys and 
girls’.116 
 
The BEU divulged the matter to the authorities. Consequently, Anderson and two others 
were ‘detained and charged before a magistrate with publishing and selling obscene 
literature’.117  
In August 1924 the Empire Record carried an appeal for funds to enable the 
training of ‘a number of very poor and neglected children in the principles of religion and 
patriotism’. The BEU believed there was ‘grave danger of their being recognised as 
excellent material for the moulding of young revolutionaries of an extreme type’, and 
wished to ‘save these children’ by gathering them into a room on Sunday afternoons, 
where they would be ‘taught and helped to become good citizens of our country’. The 
BEU felt certain funds would be forthcoming ‘from those who are anxious to give some 
practical help in a direct counter effort to the work of revolutionaries among children’.118 
Subsequent issues of the Empire Record do not refer to this initiative, however, and it 
must be assumed that it remained a dead letter. This failing should not be taken to 
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indicate that the BEU did not seriously interest itself in constructive methods for winning 
children away from communism. They were responsible for numerous benevolent and 
educational initiatives, aimed primarily at instilling patriotism and loyalty in working-
class children. In June 1921 two leading female BEU members, Miss Almaz Stout and 
Mrs Gee, were praised by the Empire Record for their work among the poor children of 
Bermondsey. The ‘great object’ of such efforts was ‘to bring them up as patriots ready to 
serve their king and country. To teach them what the British Empire means, and to 
counteract the pernicious teachings of the Proletarian Sunday Schools’.119 Other activities 
organised by BEU branches included essay competitions for children on subjects such as 
‘The Ideals and Duties of Citizenship’;120 screenings of patriotic films, such as ‘Our 
Mighty Empire’ and ‘The Battle of Zeebrugge’; and performances of plays such as ‘The 
Masque of Empire’;121 organising visits by children to the British Empire Exhibition;122 
and hosting an annual ‘Christmas Party to Poor British Children’.123 Branches of the BEU 
emphasised ‘the importance of teaching patriotism, civics and Elementary Political 
Economy in primary schools’.124 Most importantly, from 1926 the BEU became closely 
associated with the distribution of free commemorative medals to children on Empire 
Day, an activity explicitly devised to ‘save’ children from communism. 
The idea of a special day to celebrate the achievements of the British Empire 
appears to have originated in Canada in the 1890s. Its most persistent British advocate 
was Reginald Brabazon, 12th Earl of Meath, who set up the Empire Day movement in 
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1904.125 After the Great War the event was widely utilised by the BEU to spread their 
anti-socialist message among children. MacKenzie has noted that the BEU ‘sought to 
secure a wider acceptance of Empire Day, organised Empire Day gatherings, and 
distributed thousands of medals and flags to schools’.126 For the BEU, however, Empire 
Day was not merely an excuse to unfurl bunting and eat cakes. As Jim English points out, 
‘in the context of perceived threats to the Empire at home and abroad…the political right 
seized upon Empire Day as an opportunity to attack what were seen as seditious 
groups’.127 The BEU, in particular, saw a natural congruence between the aims of Empire 
Day and its own ultra-nationalist, anti-socialist agenda.  
 The BEU’s novel contribution to Empire Day – the distribution of Empire Day 
medals to children in schools and hospitals – first occurred in 1926 using 30,000 medals 
manufactured at the Royal Mint.128 This practice was intended as an explicitly anti-
communist measure. A February 1926 letter to the press over the names of the presidents 
of the BEU, NCU and the National Union of Manufacturers highlights the motivation 
behind the scheme:  
 
A determined alien-inspired attempt is being made to capture the next generation 
for atheism and revolution. The instilling of a love and appreciation of the Empire 
is the only antidote; the younger generation must be taught to revere their 
wonderful heritage.… We therefore suggest the distribution to each child on 
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Empire Day of a medal symbolic of the British Empire…. A child who wears this 
medal will have no use for the Communist red flag and badge….We invite orders 
for medals, offers of co-operation in their distribution, and especially donations 
which will enable medals to be issued to children in poorer districts. Unless 
medals are supplied free for distribution in these areas the children in places 
where Socialism and Communism are most prevalent will not receive them.129 
 
The BEU encouraged as many people as possible to become involved in Empire Day 
celebrations and went into great detail in its publications about how to make the event 
successful, with suggestions for ‘Empire Tableaux’ and other stunts.130 In many localities 
the BEU orchestrated Empire Day celebrations, donating ‘flags, maps and essay prizes to 
schools’ to ensure a suitable level of interest.131  
From 1920 the Empire Record became a vociferous mouthpiece for the BEU’s 
attacks on the newly formed Communist Party of Great Britain. The journal carried 
excerpts from the Marxist press in a regular column called ‘The Revolutionary 
Campaign’, subsequently renamed ‘The Revolutionary Press’; and it called upon the 
support of ‘every Patriot for a Campaign among the workers, when by means of outdoor 
meetings, posters, leaflets, newspaper articles, advertisements, the cinema, etc., this 
danger can be met’.132 The BEU was routinely engaged in this kind of anti-communist 
work, as well as more confrontational activities, which included meetings designed to 
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coincide in time and place with Communist Party gatherings; and the heckling and asking 
of awkward questions of Communist speakers.133 Such activity was claimed to have been 
successful in stifling Communist progress in a number of industrial centres, including 
Coventry, Mansfield, the Staffordshire Potteries, and at Sheffield, where ‘BEU working 
men’ held public debates with Communist speakers.134 At Birmingham the BEU held 
regular meetings in the Bull Ring to counter the city’s Communists, while the local BEU 
organiser, Captain Owen-Lewis often addressed local Unionist Clubs regarding the ‘Red’ 
threat.135 Liverpool was another industrial city where the BEU determined to face the 
communist threat head on. In April 1923 alone, the organisation claimed to have held 38 
meetings in the city, attended by some 16,000 people. Many were held in Islington 
Square, which was well known as ‘a happy hunting ground of Communists and other Red 
agitators’. In this ‘frankly hostile’ place the BEU claimed to have met with ‘wonderful’ 
successes.136 Examples of similar successful anti-communist campaigning peppered the 
pages of the Empire Record throughout the 1920s, and were summarised each year in the 
organisation’s Annual Report.137  
BEU meetings often ended ‘in some disorder’ as opposing sides fought to get 
their views heard; though the BEU claimed that on most occasions that ‘the honours of 
war…remain with the BEU’.138 Such victories were often due to the voluntary efforts of 
what the Empire Record described as loyal ‘henchmen’, whose services were procured 
                                                 
133
 Empire Record, February 1922, p. 37; July 1923, p. 119; December 1925, p. 10-11. 
134
 Empire Record, February 1921, p. 32; November 1921, p. 174. 
135
 Empire Record, March 1923, p. 63. 
136
 Empire Record, May 1923, p. 84. 
137
 BEU, Annual Report, (1924), pp. 14-22, 31-2; (1925), pp. 19-22, 26, 29; (1927), pp. 5-7, 9, 17-18; 
(1929), pp. 9-10, 17. 
138
 Empire Record, October 1921, p. 163; November 1921, p. 176. 
 35 
specifically to deal with objectors and hecklers.139 At Edmonton, North London, in 1921 
a local conflict between Communists and patriotic ex-servicemen occurred over the 
flying of the Union Jack or the Red Flag; a struggle which the BEU subsequently became 
involved in. The BEU claimed that as a result of its intervention, the ‘Communists, 
formerly a power in the locality, are nowhere now…they are negligible. We cut them 
under. And they are going to stay under’.140 BEU agitation was claimed to be responsible 
for a split between Labour and the Communists in the district, leading to the resignation 
of two Communist councillors, who were subsequently replaced by members of the 
BEU.141 Similar success was proclaimed at Croydon, where residents expressed their 
‘cordial appreciation of the fight that has been…waged against the Red Flag’. The 
Communists’ emblem and the ideas it symbolised were excoriated as a symbol of foreign, 
ungodly ideals: 
 
It is up to the BEU to fight the Red Flag principle with all our strength of mind 
and heart, and to show up the dark secrets that are hidden beneath its folds, calling 
upon all true Englishmen to join us in the crusade against the alien devil.142 
 
The most notorious incident in this series of clashes between the BEU and Communists 
came at a meeting of the Union at Central Hall, Westminster, on 28 October 1921, which 
was to have been addressed by the BEU’s recently appointed President, the Earl of 
Derby. On this occasion it was the Reds who had the upper-hand, effectively disrupting 
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the meeting with rattles, stink-bombs and howls. The platform was stormed, and the 
Union Jack allegedly torn up and spat on. The BEU held the incident up as testimony to 
the ‘imperative necessity for all decent citizens to band themselves together in a common 
organisation to fight the menace of Communism’. It was interpreted as a response to the 
success of their anti-communist campaign, proving how much the Communists dreaded 
‘the growing influence and intensifying activities’ of the BEU.143 According to the 
organisation’s Vice-Chairman, Sir Ernest Wild, the ‘outrage’ had only served to 
strengthen the determination of the BEU to ‘carry on the fight’ against communism, and 
had contributed to ‘a considerable accession to the Union’s membership’.144 
Less confrontational were the numerous education campaigns inaugurated by the 
BEU in working-class areas, designed explicitly to inoculate the masses against 
communism and to win back those who had been led astray by the agents of Moscow.145 
Basil Thomson’s assessment of the role of the various anti-Bolshevist groups which had 
emerged in early 1919 tended to dismiss simple leaflet campaigns, and favoured those 
organisations which employed the ‘more effective method of mobilising loyal workmen 
in factories, working men’s clubs, and public houses, to neutralise the poison instilled by 
the extremists’.146 The BEU can certainly be counted as such an organisation.  
Throughout the 1920s the dominant theme of BEU propaganda was ‘Industrial Peace’; 
and in January 1920 the organisation launched its own Industrial Peace Department to 
carry this message into the heart of working-class communities. The objective of the 
campaign was to allay industrial unrest ‘by laying before the workers facts relating to the 
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production and distribution of wealth, the relation of output and prices, the effect of 
unfavourable foreign exchanges, and the present position of the country in the world’s 
markets’. The Industrial Peace Department was established on a permanent basis 
following a number of successful campaigns on this theme during 1919. This experience 
convinced the BEU leadership of the ‘urgent need for continuous educational propaganda 
throughout the industrial areas, where hitherto the preachers of Marxism and Bolshevism 
have had it all their own way. The mass of workers are not revolutionary; and we owe it 
to them to give them a chance of hearing both sides of the question’.147  
Vital to the work of the Industrial Peace Department was co-operation with ultra-
patriotic elements in the labour movement which rejected Bolshevism and direct action, 
favouring instead what the left described as ‘yellow’ unions, committed to 
accommodation with employers. Examples of this kind of co-operation are legion, with 
numerous ‘patriotic Labour’ figures speaking on BEU platforms throughout the interwar 
years. In December 1919, for instance, Charles Stanton, NDP MP for Aberdare, speaking 
at a BEU meeting at Wigmore Hall, London, described direct action as ‘an outrage to 
political decency’ and ‘denounced certain of its advocates as “disciples of Lenin and 
Trotsky”…who, having been turned out of the House of Commons, were still planning 
and organising bleeding the Trade Unions, and by their teachings leading the workers of 
the country astray’. While Stanton wanted ‘justice for the workers and prosperity for all’ 
he insisted that this could never be brought about by direct action and ‘shouting for 
Soviets for the people’, but would be achieved through ‘organising Labour and industry 
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in such a way that there shall be reconciliation between the men who invest their money 
in industry and the men they employ’.148  
Along with Stanton and his ilk the BEU focused much of its fire on left-wing 
advocates of direct action in the labour movement, particularly Robert Williams of the 
Transport Workers Federation and miners’ leader Robert Smillie. In May 1919 Reginald 
Wilson wrote to Lloyd George and Bonar Law calling for Smillie to be removed from the 
Royal Commission into the future of the coal industry because of his threat to employ the 
general strike tactic, which was regarded as an attack on ‘those taxpayers and consumers’ 
whom the BEU claimed to represent: 
 
Experience has taught us that the general strike defeats its own ends, and that to 
allow this kind of braggadocio to inflict further crushing burdens upon the middle 
classes, and the immense body of unorganised labour in this country…would be a 
species of moral cowardice to which this Union can be no party.149 
 
While the BEU was a prominent source of public propaganda directed against 
labour militancy it was also engaged in a very much hands-on struggle with the left in 
Britain’s trade union movement, of which the Industrial Peace campaign was merely the 
public face. It has been pointed out by John Hope that the BEU ‘operated its own private 
network of “special agencies” to collect intelligence on its left-wing adversaries and 
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engage in sabotage operations against them’.150 Evidence of such activity has proved 
elusive; though as Hope notes, it is suggested from a close reading of the organisation’s 
publications, which include occasional mentions of a BEU ‘silent service department’ or 
‘secret service’.151 In 1977 Ron Bean published documentary evidence from the Cunard 
Papers exposing clandestine anti-labour activities in the North West of England, carried 
out by the Secretary of the Liverpool BEU branch, James McGuirk Hughes.152 This 
surreptitious work included the infiltration of Communist Party branches and those of the 
Minority Movement and the Organised Unemployed Movement (later the National 
Unemployed Workers’ Movement).153 This activity enabled the BEU to remain one step 
ahead of its opponents, and was used to collect information and to facilitate acts of 
sabotage.154 Bean’s research established that Hughes operated as part of a national 
network of agents working for an organisation funded by business interests. Subsequent 
authors attempting to pursue this line of enquiry have, in the face of scant and sometimes 
unreliable evidence, been forced to make a series of speculative assumptions regarding 
this activity. Recent work by Gill Bennett, however, has provided much needed veridical 
substance to a number of these assumptions. Most notably, Bennett’s privileged access to 
unreleased Secret Intelligence Service files has confirmed Hughes’ and Hope’s 
contention  that Sir George Makgill, the founder and Honorary Secretary of the BEU, was 
the shadowy ‘Sir George McGill’ referred to in the cryptic and deliberately misleading 
autobiography of John Baker White, one-time Director of the Economic League. Baker 
White states that ‘McGill created and directed a highly efficient private intelligence 
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service’ which was primarily, though not exclusively, concerned with fighting 
communist-inspired subversion. ‘McGill’ was a close personal friend of Vernon Kell, the 
founder and head of MI5, and ‘could always see the Permanent Secretary to the Cabinet 
whenever he wished and at short notice’.155 The fact that there does not appear to have 
been a ‘Sir George McGill’ living at this time, along with evidence of a friendship 
between Sir George Makgill and Kell, and Makgill’s association with a number of right-
wing and patriotic organisations, convinced Hughes and Hope that they were one and the 
same. Bennett’s research into the Zinoviev Letter affair shows that Makgill formed an 
organisation called the Industrial Intelligence Board on the instigation of ‘the Federation 
of British Industries and…the Coal Owners’ and Shipowners’ Associations’ which 
wished to ‘set up an organisation to acquire intelligence on industrial unrest and keep 
employers informed on Labour matters, including Trade Union and Communist 
activities’. The IIB acted as a link between these organisations and Makgill’s contacts 
within Whitehall’s intelligence community, with meetings of Makgill’s dining club – the 
Monday Club – acting as the hub of this activity.156 Bennett’s biography of SIS agent, 
Desmond Morton, expands on this, confirming unequivocally that Makgill was indeed 
the ‘McGill’ Baker White refers to. Makgill is described by Bennett as ‘ultra-
conservative in his views and full of ideas about the efficient management of labour 
(including a deep-rooted dislike of Trades Unionism)’. For him Bolshevism ‘threatened 
the very core of British Imperial capitalism and imperilled the postwar return to 
profitability’. Such views made Makgill highly amenable to the invitation from 
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industrialists to form the IIB.157 Intimate links with British business interests were also 
openly fostered and proclaimed by the BEU. Alongside articles attacking trade union 
militancy in the Empire Record, were a significant number extolling publicly the alleged 
virtues of capitalism and private enterprise.158 The organisation regularly boasted of the 
large number of businesses which sponsored it.159  
During 1925 the BEU was involved in moves to create a national strikebreaking 
force capable of standing up to the looming threat of a general strike. This culminated in 
September with the formation of the Organisation for the Maintenance of Supplies 
(OMS). Those few historians who have examined the OMS have tended to focus on its 
relationship with the Baldwin government; giving particular attention to the controversy 
which erupted on the eve of the General Strike regarding the participation of the British 
Fascists in the organisation.160 The relationship between the OMS and established anti-
socialist bodies like the BEU and NCU has been overshadowed by this debate.  
The nature of the OMS is itself a source of controversy. Contemporary partisans 
of the left tended to describe the organisation in a simplistic manner as an official 
government body;161 while the OMS itself went to great lengths to prove that it was an 
entirely unofficial body, which, while it supported the Conservative government, would 
willingly offer its services to any ‘Constitutional’ government irrespective of its political 
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complexion.162 Although there is some evidence supporting the OMS position,163 there is 
much to suggest that – in common with organisations like the BEU and NCU – the OMS 
had extensive informal links with the Conservative government. A number of its founders 
were former government officials;164 and it was viewed favourably by certain Cabinet 
Ministers and by backbench Conservative MPs and peers. The initial reaction to the OMS 
of the Home Secretary, Sir William Joynson-Hicks, was to commend its ‘preparation of 
lists of citizens prepared to carry on essential services…in the interests of the 
community’.165 A connection – again unofficial – with the security services also exists, in 
George Makgill, for whom the General Strike was to prove the last great battle against 
‘Bolshevism’ before his death on 17 October 1926, aged fifty-seven.166 Hughes has 
speculated that ‘the OMS might well have been…[Makgill’s]…brainchild’, a suggestion 
given some credence in documents unearthed by John Hope.167  
The uncertainty of the exact relationship between the OMS and the state prompts 
Farr to declare ‘This was not collusion, but confusion, and government policy was 
shrouded in ambiguity’.168 Despite this it is relatively safe to suggest that on many issues, 
the views of the publicly stated leaders of the OMS coincided with those of many in 
government circles, blurring any supposed line between independence and government 
sanction. The organisation’s formation undoubtedly came at a propitious time for the 
government, providing a ‘non-governmental’ solution to the dilemma of putting in place 
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mechanisms for dealing with a potential general strike whilst avoiding undue provocation 
or the impression that such a conflict was inevitable.169 
One thing about the OMS that can be stated with certainty is that from its 
inception, it was intimately linked with the BEU. In October and November 1925 the 
BEU offered ‘to co-operate with and render all possible help to’ the OMS. In December 
the Empire Record reported that this approach had born fruit in an ‘arrangement for 
mutual co-operation’ between the Council of the OMS and the BEU Board of 
Management.170 The BEU believed that there was ‘ideal scope’ for co-operation between 
the two bodies, as their ‘respective labours are absolutely complimentary’. While the 
BEU strived through propagandist means ‘to prevent an emergency and to get capital and 
labour to work in harmony’, the OMS was intended to ‘safeguard the life-blood of the 
country if the emergency does eventualise’. The main points of the agreement were as 
follows: 
 
The OMS will leave all formative or propagandist work (except in the Press) to 
the British Empire Union, and will in some way make this arrangement known 
publicly. 
 
The BEU will commend the OMS to the audiences at its meetings as occasion 
arises and endeavour to obtain recruits. 
 
As far as Press work is concerned the BEU will work with the OMS. 
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Each body will supply the other with such information as reaches it or is likely to 
be useful to the common cause.171 
 
While much of this type of activity was planned and coordinated in secret, the 
leaders of the BEU and similar bodies needed contact with the wider public in order to 
make their schemes effective. In this regard the Empire Record was a crucial organising 
tool as well as a simple mouthpiece for BEU propaganda. It contained articles, cartoons, 
reports from branches and lists of upcoming activities. Additionally the organisation 
produced large numbers of leaflets and pamphlets, although many of these consisted of 
reprints from the Empire Record. The BEU also had its own ‘Research Department’ and 
from December 1919 published the Weekly Circular, a confidential anti-socialist 
intelligence briefing aimed explicitly at ‘leaders of industry’, providing subscribers with 
up to date information to assist in their struggles with trade unions and the left.172 In 
addition to its own printed output, the BEU General Secretary, Reginald Wilson, was a 
prolific correspondent with both the national and provincial press. The organisation made 
a number of confidential appeals to its business backers to finance advertising campaigns 
in ‘the principal Sunday Newspapers which appeal to the working classes’. An example 
from November 1921 survives along with proofs of the advertisements – in this case 
advocating secret ballots in trade disputes – for the approval of those called upon to fund 
the campaign.173  
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Figure 1.1. Empire Record, January 1922, p. 30. 
 
The BEU was also at the forefront of attempts to consolidate the myriad forces of 
British anti-Bolshevism after the war. Objection to the existence of too many anti-
Bolshevist societies and the consequent wastefulness of resources and ‘overlapping’ of 
effort was a perennial theme in the organisation’s discourse. The BEU’s powerful 
financial backing in the early 1920s allowed it to develop a national profile which put 
many smaller anti-Bolshevist organisations in the shade. By 1921 the BEU had absorbed 
about twenty such organisations in England and Ireland.174 Among these can be counted 
the Manchester-based Britain for the British Movement, which became the Manchester 
and District Branch of the BEU on 7 October 1920;175 and the Stourbridge and District 
Citizens’ League, which became a sub-branch of the BEU around the same time.176 
Despite such successes the General Secretary of the BEU, Reginald Wilson, was moved 
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in September 1921 to respond to calls in the Spectator for a ‘Citizens’ League’ by stating 
that ‘Already there are far too many leagues and organisations with similar objects in 
existence’. He expressed the hope that the Federation of British Propaganda Societies, to 
which the BEU was affiliated, ‘will do much to bring about co-ordination of effort and 
avoid waste of time, money and energy’.177 The Federation, which had been set up that 
summer, was run by David Gilmore with the Duke of Northumberland acting as 
President.178 According to Nesta Webster ‘the plan fell through…owing to the difficulty 
in getting the chairmen and secretaries of the different organisations to unite in the 
common cause’.179 
Another feature of the BEU anti-communism was its relentless propaganda 
campaign against what it described as ‘Sinn Fein Bolshevism’ in Ireland.180 In March 
1921 the Empire Record reported approvingly a speech by Sir Hamar Greenwood, 
Coalition Liberal MP for Sunderland, which stated that ‘Sinn Fein Extremists and their 
Soviet colleagues…have conspired to smash the Empire’. Greenwood claimed that Irish 
nationalism was part of an ‘international conspiracy’; and that Irish events were being 
‘watched by sinister eyes…throughout the world’. Success for Sinn Fein would ‘mean 
the break up of the Empire and our civilisation’.181 That autumn the BEU Grand Council 
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passed a motion urging that ‘Ireland should never be recognised as a sovereign or 
independent State’.182 
Beyond issuing anti-nationalist propaganda, the British anti-socialist right sought 
to organise on the ground in Ireland. There is some evidence of organisation in the south 
of the country in the years following the Great War. A branch of the MCU was set up in 
Dublin in the spring of 1919, and its secretary was ‘hopeful of getting hundreds, if not 
thousands of members’.183 However, due to the conditions of guerrilla warfare in the 
south and west of the country, and the hostility of sections of the Catholic population to 
British imperialism, most of the right’s activity was confined to the north-east corner of 
Ireland, with its loyalist, Protestant majority. In the case of both the BEU and the 
MCU/NCU the six counties of truncated Ulster, which after 1921 formed the state of 
Northern Ireland, were to prove a highly productive recruiting ground. This was 
particularly true of Belfast, where the local branches of the two organisations merged to 
avoid duplication of effort. The united body boasted thousands of members, a number of 
whom were influential Unionist politicians, including councillors, MPs, Cabinet 
members, and the first Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Sir James Craig. 
During the elections to the new Northern Ireland Parliament in May 1921 it was 
the calls for a solid Unionist vote from Craig, and BEU President, Sir Edward Carson, 
which grabbed the headlines in loyalist newspapers. Carson urged ‘every loyal man and 
woman in Ulster to rally round for civil and religious liberties. Ulster must be saved from 
the tyranny of the assassin’. Craig called on the electorate to ‘Do your duty, let no one 
stand aside. The cause is sacred and worthy of every personal sacrifice’. He concluded by 
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pointing out that ‘The eyes of our friends throughout the Empire are upon us. Let them 
see that we are as determined as they to uphold the cause of Loyalty’.184 The Belfast BEU 
branch contributed to the election campaign by issuing a manifesto echoing these 
sentiments and stressing the imperial implications of the election. At a ‘large and 
representative meeting’ of the branch James A. Thompson, Chairman of the Executive 
Committee, declared that ‘they all had the greatest confidence in Sir James Craig’, while 
Lady Kennedy, speaking for the Executive of the Ladies’ Committee, stressed that ‘a 
strong loyal majority in the Northern Parliament was essential’.185 
At the level of street politics, too, the BEU was active in support of the loyalist 
cause, adding its own speciality – anti-Bolshevism – to the sectarian battleground of 
Belfast politics. This was dramatically manifested in the ‘Ulster Hall incident’ when the 
BEU, ‘in co-operation with the Ulster ex-Service Men’s Association and the Ulster 
Protestant Association’, organised a body of armed Harland and Wolff shipyard workers 
to disrupt a rally intended to show support for the unofficial candidates of the Belfast 
Labour Party (BLP) in the May election. The BEU characterised the BLP men as ‘Sinn 
Fein Bolsheviks’, and amid ‘stirring scenes’ the BEU-inspired mob physically prevented 
the rally from taking place.186 In the face of such intimidation and the general dominance 
of sectarianism in the city, this fledgling socialist electoral challenge to Unionism was 
seriously hampered. All forty of the candidates put up by the Ulster Unionists were 
subsequently elected, while the three BLP candidates lost their deposits in a ‘disastrous 
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showing’.187 The Unionists’ crushing victory, which ensured loyalist dominance in the 
new parliament and thus the state, elicited the hearty congratulations of the Empire 
Record, which declared that ‘The Loyal and Imperial Province has once more proved her 
claim to that title’.188 The BLP later attempted to rebuild its local support base by 
focusing on economic issues, partly under the auspices of the Belfast Anti-Profiteering 
Committee. Despite its wholehearted support for the profit motive, the BEU, along with 
the Ulster Unionist Labour Association (formed in 1917 by Sir Edward Carson to 
counteract socialism amongst working-class Unionists), and the Ulster Ex-Servicemen’s 
Association, became involved in the anti-profiteering movement and ‘effectively 
precluded whatever potential…[it]…had as a vehicle for the non-sectarian class politics 
of the BLP’.189 
The high level of support for the BEU in Belfast at this time can be gathered from 
the annual report and statement of accounts presented to the fifth annual meeting of the 
branch, held at the city’s YMCA Hall in July 1921. These claimed that the membership 
of the branch had grown from 321 in 1917 to 5,058 in 1921. During the same period, the 
income of the branch had risen from £130 to £1,396. Strangely, given such clear evidence 
of the vitality of the branch, James Thompson moved a resolution ‘empowering the 
chairman of the meeting to ascertain the view of the members as to whether the branch 
should be wound up or not’. He explained that this was due to concern that the 
‘deplorable trade depression’ that existed at that time might make it very difficult to 
maintain the branch’s income, ‘a considerable portion of which had come from business 
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houses in the city in past years’. The proposal led to a number of speeches highlighting 
the dangers of Bolshevism in Ireland and the wider empire, and stressing the vital role 
played by the BEU in Ulster in resisting this menace. Sir Robert Kennedy attacked both 
‘Prussianism’ and ‘Bolshevism’, both of which were ‘working in a tremendous 
revolutionary conspiracy against the Empire’. This view was echoed in a passionate, 
almost evangelical, speech by Councillor Alex M’Kay, a representative of the shipyard 
workers, who stated that under such circumstances, with ‘so many influences at work for 
the destruction of the British Empire’, it would be the ‘utmost humiliation’ to dissolve the 
Belfast branch of the Union: 
 
Those who are responsible for the carrying on of the propaganda work of the 
Union were too kid gloved and too sedate. They should come to the streets to 
counter these other influences so rampant in our midst. If they allowed that branch 
of the Union to be swept to one side, they were sinning against the Empire to 
which they were proud to belong…. The boys of the shipyards would not be true 
to their principle if they agreed to drop this branch. Please God they would carry 
it on.  
 
Following further ‘vigorous speeches’ the branch voted overwhelmingly to carry on its 
activities.190 
 As in the rest of Britain, the BEU, a predominantly middle-class organisation with 
aristocratic patronage, assiduously sought allies among patriotic workers. In Belfast this 
strategy resulted in close co-operation with organisations which were patently not ‘kid-
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gloved and too sedate’. Indeed, it seems reasonably clear that at least one of the 
organisations which mobilised alongside the BEU at the Ulster Hall in May 1921 
regularly engaged in acts of extreme terrorist violence against the Catholic minority in 
the province. The Ulster Protestant Association, formed in 1920, was essentially a 
sectarian murder gang, which was later described by the Royal Ulster Constabulary as an 
organisation ‘dominated by the Protestant hooligan element [whose] whole aim and 
object was simply the extermination of Catholics by any and every means’.191 Many of 
these attacks occurred with the collusion of elements among the Ulster Special 
Constabulary.192  
To counter the perceived threat of Bolshevism within the wider British Empire, 
the BEU encouraged white settler populations to set up organisations similar to their own, 
and sought to co-operate with other existing anti-socialist forces. The BEU had a number 
of affiliates in the Dominions and beyond, including bodies in New South Wales, 
Victoria, Tasmania, New Zealand, Egypt, Canada, South Africa and India.193 The British 
Empire Union of Australia was formed during the Great War; and much of its early 
propaganda centred on questions of loyalty to the crown and support for the war effort.194 
In spring 1918 the organisation launched a campaign of petitions and public meetings 
‘against disloyalty and Sinn Fein’, during which it secured the support of other patriotic 
organisations. Acting under the name of the Citizens’ Loyalist Committee, these bodies 
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planned a ‘monster patriotic demonstration’ in Melbourne in support of the war and the 
British Empire.195  
The Australian BEU boasted a number of prominent supporters. Its President until 
1927 was William Scott Fell, a businessman with interests in shipping and coal, and an 
Independent Nationalist Member of the New South Wales Legislative Assembly. Among 
its Vice-Presidents were Sir William MacMillan, D. M Anderson (MLA), and 
Archdeacon Boyce.196 Other members included the philanthropist, Thomas Rofe.197  
The activities of the Australian BEU mirrored those of its parent organisation. As 
in the UK a myriad of anti-Bolshevist groups emerged after the war and Australia’s 
‘conservative politicians…exploited the red scare with material provided by the security 
service and encouragement from employers’ groups and the press’.198 The BEU later 
promoted Empire Day among conservative politicians as a means of winning the 
electorate away from the Australian Labour Party.199 The Australian BEU’s 1924 annual 
report noted that it was suffering, as were other patriotic societies in Australia, due to ‘the 
apathy of the loyal public’. It was felt, however, that the growth of the Australian left 
would show that an organisation like the BEU was necessary; and furthermore that it 
‘ought to be numerically and financially strong enough to combat…the evil teaching of 
disloyalists, and stem the progress to their goal of Empire disintegration and the 
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destruction of our social, industrial, and political system’.200 The parent BEU’s annual 
report for 1925 appears to confirm the decline of its Australian affiliate, noting only 
briefly that it continued to keep in touch with the New South Wales Branch.201 The 
organisation was still in existence on the eve of the Second World War, however, 
campaigning, along with other right-wing and nativist organisations, in support of 
increased immigration from the UK.202 
The BEU’s affiliate in New Zealand was the Political Reform League, which 
fought against ‘Labour-Socialists in the Dominion [who] are striving to bring about the 
downfall of sound constitutional Government, and to establish a Soviet form of 
Government’. This fight was deemed necessary, despite the overwhelming loyalism of 
the people of New Zealand, because of a ‘multiplicity of political parties’ which provided 
a possible electoral advantage to the left. While the League thus concentrated on 
encouraging ‘unity and solidarity among parties opposed to Socialism’, it was active in 
other matters, too, such as support for imperial unity, and opposition to foreign influences 
in education, the arts, and entertainment.203 This organisation was formed following 
correspondence between the secretary of the New Zealand Welfare League and Reginald 
Wilson of the British BEU in spring 1923 in which it was agreed that their work and 
methods were very similar.204 
Beyond the white Dominions, the BEU co-operated with organisations 
representing British residents in the dependencies and protectorates such as the European 
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Association of India and the British Union in Egypt.205 The British Union had been 
formed in 1919 as the Non-Official British Community in Cairo, ‘with the object of 
safeguarding the interests of British residents’. In 1921 it changed its name upon 
affiliating with the BEU and adopting its policy.206 The British Union attacked the 
‘fallacy’ that the Egyptian people were capable of running their own affairs and called 
upon the British government to ‘maintain order, not merely to restore it after it has been 
disturbed’.207 Following the granting of Egyptian independence in 1922 the Union strove 
for the protection of British interests within the new nation.208  
Some historians have tended to be dismissive of the significance of the anti-
Bolshevist right. Webber, for instance, appears to regard organisations like the Liberty 
League – an ephemeral, amateurish, almost comical, enterprise – as representative of all 
the British anti-Bolshevist groups of the post-war period.209 This impression can be taken 
from White, too, who regards the ‘individuals associated with the anti-Bolshevik 
societies’ as ‘more likely to embarrass their supporters than their opponents’;210 
Certainly, the Liberty League appears to have been a somewhat pompous and particularly 
hapless outfit; but as the foregoing chapter shows, other anti-Bolshevist organisations 
existed which were far more successful at ‘doing’ anti-subversion, rather than simply 
talking about it. At the launch of the Liberty League, a sanguine Henry Rider Haggard 
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had unveiled its ambitious plans in full public glare along with the ubiquitous appeal for 
funds: 
 
Apart from our GHQ in London, we must be able to stretch out our arms to the 
provinces and institute similar bodies there. Literature has to be prepared and 
distributed, workers and speakers are to be trained, meetings are to be organised, 
and a special Intelligence Branch has to be maintained. Activities in numerous 
other directions could be named, while, once successful here, we hope to carry on 
similar propaganda in the Overseas Empire.211  
 
The contrast between the approach of the Liberty League and that of the secretive, 
heavily-funded and extensively connected National Propaganda/EL, and the 
organisations under its tutelage – most notably the BEU – could not be more striking. The 
BEU had a prolific literary output, regularly employed ‘trained speakers’ in working-
class areas, organised an ‘Intelligence Branch’, and possessed affiliates in ‘the Overseas 
Empire’. While figures like Admiral Sir Reginald Hall and Sir George Makgill were busy 
laying the foundations of an anti-labour network which plagued the left for over seventy 
years, Rider Haggard closed off his diary in a mood of despondency, describing 1920 as 
‘one of the most wretched [years] in our history, more full of doubts and fears than any of 
those of the war’.212 
By the mid-1920s the BEU had evolved into the leading anti-communist 
organisation on the British right. Brown has summarised some of the reasons for this 
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success in contrast to the fortunes of the Anti-Socialist Union.213 With the partial 
exception of his suggestion that BEU anti-Bolshevist propaganda appealed to the intellect 
rather than the emotions, it is difficult to find fault in his conclusions. The BEU was a 
dynamic, well-funded and efficiently organised body. It had important links with a 
variety of forces in British society which, when combined, gave it a formidable number 
of avenues for exerting its influence. These included sections of the British secret state, 
via its connections with Sir George Makgill and Admiral Hall’s National Propaganda; a 
vast array of business backers; the patriotic section of the British labour movement 
associated with figures like Stanton, Gilmour and Havelock Wilson; and, perhaps most 
significantly, a large number of Conservative and ‘Constitutionalist’ politicians in both 
Houses of Parliament, including government Ministers.  
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Chapter 2 
The National Citizens’ Union: Middle-Class Activism and Anti-Socialism. 
 
Middle-class discontent played a role in the break-up of the Lloyd George-led 
Coalition government in October 1922. Although some attention has been given to the 
role of the anti-socialist right in this process,214 there remains a dearth of detailed analysis 
of the part played by the Middle Classes Union (MCU) in these developments. The MCU 
rebranded itself as the National Citizens’ Union (NCU) in January 1922 and achieved 
prominence as an anti-communist, strike-breaking organisation. This chapter focuses on 
the manner in which the MCU/NCU channelled middle-class discontent in an anti-
socialist, anti-labour direction both during and after the Coalition period.  
The post-war period witnessed an acute sense of crisis among the middle class on 
an international scale. The crisis was symptomatic of the development of large-scale 
capitalist and state capitalist concerns in certain areas of manufacturing, distribution and 
retail, a process accelerated and intensified by the war.215 This was perceived as being 
responsible for undermining the income and status of the middle class. In Britain 
massively increased state spending pushed up taxes as a proportion of middle-class 
income.216 Much contemporary discourse on this crisis – characterised by graphic 
descriptions of the plight of the ‘New Poor’: the ‘impoverished middle classes’ – 
exaggerated the extent of financial hardship and ignored wide divergences in middle-
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class experience.217 Behind the hyperbole, however, were some genuine concerns, 
stemming from a fall in real earnings for certain ‘black-coated’ salaried staff living on 
fixed incomes, whose pay had often not been increased since 1914 despite considerable 
rises in the cost of living.218 More significant in many ways than the fiscal reality was the 
perception among middle-class Britons that their relatively privileged standing in society 
was under threat, squeezed on the one hand by big business and nouveau riche profiteers 
and, more importantly, on the other by the organised labour movement.219  
Trade union membership mushroomed during the Great War and its immediate 
aftermath, and some groups of workers had secured significant pay increases. 
Willingness to engage in industrial action to safeguard these gains produced a wave of 
industrial unrest after 1918. In the context of worker insurgency in Europe, this unrest 
was perceived with deep foreboding by middle-class observers. Furthermore, the 
extension of the franchise to include all working-class men and large numbers of women 
raised the spectre of elected socialist administrations – both local and national – 
committed to ‘confiscatory’ policies of even higher taxation, with middle-class ratepayers 
and taxpayers bearing the burden of ‘lavish’ expenditure on the welfare of already ‘over-
paid’ manual workers and the ‘work-shy’ unemployed. An expression of these anxieties – 
alongside a plethora of concerned articles in contemporary periodical literature and 
journalistic exposés in the Daily Mail – was the creation of new middle-class pressure 
groups and the expansion of existing ratepayers’ associations and chambers of commerce. 
These concerns permeated the anti-socialist right leading directly to the formation of new 
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organisations committed to the militant defence of middle-class interests, the most 
important of which was the MCU.  
The MCU was formed in March 1919, explicitly to fight against socialism and to 
champion the interests of the middle strata of British society in their alleged hour of need. 
The organisation’s founder and chief organiser until his death in October 1921 was 
William Kennedy Jones, Conservative MP for Hornsey, and former editor of the Globe 
newspaper.220 He defined the middle class as  
 
all those unorganised citizens who stand between the organised and federated 
worker on the one hand and the smaller, but almost equally powerful class, who 
stand for organised and consolidated Capital on the other. The middle classes are 
that large body in the nation who work with their heads rather than their hands, 
and in whom by far the greater part of the national brain is concentrated. They 
comprise all the professions, learned and otherwise, shopkeepers, and clerks, and 
those who help to manage industries and businesses of every sort. To these classes 
belong both the soldier and the sailor, the stockbroker and the clergyman, the 
barrister and the architect, the grocer and the solicitor, the author of great works 
and the men and women whose writings are confined to ledgers.221  
 
On being asked if the MCU had ‘any objection to younger branches of the aristocracy, 
“who are as poor as church mice”, joining the union’, Kennedy Jones reputedly replied 
that the organisation would be glad to welcome any ‘impoverished earl’ who wished to 
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join.222 Another founding member, Major John Pretyman Newman, Conservative MP for 
Finchley, reiterated the point, defining the ‘middle class man’ as ‘any person, whether 
peer or peasant, who is of the opinion that his interest and his liberty are not safeguarded 
by organised labour on one side or organised capital on the other’.223 Similarly broad 
appeals were made in MCU leaflets of the time (Figure 2.1).  
The MCU was necessary, Kennedy Jones insisted, to ‘withstand the rapacity of 
the manual worker and the profiteer’; when combined, the middle class ‘had co-operative 
powers for their own protection not less potent nor less effective than those possessed by 
the organised workers’. The new body would campaign, among other things, to ensure 
that workers liable for income tax were made to pay, and that middle-class tax-payers 
obtained all the benefits to which they were entitled. While most of the aims of the MCU 
could be achieved by legislative means, he insisted that the new body would not shy 
away from its own brand of ‘direct action’ if necessary, such as a ‘fortnight’s abstention 
from the use of taxi-cabs…or a refusal to use gas for a certain period’.224  
Indicative of the strength of feeling in support of such views is the fact that the 
MCU’s public launch meeting at the Cannon Street Hotel, London, proved so popular 
that police officers had to be employed to turn away hundreds of disappointed late-
comers. These were addressed at a hastily organised overflow meeting by Sir Harry 
Brittain, Conservative MP for Acton. Meanwhile, at the main meeting, speeches from  
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Figure 2.1. MCU recruiting leaflet (July 1919), author’s collection. 
 62 
Kennedy Jones, Pretyman Newman and Major Marmaduke Lawther were made 
expounding the views of the MCU on a variety of issues and pointing out the urgent 
necessity of its establishment. Kennedy Jones claimed that the middle class had 
contributed disproportionately to Britain’s victory in the war in terms of resourcefulness, 
personnel, money and services; and yet they received none of the spoils of victory, while 
the unemployed drained the exchequer and ‘miners and railwaymen threatened the 
industrial life of the community’. It was time, he insisted, that ‘the middle classes 
organised themselves in order to ensure that some of the sunshine promised by Mr. Lloyd 
George should find its way into middle class homes’.225 
There was much emphasis on the notion of the ‘hapless middle class’ being 
crushed between the upper and nether ‘millstones’ of capital and state bureaucracy on the 
one hand and organised labour on the other.226 The point was reiterated a year later in the 
MCU’s monthly magazine, the New Voice: 
 
If Labour finds the cost of living going up, it can demand, strike for, and get 
increased wages to meet the living cost. If the manufacturer finds the increased 
wages adding to his production costs, he can add to his selling price and ‘pass it 
on to the consumer’. The middle classes pay the wages bill in the price of their 
coal or their season ticket or their boots or blankets – or their income tax and 
municipal rates.227 
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The MCU attempted to articulate and promote the interests of the middle classes 
via a range of activities and campaigns. Within days of the MCU’s launch, Kennedy 
Jones headed a group of sympathetic MPs who moved a series of amendments at the 
committee stage of the Coalition’s Rent Bill, aimed at bringing middle-class tenants 
within the scope of the proposed legislation. Many of the changes demanded by the MCU 
lobby were conceded by the government and incorporated into the legislation.228 On 25 
September 1919 the MCU presented evidence to the Royal Commission on Income Tax, 
arguing that proposals to increase the tax for those on incomes below £2,000 a year 
would inflict great hardship on the middle class.229 The MCU organised protest meetings 
at Westminster, Portsmouth and Glasgow against increased telephone charges in early 
1921 and mooted the possibility of a nationwide boycott of telephone services.230 Other 
issues the MCU campaigned on were excessive rail fares, laundry prices, and the 
shortage of affordable domestic servants. In September it advised housewives to ‘adopt a 
sterner tone’ with overcharging shopkeepers.231  
Such activism struck a nerve, leading to the rapid growth of the MCU. As early as 
May 1919 a correspondent to the Manchester Guardian reported the membership to be 
around 147,000.232 By 1920 the organisation had around 250-300 branches, a number of 
which claimed substantial memberships.233 In May 1920 the New Voice suggested that in 
spite of this growth ‘until its membership passes the million mark it remains merely [a] 
nucleus, for the potential membership runs into eight figures, not only seven’.234 At a 
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meeting of Shrewsbury MCU in December, the Chairman, R. D. Thomson, ‘said the 
branch had a membership of three or four hundred, but without any very great effort he 
thought their numbers might be increased to three or four thousand’.235 The optimism of 
such aspirations was dampened by Lord Askwith in June 1921, when he pointed out that 
of the MCU’s 300 branches only a small minority existed in Scotland and the North of 
England.236 
A major focus of MCU activity was opposition to excessive government 
expenditure, which was regarded as taking the nation in a socialist direction. Andrew 
McDonald notes that an ‘intense politicisation of public expenditure policy’ developed 
after the war. In 1919 over three times more people were liable for income tax than in 
1913, providing ‘a large potential constituency’ for any campaign to curtail government 
spending.237 Wartime subsidies, which had extended into peacetime leading to the virtual 
nationalisation of the railways and coal mining, were vehemently opposed by MCU 
parliamentarians, who campaigned for immediate decontrol of the affected industries.238 
Other targets were large-scale capital spending plans drawn up to honour election pledges 
of ‘Reconstruction’ and ‘Homes for Heroes’. In July 1920 a group of Conservative 
politicians, industrialists and bankers, including the MCU President, Lord Askwith, and 
another prominent MCU member, Godfrey Locker-Lampson, Unionist MP for Wood 
Green, issued a public appeal against the government’s ‘policy of prodigality’. They 
sought to mobilise public anger on the subject to force a reversal of such ‘spendthrift’ 
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policies.239 A committee set up by some of the signatories went on to become the 
People’s Union for Economy (PUE), a ‘respectable’ adjunct to a growing public and 
press movement against ‘waste’.240 Much of the day-to-day organising of the PUE fell to 
Locker-Lampson, who later became its joint Honorary Secretary, alongside Oswald 
Mosley, at that time Coalition Unionist MP for Harrow.241  
The Coalition Liberal Health Minister, Dr. Christopher Addison, bore the brunt of 
MCU attacks on government policy. He came to symbolise everything wrong with the 
government in the eyes of the anti-socialist right, which regarded his social reform 
policies as a ‘dangerous extension of war socialism and a new plunge into subsidised 
egalitarianism’.242 In October 1920 MCU members in the Commons opposed the Health 
Ministry’s Miscellaneous Provisions Bill ‘in view of the present state of the national 
finances’.243 Addison was eventually hounded from office on 31 March 1921 in an 
atmosphere largely created by the combined efforts of the MCU and the PUE.244  
Public anger over ‘Squandermania’ had coalesced in January 1921 into the Anti-
Waste League (AWL). Its campaign of 1921-2 against excessive government expenditure 
played a part in forcing Lloyd George to abandon reconstruction in favour of 
retrenchment and contributed to the erosion of Conservative Party commitment to the 
Coalition. Within the anti-waste milieu, the MCU played an important role; both in 
pushing the anti-waste message and in ensuring that anti-socialism remained at its core. 
Many of the themes of the anti-waste agitation were those on which the MCU had 
                                                 
239
 The Times, 16 July 1920. 
240
 Cowling, p. 74. 
241
 The Times, 4 August, 28 October 1920. 
242
 K. O. Morgan, Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition Government 1918-1922, 
Clarendon, Oxford (1979), p. 89. 
243
 The Times, 27 Oct 1920. 
244
 Green, ‘Conservatism, Anti-Socialism…’, p. 125; S. Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in 
Britain, Vol. 2, University of North Carolina Press, London (1981), p. 377. 
 66 
campaigned over the preceding two years. Indeed, the organisation can quite justifiably 
be described as the pioneer of the kind of consumer-oriented style of campaigning the 
AWL thrived on during its short-lived existence. The AWL’s great advantage was the 
financial and propaganda backing it received from the Northcliffe- and Rothermere-
owned press. While warm expressions of sympathy and solidarity for the MCU had been 
forthcoming in newspapers like the Daily Mail during 1919-20,245 large-scale financial 
backing had not. The personal involvement of Lord Rothermere in the AWL provided it 
with an enormous boost, enabling it to finance a number of Independent candidates in 
parliamentary by-elections.  
The MCU had supported a number of Independent anti-waste candidates before 
the formation of the AWL. At Manchester Rusholme in October 1919, the MCU 
supported a National Party candidate who only garnered 815 votes, losing his deposit. 
The MCU based its endorsement on candidates’ responses to a questionnaire drawn up by 
members in the constituency.246 At the Wrekin by-election in January 1920 MCU 
member and anti-waste campaigner, Charles Palmer, took the seat as an Independent in a 
three-way contest against Labour and a Coalition Liberal.247 At Dartford in March 1920 
the MCU backed the National Party candidate, Colonel R. V. K. Applin, in a five-way 
battle which included two Independent challengers from the right. Applin’s campaign 
launch was addressed by MCU Vice-President, Lady Askwith.248 The right-wing vote 
split three ways, with Labour gaining a majority of over nine thousand, highlighting the 
risks involved in dissipating the anti-socialist vote.  
                                                 
245
 Jeffery and McClelland, p. 44. 
246
 Scotsman, 30 September 1919. 
247
 Wellington Journal, 17 January 1920; New Voice, May 1920, p. 3. 
248
 The Times, 15 March 1920. 
 67 
During the Ilford by-election the following September the Executive Committee 
of the local branch of the MCU invited its Chairman, Lionel Yexley, to stand as a 
candidate against Frederic Wise, the Coalition Unionist.249 A general meeting of the 
branch endorsed this by a small majority; but due to the narrow margin Yexley did not 
feel justified in standing and withdrew his candidature.250 Wise faced no independent 
challenge and was elected with a comfortable majority. By the summer of 1923, he was a 
member of the NCU Parliamentary Committee.251 
A second by-election was held in the Wrekin constituency in November 1920 
following Palmer’s death. Another Independent, Colonel Sir Charles Townshend, was 
selected to fight the seat. This time the local Conservative Association, which had 
endorsed the Coalition Liberal in January, withdrew their candidate – a former National 
Party supporter – and backed Townshend.252 The ensuing straight fight with Labour saw 
the Independent returned for the Wrekin with a much increased majority. The Wellington 
branch of the MCU, meeting a month after the election, welcomed Townshend’s victory 
and attacked the Conservative’s participation in the Coalition government. Colonel Percy 
Ashford, an MCU national organiser, said that he was delighted with the result, going on 
to argue that: 
 
                                                 
249
 The Times, 26 August 1920. 
250
 The Times, 31 August 1920. 
251
 New Voice, July 1923, p. 6. 
252
 J. W. B. Bates, The Conservative Party in the Constituencies 1918-1939, DPhil thesis, University of 
Oxford (1994), p. 41. 
 68 
Party politics today were no good. Did anybody know what a Conservative was? 
He did not. If the Conservatives represented the Government he saw nothing they 
had conserved; they had committed extravagant waste.253 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
At Dover in January 1921 the MCU supported the official Anti-Waste League 
candidate, Sir Thomas Polson, against J. J. Astor, the Coalition Unionist. Polson, a ‘life-
long Unionist’, was also ‘tired…of the Unionist Party acting as the dog to Mr. Lloyd 
George’s tail’. He felt that the Conservatives were ‘strong enough in Parliament to stop 
extravagance and waste, but they had done nothing in that direction’.254 Polson’s 
subsequent victory sent shock waves through Conservative circles, as did that of the 
MCU-backed AWL candidate at Westminster St Georges, J. M. M. Erskine.255 At West 
Lewisham in September 1921 the MCU again supported an AWL candidate, Lieutenant-
Commander W. G. Windham. This was despite the fact that the official Conservative was 
also standing on an anti-waste programme and, like Windham, was a member of the 
MCU.256 Stanley Abbott, the organisation’s General Secretary, stated that the MCU 
Central Executive had discussed the matter and was satisfied that the ‘overwhelming 
majority’ of local branch members favoured Windham, who upheld MCU policy in 
‘every respect’.257 At Southwark South East in December 1921 the local Conservative 
Association voted unanimously to support the Coalition Liberal candidate, Jacobsen.258 
The AWL and the MCU, however, sent speakers and other election workers to the district 
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to support Horace Boot, the ‘Independent Conservative and anti-waste’ candidate.259 As 
in Dartford this had the effect of splitting the anti-socialist vote, handing Labour victory.  
On other occasions the MCU supported official Coalition Unionist candidates. At 
Bedford in April 1921, however, the local MCU branch, which claimed a ‘considerable 
membership’, supported the Coalition Liberal Postmaster-General, Frederick Kellaway, 
in a straight fight against Labour. MCU support, due fundamentally to the fact that 
Kellaway was ‘not Labour’, also rested on his claim to be ‘a ruthless enemy of waste in 
every form of public expenditure’, and his pledge that the Post Office ‘must be made self-
supporting’.260 Later that year at Hornsey the MCU was unable to choose between the 
Unionist or Liberal candidates because their answers to its questionnaire were equally 
satisfactory.261 
MCU support for candidates opposed to Unionists or their officially endorsed 
Coalition partners, lent weight to the organisation’s ‘non-party’ credentials. Ultimately, 
however, such support was predicated on the notion that the candidates were the best 
means of fighting the menace of socialism. They represented the ‘real Conservatism’ of 
the party grass roots, which had been abandoned by an effete party leadership 
mesmerised by Lloyd George. Although the by-elections presented rather a mixed-bag in 
terms of their outcomes, and did little initially to shake the Conservative leadership’s 
commitment to the Coalition, the anti-waste agitation was viewed by dissidents as 
evidence that right-wing, anti-Coalition candidates could be successful, without allowing 
Labour in through splitting the anti-socialist vote on most occasions. This eroded the 
myth that Lloyd George was an indispensable electoral ally for the party. The actions of 
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the MCU contributed to a crisis of identity within the Conservative Party, culminating in 
a ‘revolt of the constituencies’, which ate away at Conservative support for Lloyd 
George.262 Conservative loyalists became concerned that the party was losing support 
whilst other right-wing forces were reaping the benefits of middle-class anger over waste 
and socialism. As early as 1919 some Conservative activists had warned the party not to 
turn its back on their core middle-class supporters lest they might turn in their alienation 
to independent forces on the right. By 1921 such a process appeared to be in full swing; 
Bates points to the example of Reading, where the MCU claimed a membership of 1,154, 
compared to the Conservative Association’s 250. Although some activists expressed 
anger at the new organisations stealing the Conservatives’ clothes, most tried to emulate 
their success and agitated for a break with Lloyd George.263  
Significantly, much MCU propaganda over the issue of waste railed against 
expenditure designed specifically to safeguard the jobs and improve the lives of Britain’s 
working-class majority. Pretyman Newman welcomed Addison’s dismissal by insisting 
that the first task of his successor was to ‘halt…the construction of uneconomic dwellings 
for the working classes’.264 The MCU utilised its parliamentary influence to derail a 
private member’s Bill tabled on behalf of Durham County Council, which wished to ‘run 
a system of tramways and motor buses all over the country at an estimated capital cost of 
£1,600,000, and with no prospect that the ratepayer would ever see a half-penny of profit 
on his gigantic outlay’. On hearing of this, County Durham branches of the MCU ‘sent 
out an SOS’, and the organisation’s London headquarters ‘brought to bear all pressure 
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available’, with the result that the ‘champions of spending’ were defeated by a Commons 
majority of over eighty.265  
The MCU was a trenchant opponent of increased education expenditure. In April 
1920, Thomas Copp, Honorary Secretary of Putney, Roehampton and Southfields 
Branch, lashed out at the ‘thousands who receive income and benefit by free education, 
modern drainage and other items paid for out of the rates and who contribute nothing 
themselves, as they are not assessed’. He was angered that ‘the labouring class…have 
their children educated, if not clothed and fed, out of the rates’. In contrast: 
 
The middle class man does not care to live on charity nor send his children to the 
board schools; seldom does he throw himself on the poor rate or trouble the 
police. He is the law-abiding, respectable man who pays his way and who through 
not complaining or standing up for his rights is being imposed upon every day.266 
 
A 1922 pamphlet published by the Scottish Council of the NCU attacked Labour 
education policies as ‘extravagant and needless expenditure’. It reveals a certain disdain 
for the aspirations of the working class, suggesting Labour believed that: 
 
by lavishing money on schools and teaching it could make all the sow’s ears of 
the country into silk purses…its policy was to relieve the ‘worker’ from the 
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necessity of supporting his own children, and to have these children clothed and 
fed, as well as educated at other people’s expense.267 
 
MCU/NCU campaigning on this issue brought it into direct conflict with the 
Coalition Liberal Education Minister, H. A. L. Fisher. Responding to the attacks of the 
anti-waste lobby Fisher stated that ‘when he read the manifesto issued by the Middle 
Class Union [sic] deprecating the expenditure on education he wondered whether the 
signatories were aware how much benefit their own class was deriving from the system 
they were so anxious to curtail’. He went on to ask the newspaper owners who backed the 
MCU if they had ‘ever reflected what the circulation of their newspapers would be if 
there was nobody in the country able to read them’. Fisher’s impeccable logic seems to 
have cut little ice with the MCU, however.268 
Occasionally the message of class neutrality was still professed by MCU/NCU 
supporters. A letter to the New Voice in April 1924 stated that the British people were 
‘just as much opposed to the Junkerism of a section of the Tory Party, as they are to 
Socialism’. It went on to call for a ‘new party whose motto should be “Fair play for both 
Capital and Labour, and robbery by neither”’.269 At a meeting of the Windsor and Eton 
NCU branch, Councillor Robert Campbell said the organisation ‘had to hold the balance 
between employer and employed’, and ensure that each treated the other with fairness. 
Despite this stance Campbell felt moved to attack the spirit of dependency which was 
allegedly afflicting the nation in terms which left little doubt as to his class prejudices: 
                                                 
267
 G. Eyre-Todd, ‘Mobocracy’ Or, Towards the Abyss, Scottish Council, National Citizens’ Union, 
Glasgow (1922), p. 33. 
268
 The Times, 8 January 1921. 
269
 New Voice, April 1924, p. 7. 
 73 
 
There was a spirit today that the State had to feed, clothe and educate the people, 
and personal responsibility…had been thrown on one side. The majority of people 
were content to allow other people to look after their offspring and neglect their 
own responsibility. They were now told that houses were not for the middle 
classes, but for the poor working classes.270 
 
In the context of post-war industrial unrest and the threat of Bolshevism, the 
notion that the MCU/NCU occupied a neutral position between the interests of capital 
and labour came under intense strain. Generally, little encouragement was necessary for 
the MCU to come down on the side of capitalism. In May 1920 the New Voice reacted to 
the taunt of a British ‘advocate of Bolshevism’ that MCU members would have to 
‘behave themselves’ in the future if they did not want to share the bloody fate of Russian 
anti-Bolshevists, by stating: 
 
It is no use camouflaging the position by speaking of elimination of class 
hatred…. The class hatred already exists in its most virulent form; the party which 
proposes the establishment of a communistic state is steadily and skilfully 
attracting toward itself the ignorant sections of the community who are deluded 
by specious promises and by one-sided statements of the case…they misstate the 
aims of Capital in this country; they exaggerate the grievances of the working 
classes.271   
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From its inception, the MCU regarded socialism as wholly inimical to the interests of the 
middle class. Accordingly, MCU propaganda attacked socialism relentlessly, while its 
criticisms of capitalism and big-business were mild and muted in comparison. In its 
‘Manifesto to the Middle Classes’ published in May 1919 the MCU described how 
‘[u]nder circumstances of unimaginable horror’ the middle classes had been destroyed in 
Russia. Its goal was to prevent such a catastrophe from ever occurring in Britain: 
 
If no other reason existed than that of effectively opposing by propaganda, 
lectures and co-ordinated resistance the foul doctrine of Bolshevism, which aims 
at the destruction of our social system and is the negation of religion itself, surely 
here is a claim for concerted effort which no right-thinking man or woman will be 
found to ignore.272 
  
At a meeting later that month, at the Houldsworth Hall, Manchester, Pretyman Newman 
emphasised the MCU’s opposition to ‘the fatal doctrine of Bolshevism which…aims not 
only at the destruction of the middle classes but of civilisation, and is the negation of 
religion’.273 In July an MCU leaflet viewed ‘with great alarm the Government apathy in 
the face of Bolshevism and the constant threats of revolutionists’. One of the 
organisation’s six objects at the time was ‘To resist the growing menace of 
BOLSHEVISM which is insidiously invading this country’.274  
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At a meeting at London’s Mansion House to mark the first anniversary of the 
MCU’s foundation the number and passion of speeches on the ‘menace of Bolshevism’ 
prompted one journalist to suggest that this aspect of the Union’s work represented its 
‘most important immediate business’.275 Soon after, the MCU began publication of its 
monthly magazine, the New Voice. The first edition carried an editorial under the title ‘A 
Call to Action’, which laments the ‘drift towards communism in this country, evidenced 
by the clamour for nationalisation’. It describes the audacity of British advocates of 
Bolshevism who ‘made no attempt to deny the atrocities committed in Russia by the 
Bolshevists’. Such people are described as ‘that section of the community which the 
Middle Classes Union exists to fight’. The left wing of the Labour Party is accused of 
‘persisting in a policy of Bolshevised communism – the negation of constitutional 
government’. After a description of the despoliation of Russia under Bolshevist rule, the 
editorial attempts to justify the existence of the MCU, suggesting that it regarded itself as 
more than simply another anti-Bolshevist propaganda society: 
 
It is virtually useless attempting to convince the deluded followers of our 
communists by truths of this nature. The only possible effective action consists in 
organisation of the middle classes of the country into a body of such strength as 
could be capable of defending itself against the revolutionary element. 
 
The MCU claimed to be the nucleus of such an organisation. It was ‘not a matter of 
verbiage, but of practical work for the benefit of those whom it represents’. Despite 
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claiming a six-figure membership, the editorial stresses that far more recruits were 
necessary for the MCU to decisively counter the Bolshevist threat: 
 
[This] danger…can only be met and countered by organisation, by work in their 
own interests by the spreading of counter-propaganda and the enrolment of 
recruits in the only force which has achieved persistent and effective action 
against the doctrine of communism – or Bolshevism, or nationalisation, or any 
other name by which this anarchy may be camouflaged.276 
 
In September 1920 the New Voice endorsed the call of Pretyman Newman for a ‘Middle 
Classes Internationale’, to meet Bolshevism head-on throughout the world.277 
The recasting of the MCU as the NCU heralded a greatly increased emphasis on 
anti-communist propaganda and activity. At a meeting of the NCU Grand Council on 13 
December 1922, delegates resolved that ‘as a main point of policy the Union should set 
itself out to fight the spread of communism throughout the country’.278 The NCU was 
‘urged…to suspend the consideration of all minor questions…until a campaign giving 
effect to the major policy has been planned and inaugurated’.279 Consequently, NCU 
speakers embarked on a ‘Magnificent Tour’ of northern England to spread this anti-
communist message. The ‘insidious’ nature of communism was attacked by Lady 
Askwith at Durham; while it was described as a ‘malignant disease of the body politic’ 
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by Councillor Humphries at York.280 The New Voice carried a series of articles outlining 
the Communist ‘Plot against England’, which drew heavily on the conspiracy theories of 
Nesta Webster.281 In spring 1924 the NCU formally agreed to work with the Central 
Council of Economic Leagues in its fight to uproot communist subversion.282 An open-air 
campaign against ‘Socialism and Communism’ was organised by the NCU in summer 
1924, during which meetings were held at Bristol, Leicester, Wolverhampton, 
Knaresborough, Farnham, and Southport.283 In 1925 Edinburgh NCU branch embarked 
on a similar campaign ‘to conduct educational work against Socialism and Communism, 
and for the promotion of industrial peace’.284 As with the BEU, meetings were often 
scheduled to clash in time and place with Communist and Labour gatherings; though 
there do not appear to have been as many violent confrontations. It continued to attack 
Communist ‘infiltration’ throughout 1924-5; calling on the government to ‘“poke out the 
nests and block up the holes” of the Communist rodents who are eating into the 
foundations of our national stability’.285  
The MCU/NCU was also intimately involved in the campaign against Communist 
and Proletarian Sunday Schools. It first drew attention to the issue in October 1920 in an 
article entitled ‘Seducing the Children’, referring to the Bolshevist indoctrination of 
school children in Battersea (Figure 2.2). A 1922 New Voice article attacking Proletarian 
Sunday Schools was subsequently issued as a leaflet, in which the NCU stressed the 
accuracy ‘in every detail’ of its coverage of the matter, pointing out that ‘infinite care and 
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research were taken before presenting the facts’.286 This leaflet was superseded in March 
1923 by a booklet entitled The Red Peril to Children, which was described as the ‘best 
record published to date’ on the schools.287 Like the BEU, the NCU sought to enlist the 
support of churchmen for its campaign against the schools.288 
 
 
Figure 2.2. New Voice, October 1920, p. 5. 
 
During the general election campaign of November 1922 the NCU demanded ‘the 
suppression of proletarian or “Red” Sunday schools’.289 As a practical step towards 
achieving this goal the MCU asked all its branches to prepare petitions urging support of 
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Sir John Butcher’s Bill for the suppression of seditious teaching.290 In January 1923 the 
New Voice instructed branches on how to organise the petition campaign and render it as 
effective as possible. In early February The Times printed an editorial attacking the 
schools and endorsing a resolution passed at a meeting in Stratford-on-Avon calling on 
the government to take action.291 Subsequent letters to the newspaper pointed out that the 
meeting in question had been organised by the NCU and that, along with the BEU, the 
organisation was leading the campaign against the schools.292 In March the New Voice 
stressed that ‘apart from any legislation the country must be roused to private action 
against the evil by all peaceful means, and by education and counter-propaganda to 
expose its evil tendency’.293 At a meeting of Edinburgh NCU branch in February 1924, 
the prominent British Fascist, Mrs Hamilton More Nisbett, spoke against the schools’ 
‘pernicious teachings’ and appealed to her audience to ‘work in the cause of the Union in 
its campaign against the spread of Communism in the country’.294 At the height of the 
petition campaign it was claimed that publicity alone had caused ‘several schools’ to 
close; and that in one case, due entirely to the NCU’s campaigning, a school was closed 
when the local Labour candidate ‘found that he was losing so much ground by the fact 
that the school was housed on the premises of the Labour Party, that he threatened to 
retire if the school remained’.295  
Understandably, socialists were quick to point out the lack of even-handedness in 
much MCU/NCU propaganda. G. D. H. Cole described the MCU as ‘directed in theory 
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against both the manual workers and the representatives of big business, but in practice 
operating largely as an auxiliary of the richer classes in the community against the 
manual workers’.296 A 1920 Independent Labour Party pamphlet described the MCU as 
‘a blackleg corps for fighting organised Labour, inspired and supported by Big Capital, 
though recruited mainly from the hirelings and hangers-on of capitalism’. The evidence 
upon which such accusations were made centred on the extensive business interests of 
leading MCU members;297 and the fact that most of the ire of the organisation was 
targeted at the left and the wider labour movement. Most significantly, the organisation 
was widely involved in strike-breaking during industrial disputes. 
The anti-socialist right perceived strikes as part of a plot to paralyse the nation 
and usher in a Bolshevist uprising. Such thinking played a part in the development of a 
government administered civilian strike-breaking body, the Supply and Transport 
Organisation (STO), from 1919 onwards.298 The MCU/NCU, along with other bodies like 
National Propaganda provided physical assistance to the government during a number of 
disputes at this time. From its inception the MCU regarded a commitment to preserving 
services in an emergency as a vital aspect of its avowed aim to protect the ‘middle 
interests’; and claimed that it could ‘prevent any section of the community from 
endangering the country by holding up National industries’.299 Furthermore, through 
marshalling voluntary labour in an emergency, it would be able to ‘stem the flow of 
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Bolshevism in this country’, ‘prevent the disaster of Nationalisation’, and ‘counteract the 
destructive effect of national or sectional strikes far more effectively than by the use 
either of Military or Police’. This was to be done by ‘organis[ing] the mass of tax-paying 
and rate-paying citizens for self-defence in the event of lightning strikes, by placing them 
in a position to maintain essential public utility services, e.g., transport, supply of food, 
heating, lighting, etc’.300 On joining the organisation, new members were requested to 
report to their nearest MCU office where ‘all one’s capabilities and possible activities for 
the union’ were card indexed in readiness for any ‘emergency’.301 
In August 1919 the MCU intervened in a sanitation workers’ strike in the London 
borough of Kensington, during which it received ‘many applications…for jobs as street 
cleaners and van men’. Following the collapse of the strike, the Mayor of Kensington, Sir 
William Davison (Unionist MP for the area and himself a founding member of the 
MCU), retained some of the volunteer workers on a permanent basis, insisting that 
strikers would only be allowed to return to work on the condition that they worked 
amicably with them.302 Paddington Borough Council was also affected by the dispute. 
There, too, the MCU claimed that its volunteers were at the forefront of efforts to 
maintain services in the district.303  
The first major test of the MCU’s efficacy in this regard came during the national 
railway strike of autumn 1919. On 26 September every MCU branch in the country was 
‘requested by telegram to mobilise its registered volunteer workers to assist transport 
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work for the local Food Committee’.304 The order received an enthusiastic response. The 
Bath branch, for instance, despite having only been formed on 22 September, set up a 
‘register of voluntary assistance’ which was ‘warmly patronised by the branch’, allowing 
it to perform ‘useful work’ in the strike.305 Despite such efforts, the rail stoppage 
immediately caused large-scale disruption, and as a result was settled relatively quickly 
on 5 October, following negotiations which addressed many of the workers’ concerns.306 
From the MCU perspective, however, it was primarily the activities of its volunteers 
which had ‘saved the nation’ from starvation and brought the railwaymen to their senses: 
 
the MCU rendered the most valuable and immediate services, and was not a small 
factor in breaking the strike. Many branches organised motor car and passenger 
services. Hospitality was given by some branches for the accommodation of 
members unable to travel. Many members were employed in working for the 
railway service, and in some instances whole trains – drivers, firemen, guards – 
were completely manned by MCU members.307 
 
It was reported that lists of volunteers compiled by the MCU proved helpful to the 
government in dealing with technical jobs such as electricity supply. It was claimed that 
although such jobs were usually the preserve of skilled workmen, they could ‘be looked 
after just as well by high-grade electrical engineers and electrical students’.308 Such 
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accounts coincide with evidence of a large public response to the appeals of the 
government for volunteers.309 Not all of this voluntary effort was attributable to the 
MCU, however; and other evidence suggests that the response was not as overwhelming 
as initially claimed. Once the strike was under way the government itself, via its Strike 
Committee,310 made a direct appeal to the populace through large advertisements in the 
press with headings such as ‘Fight for the Life of the Community. How Every Citizen can 
Help’.311 Jeffery and Hennessy suggest that, at least with regard to special constables, the 
response to this appeal was ‘disappointing’. According to official figures some 6,000 
people volunteered overall, of which around 4,000 were actually used, figures dwarfed by 
the 23,000 soldiers deployed during the strike, and the further 30,000 held in reserve.312 It 
must be assumed that those volunteers recruited by the MCU made up only a portion of 
this ‘relatively small’ body, rendering the claim that the organisation ‘broke’ single-
handedly a strike in an industry employing over half a million workers somewhat 
untenable. 
 The MCU intervened in a number of smaller disputes during 1920, in which the 
organisation’s relatively greater weight in some localities may have generated more 
impact. Finchley MCU members were among 50 volunteers partly responsible for 
maintaining the supply of gas during an unofficial dispute at the North Middlesex Gas 
Company’s works at Mill Hill in February; and the organisation provided ‘some five to 
six hundred volunteers…during a strike in Southampton in May’;313 The MCU offered to 
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supply ‘one hundred qualified engineers…to maintain the Electricity supply in Sheffield, 
and thus averted a threatened strike’.314 In May 1921 the New Voice reported that: 
 
Both as a whole and by individual branches has much useful work been done in 
this connection. In some cases the effect of unauthorised strikes has been rendered 
nugatory by branch action, and in others strikes have been prevented by the 
promptitude with which volunteers were available in the event of need.315 
  
Preparedness for potential disputes was widely encouraged. At the 1920 annual meeting 
of the Wolverhampton branch of the MCU the chairman, Mr A. H. Angus, praised the 
use made of ‘Personal Service Forms’ pledging help in the event of a national 
emergency. He pointed out that ‘under present unsettled conditions no one could tell 
when a strike might occur. If the members of the MCU were ready to step into the breach 
and prevent a national hold-up, the Middle Classes generally would benefit’.316 A year 
later, with the experience of the short-lived ‘Council of Action’ crisis and a threatened 
general strike by the Triple Alliance behind it, the MCU nationally stressed ‘the 
importance of the preventative nature of our work, and its value as a deterrent against the 
actions of extremists’.317 
Of these crises, that precipitated by the government’s decision to decontrol the 
coal industry, culminating in the union climb-down subsequently known as ‘Black 
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Friday’ in April 1921, was the most serious.318 As it developed on 4 April the MCU 
leadership mobilised its ‘280 Branches throughout the kingdom’; it placed an appeal for 
volunteers in the national press; and ‘was immediately in touch with Government 
Departments and other responsible authorities’.319 By 14 April, the day before Black 
Friday, the MCU claimed that it was able to offer ‘facilities for dealing with every kind 
of volunteer for strike service’.320 Two days later, however, the STO was officially 
instructed ‘to demobilise that portion of its organisation which had been put into force to 
meet the Transport strike’, in the wake of the collapse of solidarity action.321  
The MCU was left to ponder what might have been had the strike proceeded. 
Lord Askwith, the organisation’s President, later stated that ‘We recruited hundreds of 
men to assist the Government to provide coal and food to the cities and outlying districts; 
we provided constables to guard the railway stations; we supplied workers to run the milk 
trains…. To relieve those who had gone on duty immediately the strike was called, a 
summons was sent out for an additional force. By the end of the day 2,000 men had 
answered it’.322 MCU branches set up the local components of this nationwide strike-
breaking strategy. In Camberley, for example, the MCU ensured that ‘complete 
arrangements were made to carry on the public services; an office had been arranged for, 
volunteers were ready for action, and motors and other vehicles all in readiness’.323 While 
the focus of the MCU volunteer effort was on transportation and ‘protection’, there were 
some attempts at direct intervention in the coal dispute. In the Lanarkshire coalfield, for 
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example, MCU volunteers, including a number of university students, were employed to 
maintain plant and machinery at the Hamilton Palace Colliery near Bothwell; though they 
were subsequently removed by the management following an angry demonstration by 
3,000 strikers.324  
The unions were generally dismissive of claims that volunteers could run the 
affected industries for any length of time, particularly with regard to work in coal mines. 
Will Thorn, addressing members of the National Union of General Workers at Leeds, 
pointed out that the MCU could not simply march into the pits: ‘If they did, they would 
damn well fall to the bottom. They would have the winders to ask before they could go 
down, and an inexperienced winder would soon settle their fate’.325 Although this 
contained a large element of truth, the debacle of Black Friday meant that the miners 
were left to fight alone; and in such highly unfavourable economic circumstances that 
volunteer labour did not need to enter the pits in any numbers. More significant was the 
question of solidarity action from the transport unions. This was the one area where the 
government and their supporters on the right could claim at least some experience; and 
could mobilise relatively large numbers of volunteers. Arguably, it was this ability which 
unnerved some of the union leaders. The government certainly believed that ‘the 
readiness of the arrangements had been an important factor in avoiding an extension of 
the coal strike to the railways, transport and other industries’.326  
Writing in the New Voice under the pseudonym, ‘John Citizen MP’, J. R. 
Pretyman Newman, Unionist MP for Finchley, stated that ‘for the first time the leaders of 
organised labour found themselves up against an organised and determined Middle Class, 
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the one force that Lenin and all his tribe has confessed is capable of defeating them’.327 
The stance of the MCU was hailed as a major factor precipitating the union climb-down: 
 
…on that Friday afternoon…the Cramps, the Williams and the Bramleys – 
conscious that in the face of a body of men and women who had no intention of 
allowing themselves to be bullied and starved into submission, 40 per cent of the 
railwaymen and 60 per cent of the transport workers would refuse to come out – 
threw up the sponge and John Citizen had won his victory.328 
 
Lord Askwith, the MCU president, who, as Chief Industrial Commissioner from 1911-19, 
had gained the reputation of ‘Number 1 Peacemaker in Industry’,329 reiterated the point, 
noting that the ‘real break off of the Triple Alliance arose from the reluctance of the rank 
and file to join in a dispute which was not their own, and go out upon issues which they 
did not understand’.330 By its firm resolve, therefore, and by focusing its fire on the 
alleged ‘misleaders of labour’ rather than the rank and file, the MCU claimed to have 
stimulated the consciences of the majority of moderate workers to the extent that the 
militants lost their nerve and abandoned their aggressive strategy.  
Although the MCU naturally laid claim to a share of the credit, its efforts were 
again dwarfed by the official emergency machinery, which was able to recruit some 
80,000 men at short notice into the newly formed ‘Defence Force’, in addition to its 
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regular army and navy reserves.331 It is difficult to accurately gauge the effectiveness of a 
movement which was not actually called upon to prove its mettle to any significant 
degree. Such difficulties have rarely inhibited those keen to advance their cause, 
however, and MCU accounts of the crisis of 1921 are no exception. Among the more 
sober analyses was that of Lord Askwith which shows the MCU acted as one part of a 
much larger official movement: 
 
The natural course was to follow the lines laid down by the Government as 
requisite. These were directed towards the maintenance of essential supplies, the 
avoidance of misery and hardship, the protection of persons and property and the 
continuance of industry and employment in the highest measure possible under 
the circumstances. In all these directions the Middle Classes Union, aided by 
active staff work at Headquarters and in many branches, exercised influence and 
did work. They showed how organisation pays.332 
 
A more telling criticism from the left and labour circles was that the MCU and 
kindred organisations were simply taking sides with the employers and government 
against the working class. A month after the crisis the MCU general secretary, Captain 
Stanley Abbot, took issue with the view that ‘the action of the MCU on the 
ground…indicated a partisan attitude towards the dispute itself’. He pointed out that ‘the 
public’ had every right to defend itself from any quarter which subjected it to a 
‘stranglehold’ which threatened its ‘very means of subsistence’. He claimed that ‘so long 
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as the dispute was confined to issues between the coal owners and the coal miners, it was 
not the business of the Middle Classes Union as such’. However, once ‘the country 
became faced with the threat of a sympathetic strike by the…Triple Alliance, it was 
imperative to take necessary steps for self-preservation’.333 This rather disingenuous 
argument – particularly when the MCU was intervening directly in the coal dispute, as in 
Lanarkshire – was to become the stock response of the MCU to the accusation of 
partisanship; and it regularly denied any intention of acting in a strike-breaking capacity. 
The fact that a major shibboleth of the MCU – ‘economy’ – was often the motor force 
propelling the government and employers into conflict with the unions at this time 
seemed to escape them; or rather, such issues were studiously presented as being separate 
matters altogether. 
A sharp fall in the number of strikes after 1921 – resulting from the same 
economic downturn that had so debilitated the miners’ chances of success after Black 
Friday – led to a commensurate decline in the importance of the government’s official 
strike-breaking machinery.334 Another factor contributing to this, arising partly from the 
widespread clamour for economy alluded to above was the realisation that such 
responsibilities – in part – could be farmed out to non-governmental bodies. Townshend 
points out that Sir Eric Geddes, former organiser of the STO, though in September 1921 
acting as the ‘government’s financial axe-man’, proposed the scrapping of his earlier 
creation, explaining that while it was perfectly natural that the public had formerly looked 
to the government to protect ‘the community from the irresponsible attacks of 
extremists…[t]his state of things has now passed. Private initiative has once more 
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reasserted itself’.335 While the relatively peaceful industrial landscape of 1922-3 saw an 
easing of tension in government circles, the MCU remained keenly alert, keeping its 
powder dry for the confidently predicted showdown with the unions. January 1922 saw 
the organisation re-brand itself as the NCU. Although ostensibly intended as a means to 
allow a wider appeal, beyond the sectional constraints implied in the former name, the 
‘new’ body retained its pro-business bias, reasserting its support for ‘individual enterprise 
and private interests in industry’ and its opposition to ‘Industrial (i.e. “Direct”) Action for 
Political purposes’.336  
The news in late 1922 that Italian Fascists had successfully put down an insurgent 
workers’ movement, partly through using aggressive strike-breaking tactics, was a source 
of great inspiration to the British right. The development spawned new organisations like 
the British Fascisti, who shared some personnel with the NCU, and adopted near-
identical slogans and tactics on industrial issues. The improved economic situation 
towards the end of 1923 augured opportunities for these organisations to engage in 
renewed strike-breaking activity as the unions sought to stem the fall in wages which had 
occurred over the previous year.337 The advent of the first Labour government in early 
1924 appeared to deepen this prospect and was seen initially by the right as a harbinger of 
doom, destined to unleash a wave of politically motivated strikes. Neither for the first 
time nor the last, however, the anti-socialist right misread the psychology of the British 
labour movement entirely. Ironically, when the penny eventually dropped, in the sphere 
of industrial politics at least, organisations like the NCU and the nascent British Fascists 
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were forced by the logic of their professed ‘non-political’ stance to offer their services to 
the new ‘Socialist’ government during the few examples of industrial action which 
occurred during its tenure.338  
As the new government was about to take office in January 1924, the NCU was 
involved in efforts to break an unofficial strike by 69,000 train drivers and firemen. It 
later claimed that 3,000 volunteers had enrolled at its London headquarters alone, and 
that it had been able to organise a ‘special motor lorry service’ to ferry commuters to and 
from work. On the initiative of the East Fulham branch, NCU members carried special 
passes signed by the local secretary which secured them a place on such transport. 
Additionally, the organisation provided the authorities with ‘a large number of special 
constables’, and ran an overnight courier service transporting ‘certain bags and 
consignments of mails’ in its lorries. The dispute ended quickly, however, and the NCU 
admitted that many of its volunteers were not needed.339  
Subsequently, with Labour in office and trade union leaders like Jimmy Thomas 
in the Cabinet, there was an inevitable tendency to seek accommodation in industrial 
matters, which had the potential to destroy the NCU’s pretensions as defender of ‘the 
public’. In a speech prepared for the Edinburgh branch of the NCU, Professor Charles 
Sarolea correctly surmised that ‘the Government will be concerned to settle strikes rather 
than to encourage them’.340 Despite this the New Voice pointed out that as under previous 
governments ‘the NCU is determined to help’ and was continuing to enrol volunteers, 
claiming its offices were receiving new applications in every post (Figure 2.3). It stressed 
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that ‘When the next strike occurs, and the Socialist agitators will see that one is 
engineered soon, the NCU will be…ready’.341  
 
 
Figure 2.3. New Voice, May 1924, p. 1. 
 
As matters turned out, following the rail dispute the strike-breaking capabilities of 
the right were not called upon by the new government, and there were even some 
tentative steps taken to remove what Josiah Wedgwood described as the ‘fascisti 
atmosphere’ of the official emergency organisation.342 As historians have pointed out, 
however, Labour ministers largely left the strike-breaking machinery in the care of the 
                                                 
341
 New Voice, May 1924, p. 8. 
342
 Desmarais, ‘Strikebreaking and the Labour Government of 1924’, pp. 170-1; Jeffrey and Hennessy, pp. 
81-3. Wedgwood was Chief Civil Commissioner during Labour’s brief spell in government. 
 93 
civil servants who had administered it since 1919, and respected pleas from their 
Conservative predecessors to keep its plans secret.343 The complexities of the MCU’s 
relationship with the government in this sphere were eased considerably by the collapse 
of the Labour administration and its replacement by a Conservative government 
following the general election of October 1924.  
Opposition to strikes was not an end in itself for the MCU/NCU. Industrial unrest 
was regarded as merely an outward expression of the socialist cancer which was 
allegedly eating away at the British labour movement from the inside. Thus, while a 
major focus of MCU activity during the strikes of 1919-21 was the maintenance of 
essential services, the organisation continued to emphasise its wider anti-socialist 
message, and linked the electoral challenge from the Labour Party with the disruption 
engendered by industrial action. During the Manchester Rusholme by-election campaign, 
which coincided with the railwaymen’s strike of 1919, the MCU pressed candidates on 
their attitude to such disputes, insisting that they ‘advocate the strongest opposition to the 
extreme Labour policy of direct action’.344 During the abortive transport strike of spring 
1921 the MCU colluded with government officials, possibly via Admiral Hall, to 
distribute government anti-strike propaganda disguised as impartial opinion.345 During 
the November 1922 general election campaign the NCU compiled a questionnaire for 
candidates asking if they opposed direct action by industrial organisations ‘to effect 
political purposes’ and, if so, whether they would support legislation dealing with secret 
                                                 
343
 Desmarais, pp. 169, 173-5; Jeffrey and Hennessy, pp. 76-86. 
344
 Scotsman, 30 September 1919. 
345
 NA CAB 27/75, Meeting of the Supply and Transport Committee, 23 July 1921. Quoted in I. McLean, 
‘Popular Protest and Public Order: Red Clydeside, 1915-1919’, in R. Quinault and J. Stevenson (eds.), 
Popular Protest and Public Order: Six Studies in British History 1790-1920, Allen and Unwin, London 
(1974), p. 238. 
 94 
ballots, the trade union political funds and trade union immunities.346 Questions on such 
matters were regularly directed at Ministers by the MCU’s parliamentary supporters. In 
1920 J. R. Pretyman Newman, the Chairman of the MCU Parliamentary Committee, 
called for the revision or repeal of the 1906 Trades Disputes Act, which he described as 
an ‘Anarchists’ Charter’.347 In the wake of the 1921 dispute other supporters of the 
Parliamentary Committee called for the repeal the 1906 Act and for the appointment of a 
Royal Commission to ascertain the necessity of legislation ‘so as to prevent revolutionary 
agitation under the guise of legitimate labour activities’.348 
During 1925 the NCU was involved in moves to create a national strikebreaking 
force capable of standing up to the looming threat of a general strike. In October 1925 the 
New Voice reported that the NCU had decided in early September to co-operate with the 
Organisation for the Maintenance of Supplies (OMS) in order to ‘prevent overlapping 
and the risk of consequent lack of efficiency’.349 The NCU General Secretary, Colonel H. 
D. Lawrence, was appointed as liaison officer and was in close touch with OMS officials. 
By October the plan for co-operation was circulated to NCU branches. Meantime, many 
members of the NCU were already sitting on the local committees of a number of newly 
formed OMS branches. The arrangements subsequently adopted were very similar to the 
agreement between the BEU and the OMS. Their rationale was certainly identical. In 
January 1926 Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, the OMS President, described the NCU as ‘an 
association which has…won its spurs in the strenuous fight it has made against the 
subversive forces which, instigated by Moscow, threaten our Empire and our liberty’. He 
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went on to point out that as the OMS had been set up to fulfil one of the aims of the NCU 
– that of maintaining services in an emergency – it was ‘obvious…that there should be 
the closest unity between the two’. Unity was necessary to avoid the wasteful overlapping 
characteristic of earlier anti-subversive movements. Hardinge was confident that 
‘arrangements have been made between the NCU and OMS of such a character as to 
remove all fear that friction, jealousy or overlapping…can arise’. Under the agreement, 
therefore, the existing propaganda role of NCU continued, while the OMS occupied itself 
solely with compiling lists of volunteers.350 These arrangements were laid before the 
public in December 1925 by Lord Hardinge who pointed out that the OMS had no 
intention of engaging in a propaganda campaign aimed at avoiding strikes: 
 
It is going beyond our province. Excellent work in that way is being done by other 
bodies, and, in particular, by the British Empire Union and National Citizens’ 
Union, with whom we have working agreements. We are quite content to leave 
the ‘preventive’ work in their hands.351 
 
After the strike, Hardinge recognised the importance of the NCU and BEU within the 
OMS, thanking them in the pages of the press.352  
Throughout the nine day duration of the General Strike the NCU activity centred 
on organising volunteer labour, and occurred under the aegis of the OMS and the official 
Supply and Transport machinery. Some idea of the specific contribution to this wider 
movement made by the NCU can, however, be gleaned from the numerous post-strike 
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reports in the New Voice and from the pages of the NCU Bulletin, a special daily news-
sheet, only three issues of which were circulated before the strike ended abruptly on 12 
May. The purpose of the Bulletin was ‘to give information and only authenticated news: 
to hearten the public, and to help the essential services to proceed’. The fact that the first 
issue did not appear until day five of the strike meant that some of the anxiety 
characteristic of pre-strike propaganda had given way to a more optimistic outlook. 
Despite this there was no complacency in the contributions to the Bulletin made by 
leading NCU members. An appeal from Prebendary Gough exhorted NCU supporters to 
enrol as volunteers, and to provide transportation and accommodation for those prepared 
to defy the strike call. He tried to rekindle the patriotic spirit of the Great War, pointing 
out that ‘every good worker is a public servant, and deserves to be backed up and helped 
as we backed and helped the men who saved us from the German attacks’.353 Lord 
Askwith urged the workers’ leaders to call off all sympathetic action in support of the 
miners, pointing out that such strikes would ‘effect nothing but loss, hardship, misery and 
ill-feeling’. He too impressed upon NCU members the urgent necessity of action in 
support of the ‘Constitution’: 
 
The National Citizens’ Union stand for orderly and good government. Every 
member – man or woman – should be up and doing. It is no time for talk, but, in 
small ways or in big, it is a duty to aid or be ready to aid the efforts of the 
Government to maintain and protect government, law, and order, and to prevent 
the slow throttling of the people.354 
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Even more dramatic were the words of Lieutenant-Colonel K. P. Vaughan-Morgan, 
Conservative MP for East Fulham, who echoed Gough in describing the crisis as an epic 
struggle against tyranny comparable to the war. He castigated the TUC General Council 
as ‘a self-chosen junta, responsible to nobody, elected by nobody, endeavouring to get 
their way by brute force’, representing a similar threat to that formerly posed by the 
Prussian General Staff.355 
Under the heading ‘Strike Volunteers Save the Country’ a detailed breakdown of 
the role of NCU branches during the crisis filled five pages of June’s New Voice.356 
Additionally, in May 1927 summaries of annual reports compiled by NCU branches were 
published in the organisation’s recently renamed journal, the National Citizen. They 
reiterated the ‘magnificent work’ carried out by branches during the crisis. Among the 
many mentioned were Shrewsbury, where a ‘car transport service numbering some 150 
cars’ was operated with the co-operation of local taxi drivers; Worthing, where a 
Volunteer Service Office was opened by the branch ‘at the request of the Town Council’; 
Liverpool, where ‘thousands of volunteers were enrolled as Special Police, shipping and 
dock workers, railway and transport workers, etc.’; and Marylebone, where ‘the branch 
did splendid work for the Government, the railways, and other bodies’ and ‘produced a 
typewritten bulletin of its own’.357 R. Burnett, the Chairman of the Edinburgh branch of 
the NCU, wrote to the Scotsman ‘to express the very warm thanks of the Union to its 
numerous members who volunteered for all kinds of service during the recent industrial 
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crisis’. He went on to state that ‘I have reason to know that these services were highly 
appreciated by the authorities concerned, and were most helpful to the community’.358 
The view from the left, of course, was rather less complimentary. In the run up to 
the General Strike, Joseph F. Duncan, the leader of the Scottish Farm Servant’s Union, 
during the course of his presidential address to the Scottish TUC in April 1926, had 
described ‘the various emergency organisations, such as the OMS the National Citizens’ 
Union and the British Fascisti’ as nothing but ‘Falstaffian armies’, and suggested that 
‘Attempts to carry on such services by improvised staffs of blacklegs would merely lead 
to greater bitterness’.359 In one respect Duncan was spot on: the volunteers’ actions did 
indeed generate deep and enduring bitterness in many working-class communities.360  
The experience of the General Strike dominated subsequent discussions among 
NCU members regarding the best means of curtailing industrial action. There was some 
divergence over which strategy should be prioritised: greater activism and direct physical 
confrontation with the unions or the legislative approach. On the whole the NCU opted 
for caution, favouring a renewed campaign for laws against labour militancy. This was a 
reflection of the strength of orthodox Conservative opinion within the organisation, 
which naturally favoured a legislative solution, and in part due to recognition that the 
General Strike had passed off remarkably peacefully, negating the necessity of any 
drastic ‘Mussolini-style’ solution to Britain’s industrial malaise. 
This debate surfaced in November 1926 at a meeting of its Grand Council. In 
previous months a NCU Special Committee had drawn up a series of draft Bills dealing 
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with various aspects of industrial relations. By the time the Grand Council met six drafts 
existed. Colonel A. H. Lane, who had subscribed fifty pounds to secure the services of a 
professional parliamentary draftsman, successfully suggested consolidating the six drafts 
into three.361 It was agreed to promote the Bills in the next session of Parliament.362 
In addition to the legislative campaign Major Lawther of the Southend branch 
proposed a NCU ‘Volunteer Force to be trained for emergency work’. He argued that the 
General Strike had proved that while people had been willing to serve their country many 
were unable to do so because they lacked the necessary training. He was supported by 
Prebendary Gough who claimed that ‘The country…had suffered intolerably for many 
years because it had been guided in high policy and in other policy by timidity’. He 
criticised the Conservative government for ‘lagg[ing] behind the determination of the 
people’.363 
There was considerable opposition to Lawther and Gough’s proposals, however. 
A number of delegates stressed the impracticability of the scheme, including Colonel 
Southam of Woking, who ‘urged that the Union was not strong enough to attempt the 
formation of a large national force’. He and others favoured the parliamentary approach. 
Mr McAdams of Bristol stressed that ‘the only way to deal with industrial unrest was to 
pass legislation making strikes illegal’; while Captain Boord, representing Worcester, 
argued that ‘the NCU Bills already agreed should be enough to render the force 
unnecessary’. The Grand Council voted to postpone any decision on Lawther’s 
resolution.  
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With these arguments effectively shelved for the time being, the NCU threw itself 
into the campaign to reform trade union law. The NCU tried to stimulate debate on its 
Bills through public meetings and by inserting an advert in The Times offering reprints of 
the Bills and inviting comment.364 The views of a range of Conservative MPs and peers 
regarding the NCU’s proposals were subsequently published in the National Citizen. 
While most expressed strong sympathy with the principles behind the proposed 
legislation, many pointed out that the government had already promised to update the 
laws dealing with industrial disputes and that it might be wiser to ascertain their 
intentions before the introduction of the NCU proposals.365 
However indirectly, the views of the NCU do appear to have influenced the 
formulation of the government’s Bill.366 Baldwin, although personally disinclined to 
introduce stringent restrictions on the unions, was under irresistible pressure from the 
Conservative Party grass-roots and right-wing Cabinet Ministers. This had been evident 
at the party conference at Scarborough in October 1926, where supporters of the NCU 
were among those expressing intense resentment against trade union militancy. This 
prompted deep concern among the party leadership – expressed by Sir George Younger 
in a letter to J. C. C. Davidson – that a new ‘Die-hard group may…appear on the scene 
and split our Party’.367 It is noteworthy that when the government’s own proposals were 
unveiled on 4 April 1927 they bore a close resemblance to those championed by the 
NCU. Consequently the organisation warmly welcomed the government’s Trade Disputes 
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and Trade Unions Bill; and some of those previously critical of Baldwin’s alleged 
timidity hailed it as a long-awaited ‘sign of strength’.368 The NCU quietly dropped its 
own Bills in favour of wholehearted support for the government, a position formalised at 
the annual meeting of the Grand Council on 27 April 1927.369 
The foregoing chapter shows that the MCU/NCU played a significant role in 
articulating the anxieties and galvanising the political energies of middle-class Britons in 
the 1920s. Far from being merely an element of the ‘lunatic fringe’ of Conservative 
politics the organisation attracted a mass membership in the early years of the decade, 
and was able to make its influence felt at the local and national levels both in the political 
and industrial spheres. In 1919-22 it tapped into a rich vein of middle-class anger and 
confusion at the economic and political changes brought about by the war and the rise of 
Labour. This shaped the outlook of the anti-socialist right and, temporarily, shook its 
traditional and instinctive affinity with the Conservative Party. The activism of the 
MCU/NCU played a role in encouraging disaffection with the Coalition among 
backbench Conservative MPs and among party activists. Although the organisation was 
willing to lend support to independent and unconventional political formations like the 
Anti-Waste League, it remained fundamentally Conservative in outlook. MCU efforts to 
rouse the middle class out of their apathy were predominantly exerted ‘respectfully’ 
through parliamentary and other legal means; and it constantly solicited the patronage of 
respectable establishment figures. The organisation consistently perceived the main threat 
to middle-class interests as coming from socialism and the organised labour movement.  
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After 1922 the Conservative Party embraced much of the rhetoric of the MCU 
and the anti-socialist/anti-waste milieu generally. It imposed deflationary economic 
policies which defused middle-class anger; and employed populist and patriotic notions 
of the ‘public’ and ‘community’ as a means of marginalising the labour movement and 
incorporating former Liberal voters.370 The fact that the Conservative Party successfully 
championed middle-class interests from 1922 inevitably took the wind out of the sails of 
the anti-socialist right; suffice to say the MCU never attained the multi-million-strong 
membership it was boldly predicting in 1920-1. Although the NCU continued to 
campaign over specific middle-class grievances after 1922, they were not nearly as 
explosive or controversial with the Conservatives in office with a clear parliamentary 
majority. Despite this the organisation remained a significant force on the anti-socialist 
right, due to its anti-communist propaganda and its role as a strike-breaking body. The 
defeat of the General Strike in May 1926, however, despite being regarded by the 
organisation as its ‘finest hour’, in fact heralded a prolonged period of decline for the 
NCU. It tried to maintain its influence by associating with Commander Oliver Locker-
Lampson’s triumphalist Clear Out the Reds movement in 1926-7. In the later 1920s it 
refocused its attention on issues of taxation and expenditure.371 The demise of the 
organisation appears to have been postponed partly due to the financial largesse of 
wealthy supporters like Colonel Lane, whose fervent opposition to the menace of alien 
immigration took the organisation in an anti-Semitic direction in the 1930s, arguably 
exacerbating its marginalisation.372  
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Chapter 3. 
Tarring Labour with the Extremist Brush: The Anti-Socialist Right and 
Electoral Politics. 
 
In an anti-socialist handbook published in 1924 the right-wing conspiracy 
theorist, Nesta Webster, responded to the argument that Labour Party politicians were 
‘clever and honest men’, by insisting that their continued adherence to socialist precepts 
in the face of their obvious falsehood, suggested, rather, that they ‘may be clever or they 
may be honest; they cannot be both’.373 This assessment characterised the attitude of 
many right-wing critics of the Labour Party in the 1920s. Labour politicians were thus 
portrayed in two seemingly disparate ways. They were presented as idealists and 
dreamers, incapable of recognising the folly of their beliefs, and unfit to govern due to 
the incompetence which flowed from their flawed understanding of the world. 
Alternatively, they were sinister agents of a worldwide conspiracy to subvert and destroy 
Christian civilisation, cleverly duping the masses with their ‘moderation’ and promises of 
social reform: the masks with which they concealed their true objective of violent 
revolution and the debasement of humanity. The propaganda of the British Empire Union 
and the National Citizens’ Union employed both arguments to attack the Labour Party, 
rarely deeming it necessary to justify the apparent contradiction between them. This view 
of the threat posed by the Labour Party, despite its contradictions, contributed to the 
development of an anti-socialist consensus in the 1920s which was particularly in 
evidence during elections both at the local and national levels. Fear of ‘socialism’ – 
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whether presented as experimental folly or sinister plot – was exploited to encourage 
anti-socialist alliances and pacts explicitly intended to keep Labour out of office. This 
chapter discusses the role of the BEU and the NCU in these developments.  
During the Great War the BEU attacked those sections of the Labour Party which 
were opposed to the conflict. Ramsay MacDonald was attacked for his pacifist views, 
which were regarded as unpatriotic. In 1917 the BEU boasted that it had ‘actively and 
successfully [o]pposed the Pacifists in London and South Wales…. Mr. Ramsay 
MacDonald’s meeting was broken up, and Mr. Ramsay MacDonald himself took to 
flight’.374 The BEU co-operated with ultra-nationalist labour bodies like the British 
Workers’ League to disrupt anti-war meetings organised by the Independent Labour 
Party (ILP) and the non-party Union for Democratic Change (UDC). BEU leaders 
conflated the pacifism of Labour opponents of the war with revolutionary socialism. In 
June 1917 the BEU President, Lord Leith of Fyvie, wrote that ‘there is a mixed body of 
Pacifists, Socialists, Internationalists, Revolutionists and others, bound together under the 
ILP and the UDC’. By March 1918, another senior member of the BEU, F. E. Culling 
Carr, was claiming that ‘individuals such as MacDonald and Snowden might “pose as 
Pacifists and Conscientious Objectors, but their main objective is Revolution”’.375 After 
the war the BEU continued to assert that the left in the Labour Party had ‘gone Russian’. 
The BEU’s national organiser, Captain Parsons, warned that a future Labour election 
victory would be calamitous for Britain because ‘the unspeakable hell created by 
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Bolshevik principles in Russia…might easily be created here’.376 In March 1920 the BEU 
Vice-Chairman, Sir Ernest Wild, Unionist MP for Upton, wrote: 
 
I turn to the enemy. It calls itself the ‘Labour Party’ – a most misleading 
appellation. Mr. Churchill, who is ever bold, called it, at Dundee the other day, 
the ‘Socialist’ Party. I call it the ‘Communist’ Party, or, if they prefer it, the 
‘Bolshevist’ Party…the present ‘Labour’ Members are but tails wagged by the 
Dog of Communism.377 
 
During a 1921 debate with Henry Hyndman of the Social-Democratic Federation, the 
Duke of Northumberland, President of the City of London BEU branch, set out to prove 
that ‘the so-called “moderate” leaders of Labour are working, consciously or 
unconsciously, for the same world revolution as the Extremists, and that there is no single 
aim of the Red International of Moscow which is not also an aim of the Labour Party’.378 
Northumberland later wrote describing the poison of subversion ‘working through all the 
European body politic’ in a variety of ‘subtle forms’, one of which was the professed 
moderate reformism characteristic of the British Labour Party. The party was part of a 
great international subversive movement ‘though their adherents are not all aware of it, 
and the strings are pulled by the Secret Societies which during the past century have been 
behind every revolution in Europe’.379 
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In October 1922 the Empire Record published a sarcastic aside on Labour’s ‘magnificent 
gesture’ of barring the CPGB from affiliating to it. The author stated: 
 
I am assured that the Labour Party have nothing whatever to do with the rude, 
red-handed ghouls of Moscow – except, of course, in such little matters as 
sending them fraternal greetings…; or demanding immediate recognition of the 
Soviet Government; or helping Soviet wars by holding up munition ships; or in 
forming councils of action on the Soviet model.380 
   
The BEU annual report for that year warned that ‘anti-socialist forces had to prepare 
themselves for a possible [socialist] victory at the next election and organise to fight and 
destroy Labour’s attempts to ‘Bolshevise’ Britain.381 In July and August 1923 the Empire 
Record exposed continuing links between the Labour and Communist parties despite a 
renewed official ban on affiliation.382 
Strangely – given the general outlook of the MCU/NCU and in light of some of 
his own comments on other occasions – in 1920 Lord Askwith, criticised Sir Winston 
Churchill’s statement that Labour was ‘unfit to govern’, and stated that critics of Labour 
would only be driving more and more people into the Labour Party by attacking them as 
Bolshevists, which they were not’.383 In contrast, the New Voice later condoned 
Churchill’s remarks;384 and, generally, speeches and articles by MCU/NCU members 
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throughout the 1920s conformed to the view that the Labour’s moderation was mere 
window-dressing, hiding extreme socialist and communist viewpoints.385 
The anti-socialist right repeatedly questioned the patriotism of the Labour Party. 
In January 1923 the BEU attacked Labour’s foreign policy as ‘Pro-Germanism Rampant’. 
The party was accused of ‘intense hostility to England…a constant devotion to the 
enemies of the British Empire, and a continual outpouring of virulent criticism on all 
allied or friendly countries’. Labour’s commitment to self-determination was ridiculed: 
‘Egypt, India, Ireland are all encouraged to self-determine themselves away from the 
Empire…even if they at the same time determine themselves into complete anarchy’.386 
Two months later the Empire Record carried the following: 
 
The Socialists champion Germans, Indian seditionists, De Valera’s warmongers, 
foreign immigrants, and any and every enemy of the British Empire. Their 
political pretence that they represent the masses of the people of this country who 
work for a living is clearly a transparent lie. Their friends are the enemies of 
Britain.387 
 
 In December 1923, in an otherwise relatively measured assessment of the 
potential pitfalls of a future Labour government, the Secretary of the BEU, Reginald 
Wilson, suggested that one outcome might be the break up of the British Empire: 
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Some members of the Labour Party are frankly in favour of the destruction of the 
Empire; and there are undoubtedly certain sinister alien influences at work behind 
the party which are deliberately directed to this end. More danger is, perhaps, to 
be feared from the general theoretical policy of the party which…would give 
democratic self-government to all parts of the Empire and force a legal equality 
between widely differing races.388 
   
The fate of the Empire under Labour was the subject of an article in the Empire Record 
by Sir Henry Page Croft. He concluded by saying ‘We can have Socialism which means 
ruin, or we can have an Empire. We cannot have both, so the choice is with the people, 
and they must speak in no uncertain voice’.389 Much was made of the Labour Party’s 
affiliation to the Socialist International. In December 1923 the BEU described the Labour 
Party as ‘headed by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, with that sinister international organisation, 
the Sozialistische Arbeiter Internationale in the background, pulling the wires in the 
interests of Berlin and Moscow’.390 
Another means of casting doubt on Labour’s patriotism was over an issue which 
had long been close to the hearts of anti-socialist campaigners: alien immigration. The 
BEU and NCU regularly encouraged the view that Labour would place the interests of 
aliens above those of ‘true-born Britons’. Following the accession of Britain’s first 
Labour government in early 1924, although concerns that all anti-alien legislation would 
be repealed proved unfounded, certain measures taken in this sphere were seized upon as 
clear evidence of Labour’s anti-British, pro-alien leanings. This was the case with the 
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decision by the Minister of Labour, Tom Shaw, to extend the right to unemployment 
benefits to resident foreign workers. In a BEU cartoon alluding to the question of ‘doles 
for aliens’ Shaw is portrayed picking the pocket of a terrified British tax payer and 
handing over a bag of money labelled ‘Baksheesh’ to a leering Jew, while a range of 
other stereotyped foreigners line up for their share of the pickings (Figure 3.1).  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Empire Record, April 1924, p. i. 
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During the general election of October 1924 the ‘Alien Menace’ emerged as a 
powerful component in the arsenal of scaremongering propaganda employed by the anti-
socialist right. Defries cites an anti-alien speech made by BEU supporter, Sir Ronald 
McNeill, Conservative MP for Canterbury, asserting that under a ‘Socialist’ government, 
‘if two persons were competing for a house, and one of them was an Englishman and the 
other a Polish Jew or Russian Revolutionary, the preference would not be given to the 
Englishman’.391 The Zinoviev Letter incident at the end of the campaign merely added 
fuel to an already inflamed discourse. 
A great deal of anti-Labour propaganda dealt with the party’s alleged profligacy 
whenever it was allowed into office. Much of this concerned Labour’s record in the 
administration of local authorities. A 1922 NCU pamphlet claimed that wherever Labour 
managed to gain a controlling vote in a locality ‘disaster followed almost immediately’. 
In particular, Labour successes in London resulted in ‘an orgy of unheard-of 
extravagance’.392 That election year the Empire Record carried two articles on ‘How 
Labour-Socialists Would Govern You’. The first, in October, dealt with taxation. 
Labour’s plans to reduce the tax burden on lower earners whilst increasing it for the rich 
were described as ‘The Great “Hold Up”’, while the policy of a capital levy on wealth 
was described as a ‘programme of pillage’ which would almost certainly result in a 
slump.393 In November the theme was nationalisation. The ‘Labour-Socialists’ were 
attacked for waging ‘war on private enterprise’, while their policy of nationalisation 
would take Britain down the same road as Soviet Russia – ‘tyranny, bankruptcy, and the 
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starvation of millions’.394 In 1923 Reginald Wilson attacked the Labour Party for being 
‘pledged to the lunacy of the capital levy. It is difficult to measure the financial and 
industrial disturbance that would result from this insane project of raising £3,000 millions 
in one fell swoop’.395 The policy was also roundly attacked in a leader article by E. H. 
Blakeney in the New Voice.396 
This general barrage of anti-Labour propaganda intensified considerably during 
parliamentary and municipal elections. Additionally, the anti-socialist right sought to 
curtail the chances of the Labour Party by encouraging and participating in the formation 
of anti-socialist alliances and pacts designed to limit the number of candidates fighting 
elections against Labour to one per seat, thus avoiding damaging splits in the anti-
socialist vote.  
As pointed out earlier, elections during the Coalition period highlighted the level 
of middle-class and right-wing opposition to Lloyd George’s government, but also 
exposed the dangers of standing candidates against the Coalition and thus dispersing the 
votes of the anti-Labour majority in many constituencies. This issue was central in 
debates surrounding the future of the Conservative Party at the time. Conservative 
supporters of the Coalition – including advocates of ‘fusion’ with Liberal supporters of 
Lloyd George – and the Conservative ‘Die-hard’ opponents of the government, ‘were 
agreed that socialism was the enemy which had to be confronted and defeated’.397 What 
divided them was the best way of achieving this goal.398 Similar differences of approach 
existed between the BEU and the MCU/NCU and among individuals within these 
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organisations. The anti-Labour comments reproduced above from BEU Vice-Chairman, 
Ernest Wild, for example, are from an article extolling the virtues of Lloyd George and 
his Coalition, and calling for ‘fusion’. Wild was also Vice Chairman of the New 
Members’ Coalition Group, a cross-party group of MPs elected in 1918, which counted a 
number of BEU supporters in its ranks.399 The Duke of Northumberland, by contrast, was 
an outspoken Die-hard critic of Lloyd George and all his works; while the BEU founder, 
Sir George Makgill, was a leading member of Horatio Bottomley’s populist anti-
Coalition pressure group, the People’s League and was selected as a candidate to stand 
against the Coalition.400 
 Generally, on the few occasions that the issue was dealt with in the BEU press, 
the organisation expressed its support for the Coalition as a bulwark against revolution. 
Despite being highly critical of increased spending and bureaucracy by the Coalition, 
which were regarded as ‘great measures of State socialism’, the Empire Record insisted 
that: 
 
If we destroy the Coalition Government nothing would stand between us and the 
‘Millen[n]ium’, or Communist Mecca of riot and bloodshed. The Direct Action 
invoked by Parliamentary and moderate leaders of labour would then remove 
those leaders for more extreme men…. It is only in unity that we can derive 
strength; and, thank God, in adversity we have always been united.401 
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In July 1921 the cover of the Empire Record contained a cartoon depicting ‘Lloyd 
George the Constitutionalist vs. Tom Mann the Communist Monster’, alongside the 
question ‘Under Which Leader?’402 
As we have seen the MCU/NCU was far more critical of the Coalition. It was 
clearly of the opinion, however, that socialism was the main enemy, and the organisation 
was quite willing to offer its services to the government during industrial disputes, and 
collude with it in the distribution of anti-Bolshevist propaganda.403 In 1920 the MCU 
informed potential supporters that it could ‘ensure by corporate action the return in every 
constituency of Constitutional Members of Parliament who would be pledged to serve the 
Middle Interests’. The same was true of ‘Municipal Bodies’, which it hoped to fill with 
‘men and women pledged to oppose all extravagance and all expenditure not in the 
general interest’.404  
 The demise of the Coalition government negated many of these arguments and 
prompted a general election in November 1922. During campaigning the anti-socialist 
right enthusiastically rallied to the ‘Constitutionalist’ cause, which in most cases meant 
support for Conservative candidates. The BEU ‘circulated thousands of special election 
leaflets’ attacking the ‘Labour-Socialist’ Party (Figure 3.1).  
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Figure 3.1. Empire Record, December 1922, p. 5. 
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It placed ‘red scare’ advertisements in a number of local and national newspapers, 
including one which warned:  
 
If You Don’t Want Revolution, Ruined Trade, Industrial War, Strikes, Tyranny of 
Officials, Workshop Dictators, Industrial Conscription, Misery and Starvation, 
VOTE AGAINST THE LABOUR-SOCIALISTS…EVERY ANTI-SOCIALIST 
VOTE IS NEEDED.405 
 
The NCU intervened in the campaign with a detailed questionnaire for candidates, which 
it utilised in deciding which candidates to endorse, and also to promote NCU policies 
among future MPs. The questionnaire was only intended for anti-socialist candidates, as 
‘[h]aving examined the manifesto of the Labour Party, the Union must oppose any 
candidate pledged to that policy’.406 After the Conservative victory the New Voice praised 
the role of NCU members who had campaigned for the Constitutionalist cause.407 
During the 1923 general election campaign the BEU urged its members to 
actively support the Conservative government. It described apathy as the greatest danger 
to the Constitutionalist cause and appealed for funds to enable the organisation to 
maximise its effectiveness.408 The organisation campaigned in 65 constituencies and 
claimed that where it was active the results bucked the national trend and generally saw 
Labour candidates defeated. At Coventry, the election of left-wing socialist, A. A. 
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Purcell, was blamed on the absence of a BEU campaign due to lack of funds.409 The NCU 
Grand Council on 16 November reaffirmed the organisation’s ‘Non-Party attitude, 
excepting as to Socialist candidates’ and approved a draft questionnaire for candidates 
along similar lines to that used in the previous general election.410 
The eventual advent of a minority Labour government following the election 
exposed many of the more outlandish right-wing criticisms of the Labour Party. As the 
new government’s moderation became apparent, however, the BEU and NCU adapted 
their propaganda. The Empire Record suggested that Labour’s policy of ‘gradualness’ 
had been forced upon the government by its lack of a parliamentary majority. While the 
government’s policies taken separately appeared ‘humane and popular’, all the proposals 
meant heavier expenditure, and when the bills came in they would ‘break the over-
burdened back of industry’.411 Furthermore, the BEU suggested, the strategy of hiding 
Labour’s true aims was still in place, until such time as the socialists were strong enough 
to remove the ‘mask of moderation’. In an article entitled ‘Some Dangers of the Socialist 
Government’, Reginald Wilson portrayed MacDonald as a ‘most astute politician’ 
deliberately trying to ‘entrap’ the electorate. The ‘real Socialist and Communist 
programme was not mentioned; it was relegated to the background’.412 
At a public meeting organised by the Edinburgh branch of the NCU on 3 March 
1924 Lord Askwith stressed that while Ramsay MacDonald had recently spoken in 
support of individuality, this did not represent the views of his followers, particularly ‘the 
extreme element, who were the tail endeavouring to wag the dog’. By championing 
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excessive welfare spending, Labour was encouraging ‘those who liked to be spoon-fed by 
the State’, rather than those hardy individualists who had made the Empire great. The 
president of the local Rotary Club read a message from Professor Charles Sarolea 
expressing his view of the new administration: 
 
The history of the first few weeks of the Labour Government had led the majority 
of unsophisticated British citizens to the belief that Socialism was after all only a 
bogey to frighten the simple and credulous. That innocuous beginning did not 
reassure him for the future. He was convinced that the mildest experiment in State 
Socialism might prove more fatal to the commercial prosperity of the country than 
Bolshevism. Bolshevism was like a high fever. State Socialism was a lingering 
disease.413 
 
The first Labour government was also a powerful stimulus for the idea of anti-socialist 
unity. The New Voice of February 1924 contained numerous articles and letters on the 
need for cooperation between ‘Constitutionalist’ forces. It also reported a ‘Great NCU 
Protest Meeting’ against the new government which carried a resolution calling on all 
Anti-Socialist MPs irrespective of party, to suspend minor issues and cooperate in 
maintaining a Government which will truly reflect the opinion of the country’.414 The 
debate on how to fight socialism during elections continued through to the summer when 
the NCU annual conference rejected motions calling for it to set up a new anti-socialist 
Centre Party independent of the three major parties. Lord Askwith assured delegates 
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‘most definitely and earnestly that the Central Executive had no intention whatsoever of 
supporting any idea of the formation of a Fourth or Centre Party’.415 
Both the BEU and the NCU gave prominent attention to the issues which 
eventually forced the minority Labour government back to the polls to seek a more 
considerable public endorsement. The question of the proposed Russian loan was 
regarded as an act of ‘crass stupidity’ by the BEU, while it castigated the government for 
‘interfering with justice’ in the Campbell Case, in which the prosecution for sedition of J. 
R. Campbell, editor of the CPGB newspaper, the Weekly Worker, was dropped following 
pressure from Labour Ministers.416 The NCU gave the Campbell case a good deal of 
attention, claiming that it was one of its own members who had brought the offending 
article in the Weekly Worker to the attention of the NCU Central Executive on 25 July, 
which had then informed the authorities via one of the organisation’s parliamentary 
supporters.417  
Reginald Wilson of the BEU ended his attack on the government with a rousing 
call to action: 
 
The greatest advantage…enjoyed by the present Socialist Government consists in 
the apathy and indifference of those who are opposed to their proposals…. Rates 
and taxes will go up unless anti-Socialists cease bewailing their fate, come off 
their perches and fight their enemies. Let us have more backbone and less wish-
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bone and we shall win…. The Socialists have obtained control by steady effort, 
self-sacrifice and organisation. Only by similar methods will they be defeated.418 
 
In the election which followed soon after these words were written, the activists of the 
BEU and the NCU, and Conservatives generally, certainly got off their perches and 
showed some backbone, or at least bared their anti-socialist teeth, contributing to a 
landslide victory for Stanley Baldwin. The BEU produced and distributed a special 16 
page pamphlet for the election entitled Some Dangers of the Present Socialist 
Government, as well as around 150,000 leaflets. It also distributed 100,000 miniature 
Union Jack flags among voters.419 In London the BEU concentrated its anti-Labour 
campaign in ten constituencies. Eight saw increased majorities for sitting ‘Constitutional’ 
candidates; while two were gained from Labour.420 Outside the capital the BEU claimed 
that its efforts were focused on a number of ‘black spots’, alleged ‘centres of Socialist 
and revolutionary infection’ where Labour was strong (Figure 3.2). There were 
limitations in the BEU’s coverage of the ‘black spots’, however. Important Labour 
strongholds like South Wales and South Yorkshire were neglected, for instance, while a 
major campaign was mounted by the organisation in the Home Counties and the West 
Country, areas already dominated by the Conservative and Liberal parties. The BEU did 
take its message to some of the ‘black spots’. Unlike London and the South, however, its 
efforts in these districts resulted in a mixed bag of success and disappointment. 
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Figure 3.2. BEU Annual Report, 1924, p. 10. 
 
Campaigning in Lancashire and the North was focused on Liverpool and Newcastle. 
While in Liverpool the ‘Constitutional cause won notable triumphs’, splits in the anti-
socialist vote in Newcastle and the North undermined the ‘intense effort’ of the BEU and 
the results were less striking.421 
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In the Midlands the BEU ‘opened its campaign early and our speakers frequently 
addressed crowds of over 1,000 people’. In Birmingham, in particular, the election work 
of the Midlands Organiser, Captain Owen-Lewis, was energetic and courteous and had 
left the organisation with ‘a very high standing’ in the city. Further successful 
electioneering was carried out by BEU organisers at Oswestry, Shropshire, and the 
Staffordshire Potteries422 BEU speakers mounted a ‘whirlwind campaign’ in 
Northampton in support of the Conservatives’ attempt to unseat Margaret Bondfield, 
Britain’s first female Cabinet Minister. The organisation claimed that its efforts had 
‘largely contributed’ to her defeat in what had been regarded as a safe Labour seat.423 The 
BEU organised over 20 meetings in the constituency, and claimed that ‘some 25,000 
people listened to our speakers, Mr. F. Tongue and Capt. Pearson’.424 During one incident 
– in the town square, following a speech by Bondfield – Tongue and Pearson, 
accompanied by a number of female supporters, attempted to address the crowd from the 
back of a Ford van festooned with Union Jacks. The crowd of mainly Labour supporters 
rushed the van and tore down one of the larger flags. Tongue was allegedly assaulted 
with a stick, while Pearson ‘retaliated upon a man who attempted to strike him’.425 
Although the incident passed off without further trouble, it was held up as yet another 
example of ‘Labour-Socialist rowdiness’ by the BEU. The alleged disdain shown towards 
the Union Jack was posited as further evidence of Labour’s lack of patriotism; and 
prompted the Empire Record to print a poem attacking those who had defiled the ‘Red, 
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White and Blue’.426 On the eve of the poll, the BEU organised a rally in Northampton in 
support of the ‘Constitutional cause’. It was addressed by the BEU President, Lord 
Danesfort, who stated that the question before the people was: 
 
Were we going to uproot all the social and economic institutions of the country to 
embark upon wild experiments which wherever tried had proved disastrous 
failures, or were we going to send back to power a sound steady and stable 
Government under which the people could prosper…?427  
 
Remarking on the election campaign generally, the BEU annual report for 1924 noted 
that in most regards the organisation’s efforts were ‘most satisfactory’; and looked 
forward to making even greater inroads on Labour’s support in the future. It pointed out, 
however, that future success was entirely dependent on increased money and members.428  
The NCU was also active in the campaign. It produced notes for speakers and 
drafted a series of questions to put to Labour candidates designed to put them on the spot 
regarding their party’s economic policies.429 The organisation was particularly keen to 
prevent a split in the anti-socialist vote: 
 
 To this end the Union declares in favour of negotiations between the local 
political associations with a view to concentrating support for the Anti-Socialist 
candidate regarded as having the greater prospect of success in this election. 
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Therefore NCU branches in constituencies at present represented by Socialists or 
where a three-cornered contest is anticipated, are urged immediately to make 
representations to the bodies respectively concerned.430 
  
Municipal politics was another crucial arena in which the anti-socialist right 
confronted the challenge of Labour. In many localities formal alliances or electoral pacts 
between Conservative and Liberal organisations developed, again designed to circumvent 
‘the triangle’ of three-party politics, which was tending to benefit Labour in working-
class districts. The pressure groups of the anti-socialist right were often at the forefront of 
local movements for unity among ‘moderates’.  
Developments in municipal elections were a factor in the growing awareness of 
the national threat from Labour. The ‘most dramatic’ evidence of Labour’s advance came 
in the municipal elections of November 1919. These were the first to be held since 1913, 
and were open to roughly double the electorate of that year. There was a low turnout 
which distorted the result; but this could not mask the fact that the elections marked ‘a 
massive breakthrough for Labour’. Labour gains in Britain’s larger towns in 1919 were 
‘nothing short of sensational’. This confirmation of the party’s increased strength was a 
major factor precipitating the formation of anti-socialist pacts.431  
These took a variety of forms, depending on local traditions and circumstances. 
Chris Cook points out that in some areas the need for co-operation was negligible, as ‘the 
Liberal Party had all but disappeared’.432 More typical, however, were those localities 
where ‘Conservatives and Liberals combined to defeat Labour, either by a formal 
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amalgamation or by means of an electoral pact’. Examples include the Sheffield Citizen’s 
Association, the Crewe Progressive Union, the Derby Municipal Alliance, and Swindon’s 
Citizen’s League.433 Such bodies encompassed a wide range of local middle-class, 
business and political opinion, united in common antipathy to socialism. The Durham 
Municipal and County Federation, formed in Autumn 1921, for example, included local 
branches of the Anti-Nationalisation Society, the Durham Federation of Property Owners 
and Ratepayers’ Associations, Durham County Unionist Associations, the Durham and 
North Yorkshire Chambers of Trade, the Middle Classes Union, the County Farmers’ 
Union, and the North Eastern Area Coalition Liberal Party.434 The Glasgow Good 
Government Committee (later the Good Government League), formed in 1920, 
represented the Glasgow Unionist Association, the Glasgow Liberal Council, the 
Women’s Citizens’ Association, the Citizens’ Union, the Rotary Club, the City Business 
Club, the Citizens’ Vigilance Association, the YMCA, the National Council of Women, 
and the Scottish Middle Classes Union.435 Looser anti-socialist co-operation existed in 
places like Wolverhampton and Coventry, where ‘although no formal amalgamation of 
Conservatives and Liberals for municipal purposes took place, the two parties had a 
written pact to maintain a united anti-Labour front’.436 The investigations of Davies and 
Morley have shown that anti-socialist alliances and pacts became a ubiquitous feature of 
municipal politics during the inter-war period.437  
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The BEU and the MCU/NCU played a role in encouraging such alliances and 
agreements. Both organisations recognised the growing importance of local politics and 
were acutely aware that Labour success at the local level might eventually translate into 
parliamentary success. In December 1925 the Empire Record emphasised the national 
importance of municipal elections and criticised those who were ‘inclined to regard them 
in a parochial spirit’. It pointed out that Labour leaders like MacDonald and Sidney 
Webb viewed municipal power as an important stepping-stone to parliamentary power. 
Indeed, it contended, a Labour majority on a local council was worse than the return of a 
solitary socialist MP. The BEU painted a bleak picture of what might occur if Labour’s 
municipal policies were carried to their conclusion: 
 
…the local application of Socialist theories is regarded solely as a step towards 
their national application. The destruction of the present system of Society is the 
Socialists’ aim. If industries can be locally ‘municipalised’, if Municipal control 
can be imposed upon the necessities of life, that is a great step forward in the 
Socialists’ universal nationalisation programme and in the war on capitalism. The 
killing of private enterprise in certain areas…is a sure forerunner to the 
destruction of private enterprise throughout the country.438 
 
The MCU/NCU also regarded high levels of middle class participation in municipal 
elections as a vital means of halting Labour’s advance: 
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In Municipal voting especially we all have a direct and close interest, and yet too 
many of us pay no heed to the Municipal elections and are content to leave the 
voting to those who like to bother about it…. Has it ever occurred to you to notice 
the strong and increasing hold that Labour members are getting on our Municipal 
bodies, and how the Middle Class householder has to sweat for it? 439 
 
The message was clear: where ‘Socialist-Labour’ was in the majority rates went up. To 
prevent this calamity middle-class voters were urged to ‘go to election meetings and 
listen to the speeches and promises, and heckle stoutly as occasion offers’.440 The anti-
socialist right did much more than simply encouraging heckling, however. The 
MCU/NCU stood many candidates in municipal elections across the country during the 
1920s; and the BEU was outspoken in its support for anti-socialist candidates. The 
MCU/NCU, in particular, became a significant player in local politics in a number of 
towns and districts.  
Although the 1919 municipal elections are rightly seen as the catalyst for the 
widespread formation of anti-socialist alliances, examples of cross-party and ‘non-
political’ initiatives against Labour already existed in many localities. In large part this 
was a reflection of the co-operation between Conservatives and Liberals which 
underpinned the Coalition government. It was also influenced by the activities of the anti-
socialist right. In Eastbourne party labels were eschewed by anti-socialist councillors who 
preferred to be known as Independents. As Davies and Morley make clear, however, the 
label was misleading and such councillors ‘were, in both policy and speech, of a 
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conservative persuasion’. These ‘Independents’ received support from a variety of 
middle-class pressure groups, the ‘most notable’ of which was the MCU, which was 
‘very active in the Eastbourne area’ and achieved some prominence in the borough’s 
politics in 1919-20, and again in the late 1920s as the NCU.441 In Brighton in 1919 seven 
MCU candidates were elected to the borough council.442 A year later seven more stood 
on the MCU ticket, five of whom were elected. In 1921 three out of six were successful, 
though this time they did not use the MCU label. Davies and Morley suggest that this 
signalled the end of this ‘short-lived political diversion’;443 but the following year the 
organisation was still making an impact on local politics, campaigning for the closure of 
the town’s aquarium. The MCU branch Chairman, himself a town councillor, opposed all 
moves to keep the site in public ownership, claiming that ‘The town cannot run it at a 
profit…because, as with everything controlled by a public body, there would be too many 
highly-paid officials’.444 
Following on the successes of Labour in municipal elections in 1919 the MCU 
and BEU campaigned vigorously against middle-class apathy. Such campaigns, along 
with a number of well publicised rate rises, played a part in raising voter turnout 
significantly in 1920.445 This led to a marked decline in Labour victories, with 548 out of 
747 Labour candidates defeated. There was no major change in the number of openly 
Liberal and Conservative candidates returned, however, and it was often ‘Independents, 
standing as rate reducers’, who received the most votes. The Chairman of the MCU, 
Pretyman Newman, stated that the setback for Labour was ‘not a Conservative victory, 
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but a victory against municipal extravagance’. He pointed out that Conservatives, 
Liberals and even what he described as ‘ratepaying Labour’ jointly contributed to the 
results, which he hailed as ‘a victory of ratepayers at last aroused to action’.446 
Despite Pretyman Newman’s non-party claims, however, the vast majority of 
‘Independent’ candidates were Conservatives or anti-socialist Liberals, combining to 
keep Labour out of office, and committed to drastic ‘economies’ in local and national 
expenditure. A large number of them stood explicitly as MCU supporters. In April 1920 
the New Voice reported MCU councillors elected at Watford, Uxbridge, Twickenham, 
Ilford and Weston-Super-Mare.447 The organisation claimed to have run or supported 
nearly 300 candidates in November 1920, the large majority of whom were successful. In 
many towns and cities, including Liverpool, Southampton, Leeds, Yeovil, Ipswich and 
Wolverhampton, all the candidates supported by the MCU were elected. The numbers of 
MCU sponsored candidates varied considerably, however, with 23 in Liverpool and 21 in 
Southampton, but only one standing in Sheffield and two in Newcastle-on-Tyne.448  
Six out of eight MCU candidates were elected at Chester in 1920, where a year 
earlier the local branch had organised meetings to campaign against the council’s plans 
for building projects and other subsidised schemes, due to their cost. At one of these a 
local MCU member pointed out that the organisation was ‘without party purpose’ and 
that both Tories and Liberals could be members. Consequently, although the two parties 
continued to fight elections under their own party labels, the influence of the MCU and 
the Chester Ratepayers’ Association ensured that an electoral pact existed from 1920 
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onwards, providing ‘a rock-solid base for their joint domination of the council 
chamber’.449 
In 1921 the MCU again devoted significant efforts to intervening in municipal 
contests. Anti-waste was the major theme of local politics at this time and the MCU 
joined with the London Municipal Society and Municipal Reform in attacking the 
‘spendthrift tendency throughout the country’. The MCU expected to ‘use its influence in 
about 100 elections’ to urban district councils in April.450 As the county borough 
elections approached that Autumn, MCU Branches were instructed to ‘give consideration 
to the action of other organisations’ when deciding whether or not to stand candidates. It 
was stated that ‘Where the objects of…such bodies are in general accord with those of 
the MCU, negotiations may result in cooperation. It is hoped that unity of action will 
prevent the nomination of rival anti-waste candidates’. A list of twelve questions was 
drawn up by the MCU to enable electors to ascertain each candidate’s level of 
commitment to middle-class interests.451 Overall, out of 62 MCU candidates 45 were 
elected; and out of the 272 other candidates supported by the MCU 231 were elected. 
Among those places where MCU influence was felt was Cardiff, where the local 
branch, which had nearly doubled in size in the preceding year and claimed 1,412 
members, lent its support to five Coalitionists and a Liberal. From 1922 an informal anti-
Labour pact held sway and the NCU supported a variety of Conservative, Liberal, 
Independent and Ratepayer candidates, until a more formal anti-socialist alliance was 
formed in 1928. 452 At Leyton Labour successes in the municipal elections of 1920 led to 
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a joint campaign by the MCU and the local Ratepayers’ Association against a ‘soaring 
combined rate’, culminating in the 1921 defeat of council plans for a staff superannuation 
scheme, improved borrowing facilities, and increased powers for street improvements. 
This experience strengthened the anti-Labour forces in the district and although the 
election of 1921 produced stalemate, from 1922 until 1926 local government in Leyton 
was dominated by the Ratepayers’ Association.453 In Richmond the MCU ‘gave vocal 
support to any candidate who opposed the Labour Party, be they Conservative, Liberal or 
Independent’. Members included the former Mayor of Richmond, Dr. Lewis G. Hunt, 
and a number of councillors and aldermen.454 In neighbouring Twickenham the MCU 
branch was strongly represented on local councils in the early 1920s. In April 1921 MCU 
members won all eight of the seats up for election for Twickenham Urban District 
Council. In February 1922 two NCU candidates were returned unopposed to sit on 
Middlesex County Council; and a month later two more district councillors were added to 
the organisation’s tally.455 
On 17, 24, and 31 October 1921 the BEU placed large advertisements in the 
‘principal Sunday Newspapers which appeal to the working classes’ attacking 
Bolshevism and the Labour Party. The organisation’s Chairman and Treasurer, in a 
confidential letter to business backers, suggested there was ‘every reason to believe that 
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they were largely responsible for the overwhelming defeat which was suffered by the 
Labour and Socialist Candidates at the Municipal Elections on November 1st.456  
Following municipal elections in November 1922, which saw set-backs for 
Labour, Lord Askwith hailed the NCU’s ‘active opposition to Communism and 
Socialism’ as a major factor in the return of ‘124 NCU candidates out of a total of 
145’.457 The New Voice celebrated the fact that ‘Socialism in the municipalities has 
received a smashing blow. It must be followed up again and again, until the final “knock-
out” is delivered. The NCU can deliver that blow, and in the succeeding rounds vigilance 
and preparation must be continuous, zealous and confident’.458 
During the run up to the London County Council election of 2 March 1922 the 
BEU Executive Committee announced that it was organising ‘a band of voluntary 
workers who would give their services to any candidates opposing Labour-Socialists and 
Communists who may need assistance’; and appealed to all its supporters to ‘take an 
active part in canvassing others and bringing them to the poll’. This was prompted by its 
fear that Labour’s ‘programme would prove in practice a serious menace to the solvency 
and good administration of the Council as well as to private enterprise, and to the 
interests of all citizens and rate-payers’.459 When campaigning began the BEU made an 
‘intensive’ effort ‘in those districts where the Red influence was strongest’. The 
organisation claimed that it ‘did not support any candidate’, due to its strict ‘Non-Party-
Policy’. It merely ‘recommended voters not to elect the Labour-Socialists and gave them 
many reasons why they would suffer if they did’. The BEU stated that it had: 
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Played an important – and perhaps a decisive – part in averting the danger which 
threatened London. The threat was not from Labour, but from the sinister 
revolutionary element which professes to speak on behalf of Labour.460 
 
During the metropolitan borough elections in November the BEU claimed to have 
organised 100 meetings a week in the three weeks preceding the poll, utilising the slogan: 
‘Get the Labour-Socialists out and the rates will come down!’ A year later, it claimed that 
Londoners had as a whole had saved over £3,750,000 resulting from reduced rates 
prompted by their rejection of municipal socialism, and asked that voters take this into 
account and consider making a donation to the BEU fighting fund.461 
The BEU felt that it was due to their speakers that a ‘Moderate Member’ for 
Walsall town council was returned in the May 1923 elections with a two-to-one majority 
against an opponent ‘holding extreme socialist views’.462 During the borough elections of 
November, however, the BEU was forced to admit that ‘owing to lack of support’ it ‘was 
unable to carry on…a vigorous and widespread counter-campaign’ when Labour 
attempted to regain the seats it had lost the previous year. The set-backs were blamed on 
voter apathy. As soon as rates had been reduced ‘many electors promptly forgot the need 
for vigilance’. In those cities where the BEU was able to mount an effective and 
continuous counter-propaganda, however, such as Birmingham and Liverpool it was 
noted that the results were far more satisfactory.463 
                                                 
460
 Empire Record, April 1922, p. 71. 
461
 Empire Record, December 1923, p. 12. 
462
 Empire Record, June 1923, p. 100. 
463
 Empire Record, December 1923, p. 12. 
 133 
In municipal elections held in April 1924 NCU candidates were again successful 
in a number of localities, including Portslade, Hearne Bay, New Malden, Camberley, and 
Sutton.464 In local elections held in the same week as the 1924 general election the BEU 
claimed to have made ‘every effort…to rouse constitutional electors to do their duty at 
the polls’. Set-backs for Labour candidates in a number of localities, including 
Northampton and Portsmouth, were deemed to be a result of BEU activity. This was 
particularly true of Birmingham, where a large and active branch ensured that ‘the 
Socialists were routed’. The BEU’s local organiser, Captain Owen-Lewis, was returned 
by a record majority over his Socialist opponent’; and other notable successes were 
recorded across the city.465 Results in other parts of the country were less impressive, 
however. Although ‘the mass attack of the Socialists’ was defeated, Labour’s municipal 
representation overall had increased. Again, this was blamed on voter apathy and the fact 
that, unlike Birmingham, these localities did not have the BEU on hand to expose the red 
menace behind Labour’s moderate façade: 
 
Where the Constitutional party acted together, stirred up the ratepayers, and 
emphasised the importance of sane and economical Municipal government, they 
carried the day without difficulty. It is slackness in propaganda that leads to 
apathy among the electors. 466 
 
In early 1925, bolstered by the Conservative success in the general election and its 
own minor triumphs in Birmingham and Northampton, the BEU focused its attention on 
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attacking Labour’s remaining footholds in the municipalities. The organisation’s annual 
report for 1924 stated that ‘having worked hard to help remove…MacDonald and his 
supporters from the control of the country’ it would now ‘start a systematic 
campaign…for the removal of Socialist representation on the City, Borough and County 
Councils, Boards of Guardians and other local authorities’.467 This ambitious plan rested 
on the ability of Conservatives and other ‘Constitutionalists’ to maintain the unity 
evinced in the electoral battles of the previous year; for there was abundant evidence that 
despite the continued attempts to portray Labour as the thin end of a Bolshevist wedge, 
increasing numbers of voters were supporting the party’s candidates. The BEU noted 
ruefully that despite the Conservative landslide in the general election ‘Socialist and 
Communist candidates obtained a million more votes than they secured in 1923’.468 The 
NCU was also concerned that the stability heralded by the new Conservative government 
should not lead to apathy among the municipal electorate. It insisted that ‘the Socialists, 
sailing falsely under a “labour” flag, must be prevented from boarding the smaller ships 
of state represented by the local bodies’.469 
BEU and NCU fears concerning Labour’s continued popularity were confirmed in 
the municipal elections of 1925. Despite the fact that the anti-socialist Municipal Reform 
retained overall control in the London County Council elections in March, the advance of 
Labour at the expense of the [Liberal] Progressive Party was regarded as most disquieting 
by the BEU, which despite its best efforts, was unable to impact upon the result in a 
number of seats.470 In December the Empire Record stated that the results of the 
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November municipal elections were ‘not a cause of congratulation for the Constitutional 
parties’. Labour again made significant gains in London and in a number of provincial 
cities and boroughs. In Scotland, however, the party was routed, ‘the Socialists being in a 
general minority of less than one-third of the full representation’; and overall, the BEU 
took some comfort that Labour had not, despite ‘a most determined effort’, been able to 
repeat its 1919 level of success. The organisation claimed, furthermore, that in areas 
where it had been active, the national trend in favour of Labour had been reversed. In 
London the BEU organised ninety-six open-air meetings and distributed over 18,000 
leaflets. Although overall in London Labour made a net gain of 90 seats and gained 
control of two boroughs to add to their existing six, of the 18 boroughs in which the BEU 
was active only Shoreditch saw Labour increase its control. The Empire Record stated 
that ‘we have every reason to congratulate ourselves’, regarding the campaign as a 
vindication of the BEU’s consistent anti-socialist activity, which combined all-year-round 
propaganda work with intensive ‘whirlwind’ campaigning at election times. In London 
the BEU trebled the number of outdoor speaking staff it generally employed and made a 
special point of holding meetings in ‘spots which were regarded as so “unhealthy” that 
they were generally avoided by other propagandists’. These included Hoxton, and the 
‘notorious’ West Ham, where the organisation held three meetings at the request of the 
local ratepayers’ association. The BEU claimed that its efforts contributed to Labour’s 
loss of five seats in West Ham and had removed socialist representation in Wimbledon.471 
The BEU claimed significant success in Birmingham. Not only did all the sitting 
anti-Socialist candidates retain their seats, but the organisation’s intensive election 
campaign, building on year-long work in the city, was held to be responsible for four new 
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seats ‘won from the Socialists in the poorest parts of the city’. Much of this success was 
due to the efforts of Captain Owen-Lewis, the BEU Midland organiser, himself a city 
councillor. He had spoken at ‘many crowded meetings in several wards’, designed and 
composed an election poster which was praised in the Birmingham Mail, and had secured 
the loan of a large lorry which toured the city on polling day ‘packed with children 
singing patriotic songs’.472 
The operation of anti-socialist alliances in the localities ensured that agitation 
over rates and local expenditure effectively kept Labour from office in town halls across 
the nation. As keeping the ‘Socialists’ from power was the raison d’etre of the BEU and 
the NCU, they naturally supported such arrangements. Indeed, as the above investigation 
indicates, in many localities the MCU/NCU acted as a de-facto anti-socialist alliance, 
while the BEU was a most active participant in the anti-socialist cause. Furthermore, both 
bodies campaigned for the application of such a strategy at the national level and 
therefore contributed to the remarkable electoral success of the Conservative Party during 
this period.  
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Chapter 4. 
An ‘English Fascisti’? The Anti-Socialist Right and British Fascism. 
 
Benewick long ago suggested that the right-wing anti-socialist pressure groups of 
the 1920s, including the British Empire Union and the National Citizen’s Union, were 
among the precursors of British fascism.473 Such linkages reflect most historians’ 
understanding of the development of the British fascist movement, giving deserved 
attention to its domestic antecedents.474 Some observers have gone beyond this to suggest 
that these organisations were themselves ‘semi-fascist’ or even simply ‘fascist’.475 Many 
historians, however, reject such a direct correlation between the right-wing Conservatism 
of these groups and ‘genuine’ fascism, which, they contend, only appeared in Britain in 
any meaningful sense after Oswald Mosley’s adoption of the creed in 1932.476 This 
interpretation is complicated by the existence in the 1920s of a number of avowedly 
‘Fascist’ organisations, the nature of which have divided historians.477 In some respects 
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these organisations – particularly the British Fascists (BF) – were remarkably similar to 
contemporary anti-socialist pressure groups.478  Initially, both the BEU and NCU evinced 
a keen interest in and a level of sympathy towards Italian Fascism; and the NCU for a 
short time even styled itself the ‘English Fascisti’. Despite this, studies which set out to 
discuss the relationship between the Conservative right and fascism in the 1920s pay little 
attention to these bodies.479 This chapter will examine the contemporary discourse of the 
BEU and NCU on the question of fascism.  
 It is necessary to understand how fascism was perceived in Britain in the 1920s. 
This helps us to appreciate how organisations which might not have been fascist in the 
sense understood by some modern scholars were at times happy to lay claim to the 
epithet – and, even when they were not, frequently had it bestowed upon them by their 
enemies. Contemporary opinion often regarded Mussolini’s Italian Fascist movement as a 
more aggressive counterpart to British organisations like the BEU and the NCU. The 
Italian Fascisti were described in 1922 by one British commentator as ‘a strike-breaking 
anti-Bolshevist organisation composed mostly of the young men of the better classes who 
turn out like special constables to keep order, and to keep things going in factories, hotels 
etc., when workmen strike’.480 The Italy correspondent of The Times reported that 
‘Originally they were a sort of middle-class union against the disruptive forces which 
were eating into the Italian State and economic life’. He pointed out that the Fascisti 
claimed to be ‘progressive Conservatives’; and while subsequently the movement became 
‘something much more alive than a middle-class union’, and ‘spread into all classes and 
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split Labour in twain’, its main goal remained political and physical opposition to 
‘disruptive organisations’.481 In a speech to the Young Liberal Federation in January 
1925 Lloyd George pointed out that Conservatives and the middle classes generally had 
welcomed Fascism in 1923 as a powerful new remedy for Bolshevism: 
 
he remembered the joy in Tory circles here. There was not a first-class carriage 
which did not ring with songs of praise for Mussolini. If they scratched a 
Conservative they found a Fascist.482 
 
The political representatives of the British labour movement viewed 
developments very differently, but saw fascism in broadly similar terms, often employing 
the expression with regard to domestic developments. Labour Party MPs, including 
Emanuel Shinwell and Josiah Wedgwood, regarded fascism primarily as a strike-
breaking force.483 In the months running up to the General Strike of 1926 the Communist 
Party of Great Britain declared that the formation of the Organisation for the 
Maintenance of Supplies was ‘the most definite step towards organised Fascism yet made 
in this country’.484 Such views reverberated throughout the labour movement at this 
time.485  
It may be argued that such contemporaries wholly misunderstood the essence of 
fascism. This criticism is not only levelled by modern academics. At least one 
contemporary British supporter of Mussolini pointed out that many of his conservative 
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and nationalist sympathisers misconceived the ideological essence of the new movement. 
James Strachey Barnes, the principal British representative of the Centre Internationale 
d’Études sur la Fascisme (CINEF), emphasised the revolutionary nationalism at the heart 
of fascism, as well as its spiritual and cultural aspects.486 He was critical of conservatives 
who regarded it merely in materialistic terms and focused solely on its negative, anti-
communist aspect. In 1924 he criticised certain ‘Nationalist elements’ in Italy for 
‘denying what is as clear as day to all who have eyes to see, that Fascism is... 
revolutionary, and are deceiving themselves…with the idea that Fascism has already 
accomplished its main task and that Italian life will soon resume its normal pre-war 
aspect, before it was disturbed by the post-war threats of Bolshevism…. [I]t is this same 
attitude which is chiefly reflected in the foreign press, especially in England’.487  
Supporters of the BEU welcomed Mussolini’s assumption of power. Among the 
more influential were the proprietor and future proprietor of the Morning Post, Lady 
Bathurst and the Duke of Northumberland, both of whom were Vice-Presidents of the 
organisation. Fascism offered a beacon of hope to such figures; living proof that the ‘Red 
menace’ could be halted. Writing in his magazine, the Patriot, in January 1923, 
Northumberland expressed the view that similar ills to those visited on Italy after the war 
would face Britain in the near future. By pointing out that fascism had prevented national 
catastrophe in Italy, he hinted that in Britain, too, fascism might prove necessary.488 Lady 
Bathurst also regarded communism as a serious threat, seeing ‘the writing on the wall in 
ten-foot-high crimson letters’, a view shared by H. A. Gwynne, editor of the Morning 
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Post.489 Consequently, the newspaper hailed Mussolini’s ‘defeat of the “Socialist 
bully”’.490 While newspapers like The Times expressed unease at some of the Blackshirts’ 
excesses, the Morning Post had no such inhibitions. Anti-Bolshevism was the litmus test 
for Bathurst and Northumberland; and, as the situation in Italy ‘was simply Mussolini 
against Lenin’, their mouthpiece was not predisposed to find fault in the new 
government. Support for Fascism in these quarters continued despite concern at the 
revelation of the Matteotti murder and growing evidence of Mussolini’s dictatorial 
tendencies in 1924-5. In October 1927 the Morning Post was still rejoicing that 
Bolshevism had been routed in Italy by ‘trim handsome black shirted lads’.491  
Northumberland is widely regarded as a central figure of what Thurlow calls 
‘Conservative fascism’, and Pugh terms ‘boiled shirt fascism’.492 The Patriot ‘became a 
major mouthpiece for what has been described as the proto-fascist right or the 
‘conservative fascist tradition’.493 A number of other leading members of the BEU were 
associated with organisations laying claim to the mantle of fascism in the 1920s. Some 
became members of the British Fascists after 1923, including Earl Temple of Stowe,494 
Colonel Charles Burn, Conservative MP for Torquay,495 Sir Robert Burton Chadwick, 
Conservative MP for Wallasey,496 Admiral Sir Edmund Fremantle,497 and Miss Ethel 
Almaz Stout, minor novelist, president of the Association of Women Journalists, and a 
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member of the BEU Executive Committee.498 Other leading BEU supporters – including 
Lieutenant-Colonel A. H. Lane, and Prebendary Gough – were also members of H. H. 
Beamish’s tiny anti-Semitic sect, the Britons, an organisation often cited as an important 
ideological influence on the later development of British fascism.499 Gough, described by 
Ruotsila as the ‘cleric of the nascent British fascists’, consecrated the colours of the 
British Fascists at the Cenotaph in November 1926.500 Another leading member of the 
Britons was Brigadier-General Cyril Prescott-Decie, who sat on the Executive Committee 
of the BEU from December 1922.501 Prescott-Decie was the founder and leader of the 
Loyalty League, which wished to emulate Italian Fascism in Britain.502 He later became a 
leading member of the National Fascisti, a breakaway from the BF.503 Nesta Webster, 
who sat on the Grand Council of the British Fascists in 1926/7 and spoke and wrote for 
the organisation,504 often graced the platform at BEU meetings, and her publications were 
regularly advertised and endorsed in the pages of the Empire Record.505  
While these linkages indicate a level of kinship between the first British 
organisations claiming to be fascist and some leading members of the BEU they are not 
sufficient to tar that body with the fascist brush in any meaningful sense. Furthermore, 
those wishing to find evidence of overtly fascist leanings in the pages of the official 
publications of the organisation will be sorely disappointed. While the Empire Record 
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certainly expressed support for Italian Fascism, it was generally more guarded in its 
assessment than the Morning Post and the Patriot; and, significantly, it explicitly 
questioned the applicability of such a movement to British circumstances.  
In May 1922 the BEU’s Milan-based special correspondent reported that the 
Fascisti were very strong in the city, with 10,000 members, who were 
 
working up a great revolution to turn out the Communists and their German-Jew 
leaders. It is a stand-up fight between the Loyalists and the Bolshevists here, and 
the Fascisti will win as they are a very powerful body.506      
  
In July the correspondent stated that ‘The great power in the land is in the hands of the 
Fascisti, and rightly so, as they saved Italy from the German Jew Communist[s] 18 
months ago’. The Fascists are described as consisting mainly of ‘loyal ex-servicemen’, 
formed into an ‘armed and equipped fighting force… [of] one and a half million men’, 
augmented by the same number of reservists. Their ‘Spiritual Chief’, Mussolini, is 
described as a ‘very remarkable man… [who is] worshipped by all the Fascisti’. The 
Fascists’ ascendancy is welcomed on the grounds that ‘The old love for our country will 
be cherished by them as traditional, and they are anti-Bolshevist and entirely against this 
shameless treaty with Soviet Russia just signed in Rome by their German-led 
Government’.507 
Nearly a year later the Empire Record reproduced a speech made by Mussolini to 
delegates who had assembled in Rome for the Second Congress of the International 
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Chamber of Commerce. Mussolini styled himself as a pro-business conservative who 
wished to return Italy ‘to the full normality of her political and economic life’.508 His 
statements explain, in part, why the British right were initially prone to regard Fascism as 
an ally in the fight against left-wing extremism, and the commensurate view on the left 
that ‘Fascism is essentially a movement expressing the interests of industrial 
capitalists’:509 
 
It is my conviction that the State must renounce its economic functions…give full 
play to private enterprise and forgo any measure of State control or State 
paternalism…. I do not believe that that complex of forces which…may be called 
with the glorious name of capitalism, is about to end, as for a length of time it was 
thought it would by several thinkers of the social extremism…. [A]ll systems of 
associated economy which avoid free initiative and individual impulse, fail more 
or less piteously in a short lapse of time. But free initiative does not exclude 
understandings among groups, which are all the easier, the more loyal is the 
protection accorded to private interests.’510  
 
Mussolini’s left critics often pointed to the ‘demagogic device’ whereby he made great 
play of his working-class origins and labour movement past when addressing workers.511 
There seems little doubt that Mussolini chose his words to suit his audience on this 
occasion too. Whether or not Mussolini was trying to be all things to all men, the BEU 
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appear to have taken his pro-capitalist sentiments at face value, as there is no word of 
criticism accompanying its reporting of this particular speech. 
Following another protracted silence on the subject, the Empire Record returned 
to the theme of fascism in March 1924, in a short piece ‘giving a few details concerning 
this great counter-bolshevic [sic] force’. It describes the ‘Fasci’, rather romantically, as 
‘the little bands of men who set out to break the communist rule’, pointing out that under 
Mussolini’s generalship: 
 
the Fascismo have become one of the most vital forces in Europe. At the 
beginning it was a grim fight, they were few and all bolshevic Italy was against 
them, but they were in the right and they knew it. One of the Fascisti customs is 
that when calling roll after a raid, should the name of one who has fallen in action 
be called, the entire ‘squadra’ answer ‘Here’. Roll call over, the caller will salute 
his commanding officer and announce ‘All present and accounted for’. It will take 
more than communists to destroy this spirit. 
 
While the bravado of the Italian squadristi clearly appealed, it was felt necessary to stress 
that the Italian approach was not necessarily the most appropriate solution for Britain: 
 
But to any who play with the idea of a picturesque body of blackshirts putting 
England’s wrongs to right, I would point out that the Fascismo was essentially 
born of the need of the moment, when violence had to be met with violence.512 
 
                                                 
512
 Empire Record, March 1924, p. 55. 
 146 
The persistence of Fascist violence in Italy well beyond ‘the need of the moment’, in 
particular the ‘extremely shocking’ murder of Matteotti, was a source of some discomfort 
for the BEU, and tested its initial rose-tinted view of the new regime.513 
The Empire Record did not devote a great deal of attention to the question of 
fascism in the 1920s. Despite the paucity of its coverage, however, the extracts above 
provide an outline of the trajectory of the BEU attitude to organised fascism. Italian 
Fascism was welcomed initially as a counter-Bolshevik force when it was felt that 
bourgeois hegemony was under threat; but regarded rather more coolly when it became 
apparent that the threat was diminished, and Fascism’s ‘Continental excesses’ became 
apparent. The BEU’s attitude to the small band of British ‘fascists’ may have been 
coloured by similar considerations; though this is difficult to ascertain as there was very 
little official comment on this matter. This might be taken as an indication that, much like 
the Conservative Party, the BEU studiously ignored such organisations, regarding them 
as a liability, or more likely as insignificant.514  
Martin Pugh has suggested that the ‘frustration and anger’ evident among the 
British middle classes in the early post-war period, which manifested itself in the 
formation of organisations like the National Party and the Anti-Waste League, ‘could 
easily have become the seedbed for fascism’.515 Although the main sources of press 
support for these bodies, the Morning Post and Lord Rothermere’s Daily Mail 
respectively, were to be consistent apologists for Mussolini and Italian Fascism, Pugh’s 
assertion is difficult to concretise, because the National Party had been dissolved and the 
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AWL was in terminal decline when Mussolini assumed power.516 A much more fruitful 
avenue of investigation in this regard exists, however, in the form of the other significant 
right-wing organisation thrown up by the ferment of the Coalition years – the National 
Citizens’ Union.  
As with the BEU, prominent members of the NCU expressed support for 
Mussolini and Fascism; and some went on to join the British Fascists after 1923. Many of 
the NCU’s leading ‘fascists’ were also members of the BEU, including Burn and 
Chadwick, Prebendary Gough, Prescott-Decie, and Colonel Lane.517 Nesta Webster’s 
views were also endorsed in the NCU press, and she often spoke at NCU meetings on a 
variety of anti-socialist topics.518 So, too, did Mrs Hamilton More Nisbett, the Vice-
President of the British Fascists’ Scottish Women’s Units.519 A leading member of 
Richmond NCU, Lieutenant-Colonel Reginald Tyrer, was also a supporter of the BF in 
the locality, as well as being ‘an outspoken and rather volatile Conservative’.520  
 Public expressions of sympathy with Italian Fascism are far more evident in the 
New Voice than in the Empire Record. Furthermore, it contains a number of articles and 
letters which stress the affinity between the NCU and Mussolini’s movement, and 
proclaim fascism’s applicability to British circumstances. In a December 1922 interview 
with Dr. C. Pellizzi, a representative of the Italian Fascisti, and London correspondent of 
its journal, Popolo d’Italia, the alleged similarities between the NCU and fascism are 
enthusiastically brought to the fore: 
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For many months past headquarters of the National Citizens’ Union has been 
interested in the doings of the Fascisti for general reasons, and also because, 
owing to similarity of aims and policy, the NCU is often called the Fascisti of 
England…. A representative of THE NEW VOICE called on Dr. Pellizzi last 
week and heard some details regarding the Fascisti movement and its noble 
ideals, Dr. Pellizzi recognising many points in NCU policy which coincide with 
Fascismo.521 
 
The remainder of the article repeats, with credulity and admiration, Pellizzi’s eulogy to 
the new doctrine: 
 
 Depending on the best basic principles of national and personal desire as its 
starting point, it relies on the power of its intellectual forces for those principles to 
be carried out…. Fascismo regards itself as the expression of the true desire or 
need of the masses…. After the war, the movement became an organisation of ex-
servicemen, and the intellectual middle classes joined it in great numbers. Its 
discipline is magnificent and its organisation a wonder…. The Fascist plan of 
Government…has every evidence of being a good model.  
 
In the same issue there is another laudatory article, by Nora Brownrigg, entitled ‘Fascisti: 
A Conservative Re-action against Bolshevism’. Brownrigg asks: 
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Is it possible that a new chapter has opened in the history of the world? For the 
last few years the world in general has suffered from strikes, Socialist excesses, 
Bolshevism and anarchy…. In the last few months one country has succeeded in 
evolving order out of chaos, and with stern courage has really started ‘to set its 
house in order’…. Fascismo has formed a public opinion which not only demands 
justice and practical reform, but sees to it that the aspirations are realised.522 
 
Whilst acknowledging that some of the Fascisti ‘have passed through a phase of 
socialism and communism in their search for a new order, the keynote of which should be 
Brotherhood’, Brownrigg stresses that such people ‘did not form the nucleus of 
Fascismo…[but]…joined the party later. It was the younger men and the educated classes 
who banded themselves together to put an end to the disorders of the Socialists and 
Bolshevists which threatened to ruin the whole country’. This image of fascism as a 
predominantly middle-class defence force clearly held certain attractions for the NCU:  
 
The movement began as a natural and legitimate reaction against the intolerable 
anarchy created by the Italian Bolshevists during the feeble government of Nitti in 
1919. The occupation of the factories which was allowed by the Giolitti 
government of 1920, sealed the fate of Bolshevism. It was then that the middle 
classes and their champions, the Fascisti, took their courage in both hands and 
awoke to the fact that it was up to them to retaliate and repress anarchy and 
restore order.  
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Brownrigg emphasises the support received by Mussolini from industrialists, the 
bourgeoisie, shopkeepers, police, soldiers, and civil servants. Essentially she presents 
fascism as counter-revolutionary, emanating from elements within the existing state 
apparatus, and from among the privileged and middle strata of society. Much faith is 
placed in Mussolini as a moderate, conservative statesman, who would bring order to the 
streets: 
 
Anarchy had to be fought with its own weapons, but now that they have gained 
their end…Mussolini…is determined to uphold and enforce constitutional 
procedure and to abandon the doctrine of extra-legal organised force which has 
been in being up till now…. Our sympathies must go out to the new Government, 
with the hope that Mussolini will succeed in his…task. 
 
Particular praise is directed by Brownrigg towards the virile young Italian men who had 
donned black shirts to extinguish the Bolshevist menace: ‘It is the youth of Italy that has 
wrought this miracle, under the firm guidance of a man who knew how to organise them 
and use their patriotism and spirit of self-sacrifice for their country’.  
This emphasis on the youthfulness of fascism became a recurring theme in NCU 
discourse. In Spring 1923, a future British Fascist supporter, John Baker White, 
apologised for his tender years prior to making a speech at a meeting of Canterbury 
NCU.523 His apologies were in all likelihood brushed aside by his audience, for youth 
was a precious commodity in an organisation which appears to have had a surfeit of 
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middle-aged, as well as middle-class, members. In January 1923 ‘J. P.’ from Hythe 
insisted in a letter to the New Voice that 
 
More young blood is needed. The NCU would become much more powerful if it 
could enlist the bulk of middle class youth of both sexes. Our young men are 
playing too much. The extraordinary ‘pull’ of sport, while good up to a point, is 
keeping our young people…away from any part in the serious things of life today, 
which suits the ‘Bolshie book’ admirably. Probably ninety per cent of the Italian 
Fascisti are under thirty years of age…. Let us…enlist and encourage in our ranks 
the young men and young women of our land.524 
 
The following month, in an unsigned piece on the ‘Development of National Citizen’s 
Union Interests: Some Suggestions for the Branches’, it is asserted that: 
 
The success of the Italian Fascisti is due almost entirely to youth, and the National 
Citizens’ Union as a national body might become the Fascisti of England if the 
younger members were enrolled in large enough numbers. The NCU as Fascisti, 
while keeping in mind a similar ideal, would be without the faults and dangers of 
the Italian movement, and would avoid the harshness which has accompanied the 
growth of Mussolini’s organisation.525 
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In the same issue there is a letter from one A. Leonard Summers, who urges the NCU to 
develop as a fascist movement in a tone which adds credence to Pugh’s suggestion of 
middle-class activism as a potential ‘seedbed for fascism’:  
 
The power of the Middle Classes is far greater than appears to be realised.... ‘If 
the middle classes would only form a strong combined union, no Government 
could stand against them’…. I suggest that the NCU seeks the active co-operation 
of all Ratepayers’ and Taxpayers’ Associations, also the Chambers of Commerce 
throughout the kingdom. Such a powerful combination could accomplish many 
useful things, but I would even go further and advocate what the NCU already 
forms the nucleus of – the establishing of a British Fascismo! Why not? Signor 
Mussolini has quickly and clearly shown the whole world how completely the 
Italian Fascist movement put down Communism, reduced expenditure, defeated 
bureaucracy, and relieved the taxation burden, besides dealing effectively with 
food profiteering and similar injustices…. Obviously the time has come when 
normality and stability of nations can only be regained by the combined efforts of 
the people themselves…. To my mind no nation more sorely needs the healthy 
movement than battered Britain. I believe that if the NCU decided to organise a 
Fascisti, the proposal would be received with immense enthusiasm immediately, 
not only among members, but throughout the country, and that there would be a 
surprising rush to join the forces of what would rapidly become the greatest 
power for good England has ever seen! Now, Middle Classes, what about it?526 
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The editorial comment which accompanies the letter informs Mr. Summers that ‘the 
NCU is already known and referred to as the English Fascisti, and...the new campaign 
outlined for 1923 by the Grand Council…will emphasise this fact’. The promised 
emphasis did not in fact materialise, and excitement regarding the prospects of an 
‘English Fascisti’ emerging from the ranks of the NCU soon died down.  
 By the Autumn of 1923 the organisation was at some pains to distance itself from 
its erstwhile brethren in Italy. Public concern regarding Mussolini’s dictatorial tendencies 
and the brutality of the movement’s black-shirted vanguard meant that more often than 
not the epithet ‘Fascisti’ was applied to the NCU pejoratively by its opponents. The 
following editorial in the New Voice shows a marked change of tone: 
 
‘People think that [Italian Fascism] is rather like what our Citizens’ Union might 
accomplish if its very mild members armed themselves with revolvers and took 
their coats off’. In these terms, Lord Rothermere in…the Sunday Pictorial…refers 
to the NCU, possibly even intending his words to suggest a certain line of action. 
The fact is, however, that although Mussolini certainly broke the Communist 
movement in Italy, the Fascist activity was entirely a lawless undertaking, 
accompanied by much bloodshed and even murder. Its tyranny would never 
appeal to Englishmen for long, and rightly so, on the principle that two wrongs 
never made a right. Further, the time for violence or harsh action has  not arrived 
and probably never will, because the more reasonable methods of education, 
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propaganda and debate will achieve the desired object in our country, and civil 
war or class murder will neither be tolerated nor necessary.527 
 
The same viewpoint had already been aired, at an NCU rally in Brixton on 24 September 
1923, by Gervais Rentoul, Conservative MP for Lowestoft. Rentoul, wished to ‘see the 
reign of force come to an end and to see the reign of law and peace prevail in public 
affairs. I am therefore equally opposed to Communists and the Fascisti’.528  
The overriding picture, however, is one of ambiguity, with a number of leading 
members of the NCU publicly voicing their allegiance to fascism as the decade 
progressed. At the fifth annual conference of the organisation, held in London on 13 June 
1924, Pretyman Newman stated that the new Labour government was the British 
equivalent of the Kerensky administration which had succumbed to Bolshevism in 
November 1917. Such a situation would resolve itself, he believed, in either bloody 
revolution on the Russian model, or in salvation for the middle classes as had occurred in 
Italy, due to the activities of Mussolini’s Fascists. He left his audience in little doubt 
which outcome he preferred: 
 
I know there is a Fascist movement in England. I am a Fascist myself. I see some 
of you here are Fascists. I am really sorry you came into existence, because you 
have stolen part of our objects. It was our movement. Well, we can now work 
with you and you with us to keep…essential public services going, and if it comes 
to a question of anything like real direct action and those beginnings of 
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revolution, we, the National Citizens’ Union, and you, the Fascisti, will stand 
together as one undivided body.529  
 
A rather differently worded report of the same speech in the Manchester Guardian, while 
conveying the same general message, makes clear, however, that Pretyman Newman was 
not a card-carrying member of the BF:  
 
I know there is a Fascist movement in England. I am a Fascist myself. I have not 
attended a Fascist meeting, and have not paid a subscription. I don't know very 
much about it. I was asked to join by an old colleague of mine in Parliament. 
Some of you are Fascists. I am sorry that it came into existence. We ought to be 
doing the work that you are doing. Simply because we have been slack you have 
come into being. If direct action is started the National Citizens' Union and the 
Fascists will stand together as one undivided body to nip any revolution in the 
bud.530 
 
At the NCU Grand Council meeting of 28 November 1924 a resolution from the 
Broadstone (Dorset) branch was passed which ‘fully approves of closer co-operation 
between the NCU, BEU, British Fascisti and other kindred organisations’.531 
This confusion came to a head in 1925-6 and centred on the role organised 
‘fascists’ should play in the voluntary effort to maintain essential services in the event of 
a general strike. In November 1925 Dame Louisa Lumsden addressed an Edinburgh 
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lodge of the Unionist Workers’ League, an official Conservative Party body, on the 
subject ‘Is Fascism Desirable?’ Although expressing the view that ‘Fascism had saved 
Italy from ruin’ in ‘conditions…very similar to those we have in this country at the 
present moment’, she felt that fascism, ‘owing to the difference between British and 
Italian mentality…would never be tolerated in this country’. Instead, she endorsed the 
Organisation for the Maintenance of Supplies (OMS) and the NCU, which, ‘being non-
party and non-political, were to be preferred in this country to combat any attempted 
hold-up of the community’.532 Lumsden was possibly unaware that the British Fascists 
were in fact working alongside the NCU and BEU in the OMS. In April 1926, following 
parliamentary criticism of the OMS and its links with ‘fascist’ groups, Joynson-Hicks, the 
Conservative Home Secretary, and a prominent member of both the NCU and BEU, 
threatened to resign his positions in those organisations if they did not back his call for 
the ‘fascists’ in the OMS to change their name, reject paramilitarism and endorse 
parliamentary democracy.533 The OMS and its affiliates backed Joynson-Hicks, 
precipitating a major split in the BF, resulting in the formation of the British Loyalists 
which accepted the conditions.534 In spite of such public disavowals of fascism, however, 
a number of leading NCU members persisted in calling themselves fascists. Following 
the collapse of the General Strike a New Voice editorial describing the work of NCU 
strike volunteers exclaimed: ‘England was said to have needed a Mussolini! England 
found Mussolinis by the thousand!’535 In the same month as the OMS controversy the 
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Chairwoman of Stratford-upon-Avon branch of the NCU, Mrs Eleanor Melville, proudly 
described herself as ‘A Fascist and a Conservative’.536  
In 1927 Melville became a Vice-President of the NCU and sat on its Executive 
Committee. Joining her in these roles was Commander Oliver Locker-Lampson, 
Conservative MP for Handsworth.537 Locker-Lampson is remembered by historians as an 
employer of fascist stewards at rallies of his ‘Clear Out the Reds’ campaign, which was 
praised fulsomely by the NCU, though regarded with some disdain by the BEU. Locker-
Lampson personally requested ‘some six hundred fascist stewards’ for a rally at the 
Albert Hall in July 1926; and in October ‘1,500 fascists’ attended a similar event, chaired 
by the NCU president, Lord Askwith, at which they ‘carried Union Jacks, formed a guard 
of honour, conducted Locker-Lampson and the other speakers down the gangway, and 
ejected anyone who disturbed the meeting’.538 Less well known is the fact that Locker-
Lampson later attempted to turn Clear Out the Reds into a personal vehicle for his own 
demagogic style of anti-communist propaganda. This movement, which operated under a 
variety of names, including ‘Hands off Our Empire’, the ‘Sentinels of Empire’, the 
‘League of Loyalists’, and the ‘Blueshirts’, employed fascist-style symbolism and ritual 
to a far greater extent than others on the anti-socialist right. The Sentinels wore blue 
shirts and employed a host of other blue paraphernalia; they also had their own anthem, 
entitled March On! whose lyrics were personally composed by Locker-Lampson.539 
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Despite, or perhaps because of, their leader earning the nickname ‘Britain’s Hitler’, the 
Sentinels vanished rather abruptly into obscurity in 1932.540  
While the above investigation into the attitudes of the BEU and NCU provides 
useful evidence showing that fascism appealed to the British anti-socialist right and was 
occasionally considered worth emulating, it is less helpful when employed for 
definitional purposes. Confusion regarding the precise nature of such organisations forms 
a strand of a much wider debate on the nature of fascism itself. In recent decades this 
field has been dominated by scholars striving to distil the essence of fascism – the ‘fascist 
minimum’ – to provide an abstract but heuristically useful definition of ‘generic fascism’. 
This approach, which is most forcefully articulated in the work of Roger Griffin, has been 
employed to differentiate ‘genuine’ fascist organisations from other right-wing, militarist 
and reactionary bodies. In The Nature of Fascism Griffin contends that previous efforts at 
understanding fascism have widened its definition too far, causing scholars to lose sight 
of fascism’s core ideological values.541 To counter this he posits fascism as an abstraction 
embodying fascism’s ideological minimum.542 Griffin’s resulting ‘new ideal type of 
generic fascism’, in its most concise form, ‘…is a genus of political ideology whose 
mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-
nationalism.’543 Important characteristics of fascism that flow from this ideal type are its 
revolutionary nature, anti-Marxism, anti-capitalism, and anti-conservatism. Griffin’s 
fascism is thus far removed from liberal- and Marxist-inspired perceptions of fascism as 
reactionary, conservative and counter-revolutionary. Griffin’s definitional model may be 
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employed in order to show that the organisations of the British anti-socialist right, and 
indeed much of the ‘first wave’ of British ‘fascism’, notably the BF, possessed few 
characteristics which could reasonably justify labelling them ‘fascist’.  
Another author writing within the fascist minimum framework is Thomas 
Linehan. He dismisses the fascist credentials of organisations like the BEU and the NCU, 
stating that ‘It is clear on closer examination that the political and ideological profile of 
the post-war anti-labour groups did not contain an appropriate number of generic fascist 
characteristics’.544 Employing the empirical evidence of these bodies’ attitudes to fascism 
detailed above, alongside other aspects of their outlook and activity laid down in the 
accompanying chapters, it is possible to suggest qualifications to some of Linehan’s 
points whilst concurring with his general thesis. 
Linehan rightly points out that there was ‘a noticeable absence of a leadership cult 
within these anti-labour formations’.545 The founder of the BEU, Sir George Makgill, 
seems to have deliberately shunned the limelight; while the organisation’s Secretary, 
Reginald Wilson, though clearly an energetic editor and organiser, does not come across 
as either charismatic or demagogic. Likewise, Lord Askwith, an expert in industrial 
relations and former government negotiator, often sought to add a conciliatory note to 
MCU/NCU proceedings. Askwith’s caution was sometimes employed to restrain ‘fascist’ 
hotheads like Pretyman Newman and Prebendary Gough; but no leadership cult ever 
threatened to develop around these figures either. The formal figureheads of the British 
anti-socialist right were often elderly aristocrats, military men, and veteran Conservative 
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MPs who had been elevated to the House of Lords at the end of their political careers, 
like Lord Danesfort.  
Linehan states that among the anti-socialist right there is ‘simply no evidence of a 
desire to overthrow the existing order and replace it with a new type of state based on the 
myth of a revitalised national community’.546 The BEU and NCU saw their role primarily 
as defending the existing order and preventing its overthrow. However, there was a 
tendency on the right at times to regard liberalism, socialism and cosmopolitanism as 
forces which had usurped power in Britain, both by bribery and manipulation of the 
uneducated new electorate, and through blatant corruption. As Lloyd George’s Coalition 
fell apart in 1921-2 there was a sense that ‘old’ forms of politics were becoming obsolete; 
that ‘the people’, or more often ‘the public’ – by which was often meant middle-class 
rate- and tax-payers – should have a more direct say in the governance of the nation, 
particularly regarding public expenditure. There was a rhetorical insurgency directed 
against the government at this time led by politicians and press barons whose views 
coincided with those of the anti-socialist right on these questions. A. Leonard Summers’ 
notion, alluded to earlier, that ‘normality’ and ‘stability’ could only be ‘regained by the 
combined efforts of the people themselves’, shows how Mussolini’s success in Italy 
seemed to concretise a strategy for the achievement of these middle-class aspirations. 
Despite clear differences between Italian and British conditions in the early 1920s, there 
were enough similarities for the anti-socialist right to at least speculate on the fortunes of 
an ‘English Fascisti’, growing from the ranks of the NCU and the wider cohorts of the 
disillusioned Conservative right – had the Coalition managed to survive beyond 1922. 
That it did not is, of course, testimony to the dominant allegiance of the British anti-
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socialist right at the time, which was to the Conservative Party and ‘Constitutional’ 
politics. Organisations like the BEU and the NCU were able to articulate and channel 
middle-class fears and aspirations which might  under different circumstances – defeat in 
war, an intractable period of crisis, and a revolutionary, Marxist-led labour movement – 
have necessitated a more thoroughbred fascism than the various ‘ugly ducklings’ which 
in fact hatched out. 
On the question of paramilitarism, Linehan states that there is no indication that 
the anti-socialist right ‘were prepared to embrace a culture of political violence’.547 He 
takes issue with Hope’s suggestion that the right entertained thoughts of a paramilitary 
solution to Britain’s post-war ills, creating a ‘sort of squadristi in waiting’. Yet, 
throughout the 1920s, and during earlier struggles, the right was willing to at least 
countenance the use of paramilitary force against its enemies. Benewick points to a 
tradition of paramilitarism on the right, symbolised by the preparations for civil war made 
by Ulster Unionists and their Conservative allies in 1912.548 The anti-socialist right were 
the heirs of that tradition. Appealing against a conviction for sedition in 1921, the 
communist-sympathising MP, Colonel Malone, pointed out that during the Ulster crisis a 
number of Unionist MPs later associated with the NCU had made speeches condoning 
illegal acts of violence. Pretyman Newman had said ‘To my mind, any man would be 
justified in shooting Mr Asquith in the streets of London’; while A. M. Samuel had said 
that ‘When the first shot of civil war is fired in Ulster, as sure as we stand here one of the 
Cabinet Ministers will be hanged on a lamp-post in Downing Street’.549 Such figures 
provide a direct link between those prepared to take up arms against Home Rule and the 
                                                 
547
 Linehan, p. 55. 
548
 Benewick, pp. 22-6.  
549
 Scotsman, 18 January 1921. 
 162 
anti-communists of the 1920s. During the Great War the BEU organised gangs of thugs 
to attack supposed enemy aliens and pacifist meetings on many occasions. During the 
partition of Ireland the BEU was involved in the violent expulsion of Catholic and 
socialist workers from Belfast’s shipyards. It was by its own admission associated at this 
time with the Ulster Protestant Association, a body which evolved rapidly into a sectarian 
murder gang.  
Violence was hinted at whenever ‘Constitutional Government’ seemed in peril, 
notably after the accession to office of the first Labour government in early 1924. Pugh, 
detecting a ‘militarist element’ in the calculations of the anti-socialist right at this time, 
describes how the Duke of Northumberland felt the best outcome would be ‘a civil war 
from which the patriots would emerge victorious’.550 In this atmosphere, at a meeting 
organised by the NCU to discuss the new situation, Lady Askwith described the Labour 
government as an ‘attempted despotism of a small minority’, while Sir Frederick 
Banbury moved a resolution ‘affirming that the overwhelming majority of the electors of 
this country were opposed to being governed by the Socialist minority in the new 
Parliament’. Prebendary Gough dismissed ‘this absurd cant of fair play’ as applied to the 
Labour Party. To cries of ‘Shoot him’ from the audience, Banbury referred to a speech by 
the left-wing Labour MP, George Lansbury, in which he had allegedly stated that Charles 
I had been beheaded for standing up against the common people. Banbury claimed 
Lansbury’s speech was meant as a threat to the King and doubted a Labour government 
would respect the Constitution. Noting that ‘the Long Parliament was dissolved by 
Cromwell with the aid of the Coldstream Guards’, Banbury stated, to loud cheers, that ‘I 
should have great pleasure in leading the Coldstream Guards into the House of Commons 
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if Mr MacDonald attempted anything of that sort’.551 As late as 1927 a letter to the New 
Voice advocated ‘the restoration of the franchise to a property-owning and rate-paying 
basis’, and urged ‘the middle-class man to learn the use of the RIFLE and BAYONET as 
his means of reform in place of his useless minority vote’; though the editor was forced to 
point out that many readers might find such views ‘reactionary’.552  
Of course, much of the real rather than threatened violence of the patriotic right 
occurred at the more mundane level of physical confrontation with the left – using fists 
and coshes rather than firearms. The Edmonton branch of the BEU grew out of the 
pitched battles to hoist the Union Jack rather than the red flag above Edmonton Town 
Hall.553 On many occasions, however, such violence grew out of the right’s determination 
to defend its platform from left-wing attacks.554 While the cry of ‘self-defence’ invariably 
accompanied the violence of Mussolini’s squadristi, the extent of such conflict in Britain 
never reached the intensity shown on the Continent and remained secondary to peaceful 
methods of political struggle. Furthermore, there had been a long tradition of ritualised 
mob violence in British politics, particularly during election campaigns. The militant 
actions of the BEU may be better understood as more representative of this older political 
tradition than symptomatic of fascist tendencies. While there was a continual threat of 
violence underlying the right’s anti-socialism, therefore, Linehan is probably right to 
suggest that this did not amount to a ‘culture of violence’, or an ideological commitment 
to political violence; at least not to the extent necessary to satisfy definitions of generic 
fascism. In most instances, the violence – threatened and real – of the British right was 
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aimed at defending ‘the Constitution’. Even if Britain’s post-war crisis had been more 
acute, necessitating use of armed force against the left or insurgent workers, there is little 
concrete evidence to suggest that the right would have stepped beyond offering auxiliary 
support to the existing coercive apparatus of the state. 
Linehan stresses that there was no ‘repository of “palingenetic political myth”, the 
regenerative urge at the heart of authentic fascist doctrine, within this early post-war anti-
labour discourse’.555 It is an inescapable fact, however, that Britain’s status as a nation at 
the end of the First World War was far removed from that of Italy or Germany, where 
fascist revolutions succeeded subsequently. This understanding has underpinned most 
explanations of the failure of British fascism in the inter-war period.556 As Martin 
Durham has pointed out, ‘Ultimately, Germany’s defeat and the sheer size of the British 
Empire precluded the nationalist resentment so crucial to the rise of fascism 
elsewhere’.557 But, while there were no British ‘November Traitors’, Durham points out 
that the possibilities for the extreme right were not wholly unpromising, due in part to the 
fact that ‘[t]he rise of insurgent nationalism within the Empire led to fears that the 
nation’s pre-eminent role in the world was in danger, while at home…industrial 
unrest…polarised political opinion’.558 ‘Fascism’ in its British context thus centred on the 
defence of the Empire from those alien forces allegedly at work trying to undermine 
Britain’s pre-eminence at home and abroad. Paramount among these forces was 
Bolshevism, which was widely believed to be behind both domestic industrial unrest and 
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nationalist insurgency. Britain’s ostensible position as the world’s premier imperial 
power in the 1920s not only inhibited the success of genuine fascism, but also 
fundamentally conditioned the organisational and ideological forms which the movement 
took there. Instead of regarding fascist revolution as a necessary step along the road to 
national rebirth in the 1920s, the vast majority of British patriots regarded the existing 
institutions of the state, as long as they were controlled by the right people, as the best 
guarantors of perpetuating national greatness and safeguarding it from its enemies and 
the baleful fate of previous empires.559  
The above discussion suggests that the affinity with fascism of organisations like 
the BEU and the NCU should not be dismissed out of hand. Although they displayed an 
enduring attachment to capitalism and bourgeois democratic forms of governance which 
tends to rule them out as ‘generic fascists’, other elements of their ideological make up, 
notably their extreme anti-communism and ultra-nationalism place them within the 
general milieu of the authoritarian right, of which genuine fascism is a component. 
Arguably, the appeal of the ultra-nationalist ideology of the pro-Conservative anti-
socialist right was a factor undermining the emergence of a genuine fascist movement in 
1920s Britain. Pugh, for instance, has questioned the ‘traditional assumption’ that British 
fascism failed because the Conservative Party rejected its ideas, pointing out that ‘it is 
just as plausible to argue that it failed because Conservatism was susceptible to pressure 
from the extreme right’.560 That pressure was more successfully exerted by the politicians 
and businessmen of the BEU and the NCU than through the theatrical stunts of the 
British Fascists and the National Fascisti. In the 1920s the anti-socialist right encouraged 
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ultra-nationalist and anti-communist ideas in the Conservative Party. Although this may 
have contributed to what Benewick describes as the creation of ‘a climate of opinion 
receptive to fascist ideas’, it is more appropriate to regard the Conservative Party as a 
‘more respectable and responsible outlet…’ for the fanatical patriotism and anti-
Bolshevism which drove the phenomenon of fascism on the Continent. The ‘presence of 
a solid, reliable party of the established order was an important prerequisite in preventing 
the fragmentation and polarisation of middle-class voters’; it was a major factor 
undermining the successful development of ‘genuine’ revolutionary fascism in Britain in 
the 1920s.561 Although traditional parties of the right on the Continent also attempted to 
articulate and control such prejudices and aspirations, in some cases they lost ground to 
genuine fascism, due to the intractable nature of their respective socio-political crises, 
which fuelled the militancy of their often Marxist-led workers’ movements. These were 
precisely the factors lacking in the British context, allowing the pre-existing organisations 
of the anti-socialist right such as the BEU and NCU to channel potentially ‘fascist’ 
energies and ambitions into mainstream forms of organisation and agitation.  
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Conclusion. 
 
The British Empire Union and the National Citizens’ Union were among the 
leading anti-socialist organisations in Britain during the inter-war period. On a number of 
occasions between 1917 and 1927 they were able to push anti-socialist themes to the 
front of mainstream politics. The above discussion indicates that both organisations were 
more prominent and influential than the existing historiography of the British right 
suggests. Webber tends to dismiss the post-war anti-Bolshevist organisations as obscure 
and inept;562 while Cowling describes their supporters as the ‘lunatic fringe’ of 
Conservative politics.563 Such interpretations, taken at face value, can be misleading. 
The BEU and NCU were relatively influential within Conservative Party circles, 
particularly among backbench MPs and local activists. They developed mass 
memberships during the post-war period which would put most British fringe groups of 
the twentieth century to shame. They played an important role in the events which 
culminated in the demise of the Lloyd George Coalition government. The Middle Classes 
Union, in particular, was prominent in the anti-waste agitation which helped to derail 
‘reconstruction’ and encourage ‘retrenchment’. Both organisations had a part in the 
development of anti-socialist alliances and pacts at local and national levels which 
contributed to Conservative electoral hegemony during the 1920s and beyond. Following 
the landslide Conservative general election victory of October 1924, which owed much to 
the wholesale employment of the type of violently anti-socialist propaganda the two 
organisations specialised in, Stanley Baldwin appointed a number of figures associated 
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with the anti-socialist right to government positions.564 While it is possible – as in the 
case of Sir Winston Churchill’s appointment as Chancellor of the Exchequer – that 
Baldwin was strapping potential trouble-makers in the straightjacket of collective 
ministerial responsibility, rather than endorsing their views, it necessarily follows that 
some concern must have existed that such figures possessed a support base within the 
party which could not simply be ignored.  
In the field of industrial relations, the MCU/NCU was the best-known and best-
organised of the various strike-breaking bodies which emerged to tackle the problem of 
‘direct action’ at the time; while the BEU was deeply involved in the project to instil pro-
capitalist doctrine in working-class minds. Although Baldwin certainly personified the 
novel double-edged strategy of dialogue and conciliation backed up by firmness and 
resolution, characteristic of Conservative dealings with the labour movement at this time, 
his stance did not represent any fundamental break with the position expressed 
contemporaneously by the organisations of the anti-socialist right. Indeed, ‘Industrial 
Peace’ had been a slogan of the BEU since at least 1920. Although BEU and NCU 
members expressed a level of concern at Baldwin’s alleged softness towards the unions, 
particularly following his opposition to the Macquisten anti-union Bill in March 1925, 
and his alleged climb-down on ‘Red Friday’ four months later, the government’s 
subsequent preparation for and defeat of the General Strike was largely interpreted in 
terms of the Prime Minister coming around to the point of view of the anti-socialist right, 
with what seemed spectacularly successful consequences.  
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It is important not to exaggerate the level of success or influence enjoyed by the 
BEU and NCU, however. The claims of the organisations regarding their impact on 
elections and industrial disputes should not be taken at face value. There was 
disappointment at the failure to gain Cabinet support for legislative attacks on socialism 
over discrete issues like the ‘Red’ Sunday schools. While the Conservative Party machine 
happily included the right’s brand of rabid anti-socialism in its general propaganda 
output, the parliamentary leadership – which occupied government office during the bulk 
of the period under discussion – was primarily inclined to utilise communism as a bogey 
during elections and at times of crisis. Calls by the right to ban the Communist Party of 
Great Britain and to outlaw the activities of associated bodies like the Communist Sunday 
Schools, the Minority Movement, and the National Unemployed Workers Movement, 
despite receiving widespread support among Conservative Party activists and backbench 
MPs, generally failed to move the government into decisive action. This changed 
somewhat in the run up to the General Strike of 1926; and particularly during its 
immediate aftermath, as the government appeared to give way to the right’s calls for 
retribution against those who had allegedly plotted and financed a revolutionary takeover 
using the coal dispute as a pretext. This was, however, a pyrrhic victory for the right’s 
propaganda and lobbying; and a false dawn for independent right-wing activism. The 
government’s ability to move against the Communist left with impunity resulted as much 
from the acute weakness of the CPGB and its sympathisers after the strike as from the 
pressure of the anti-socialist right. The Conservative Party machine had assimilated anti-
socialism so effectively that it undermined the ability of the anti-socialist right to attract 
funds and supporters on the back of fears of a movement clearly in a period of decline. 
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This point is made by Webber, who goes on to note that ‘[f]or most of those who disliked 
socialism there was simply no need to be more anti-socialist than the Conservative Party 
already was’.565  
The anti-socialist activism which characterised the mid-1920s, though still 
important to the make up of the BEU and NCU, began to lose its pre-eminence after 
1927; and other long-standing right-wing causes such as tariff reform came to the fore. 
This was particularly true after the debacle of the general election of 1929, when the 
perceived failure of negative anti-socialism – symbolised by the slogan ‘Safety First’ – 
intensified calls for ‘positive’ Conservative policies. Ultimately, Conservative 
willingness to exploit anti-socialism as part of its electoral and industrial strategy in the 
mid-1920s, combined with the collapse of any credible revolutionary socialist challenge 
after 1926, undermined the fortunes of the anti-socialist right. The subsequent decline of 
the NCU in the 1930s, the slow transformation of the BEU into a more passive imperial 
education and propaganda role by the 1940s and 50s, and the emergence of the Economic 
League as the primary organisation of British anti-subversive activism in the twentieth 
century can all be said to stem from this process. 
Many of the leading right-wing figures associated with Cowling’s ‘lunatic fringe’, 
including Henry Page Croft, John Gretton, and the Duke of Northumberland, backed 
Baldwin publicly on most matters throughout the 1920s, as did the BEU and NCU; 
although they reserved the right to press for a more ‘muscular’ Conservatism on a range 
of issues, including India, tariff reform and trade union law. This right-wing support for 
Baldwin’s alleged ‘centrist, liberal, conciliatory brand of politics’,566 has led to a level of 
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perplexity among some historians. Baldwin’s biographer, Philip Williamson, for instance, 
expresses surprise that Northumberland was not more critical of Baldwin’s leadership 
after 1922;567 while David Thackeray, echoing the view of Barbara Farr,568 suggests that 
the trajectory of Henry Page Croft in the 1920s was symptomatic of a process of 
moderation affecting some on the right.569 Thackeray describes Croft’s move away from 
the ‘radical’ experiment of the National Party, which espoused ‘patriot violence’ during 
the industrial strife of 1919; portraying him as a ‘relatively quiescent’ figure after 1922, 
committed to the parliamentary manoeuvring of the Empire Industries Association, and 
the work of the Primrose League, ‘a group associated more with tea-dances than violent 
street politics’. Such an interpretation is misleading in a number of important respects. 
Firstly, figures like Northumberland and Croft, both of whom were members of the BEU, 
cannot be said to have moderated their opinions to any significant degree during this 
period, particularly as regards their attitude to socialism.570 Secondly, it is a mistake to 
regard organisations like the Empire Industries Association and the Primrose League as 
quintessentially moderate Conservative bodies.571 Thackeray himself points to a more 
coherent explanation of this seeming inconsistency when he notes that this period 
witnessed ‘a significant overlap between moderate conservative and radical right 
identities’. He argues that this linkage only began to break down in the context of a 
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polarisation between fascism and conservatism in the 1930s. This thesis has explored this 
period of ‘significant overlap’ between ‘radicalism’ and ‘moderation’ which appears to 
have existed in 1920s Conservatism. This combination of allegedly contradictory 
political outlooks enabled the Conservative Party to dominate anti-socialist politics in 
Britain: its ‘moderation’ making it attractive to former Liberals concerned at the rise of 
the Labour Party and increased industrial militancy, its ‘radicalism’ simultaneously 
undercutting any serious challenge from fascism. The pressure groups of the anti-socialist 
right played an important role in this process. Although they wished to associate 
themselves with Mussolini’s triumph over socialism, they were fundamentally 
Conservative in their outlook and their actions. The investigation of the relationship 
between the British anti-socialist right and fascism in chapter four, added to the detailed 
description of the propaganda and activity of the British Empire Union and National 
Citizens Union in the preceding chapters, provides a substantial body of evidence to 
support this thesis. 
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